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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the dynamics of the Yugoslav conflict. Three factors 
stand out as especially important: ethnic nationalism, economic dislocation, and 
changes in the international security environment. Ethnic nationalism has been 
manifest in the competition for territory and political dominance among the Serbs, 
Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and others. This ethnic nationalism has centuries-old 
roots, but came to the fore in the 1980s, owing to the death of Tito in 1980 and 
the economic setbacks of the 1980s, which led to a search for scapegoats and 
intensified inter-ethnic mistrust and rivalry. The most important change in the 
security environment was the collapse of the Soviet Union, which helped to 
precipitate the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The Soviet threat was no longer 
present to unify the component nationalities of the Yugoslav federation and to 
oblige them to cooperate. The Yugoslav conflict may spread unless international 
security institutions such as NATO and the United Nations can devise solutions. 




Diese Diplomarbeit erkundet die Dynamik der Krise in Jugoslawien. Drei 
herausragende Ereignisse stehen hervor und sind besonders bedeutend: ethnisch 
verankerter Nationalismus, ökomischer Niedergang und die Veränderungen im 
Feld der international Sicherheitspolitik. Ethnisch verankerter Nationalismus wurde 
manifest beim Wettstreit um Landbesitz und politische Vorherrschaft unter den 
Serben, Kroaten, Bosniens Moslems und anderen. Ethnisch verankerter 
Nationalismus hat jahrhundertalte Wurzeln und kam erneut zum Vorschein in den 
Jahren nach 1980, zum einen Teil, weil Tito im Jahre 1980 starb, zum anderen 
Teil auf Grund der ökonomischen Mißwirtschaft der achtziger Jahre. Dies führte 
zur Suche nach Sündenböcken und verstärkte Mißgunst und Rivalität zwischen den 
Bevölkerungsgruppen. Die bedeutendste Veränderungen im Feld der international 
Sicherheitspolitik war der Zusammenbruch der Sowjet Union, welcher half, den 
Konflikt in ehemaligen Jugoslawien zu beschleunigen. Die Bedrohung durch die 
Sowiets stand nicht länger zur Verfügung, um die zusammengesetzten 
Nationalitäten der Jugoslawischen Föderation zu vereinen, und sie zur 
Zusammenarbeit zu verpflichten. Der Konflikt in Jugoslawien kann sich 
ausbreiten, wenn nicht internationale Sicherheits-Organisationen wie NATO und 
die Vereinten Nationen Lösungen formulieren können. Ihr Versagen beim 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
EXPLORING THE DYNAMICS OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS 
Gerald A. Möller — Commander SG, German Navy 
B.S., German Armed Forces University Munich, 1980 
Master of Arts in National Security Affairs — March 1995 
Co-Advisors: Donald Abenheim and David Yost, 
Department of National Security Affairs 
This thesis explores the dynamics of the Yugoslav conflict. Three factors 
stand out as especially important: ethnic nationalism, economic dislocation, and 
changes in the international security environment. Ethnic nationalism has been 
manifest in the competition for territory and political dominance among the Serbs, 
Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and others. This ethnic nationalism has centuries-old 
roots, but came to the fore in the 1980s, owing to the death of Tito in 1980 and the 
economic setbacks of the 1980s, which led to a search for scapegoats and intensified 
inter-ethnic mistrust and rivalry. The most important change in the security 
environment was the collapse of the Soviet Union, which helped to precipitate the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The Soviet threat was no longer present to unify 
the component nationalities of the Yugoslav federation and to oblige them to 
cooperate. The Yugoslav conflict may spread unless international security 
institutions such as NATO and the United Nations can devise solutions. Their failure 
in this effort to contain and resolve the conflict could set a dangerous example. 
An important continuity in Balkan history has been Serb nationalism, 
pursued by violence against other ethno-national groups in the Balkans. Historical 
analysis shows that the first Yugoslav state (1919-1941) failed, in part because it did 
not resolve the national question. In 1919 and again in 1945, the state of Yugoslavia 
was created on the basis of a political idea, with little cultural or historical content. 
On each occasion, the idea of a united Yugoslavia was imposed from above and 
conceived bureaucratically rather than democratically. On each occasion, Yugoslavia 
xv 
disintegrated over the national question. Serb-Croat antagonism remains at the core 
of today's hostilities. 
The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina has resulted in large part from Serbia's 
struggle to dominate what is left of the former Yugoslavia. The Serbs living in 
Bosnia and Croatia did not want to live in states that would separate them from 
Serbia proper. The Serbs declared a 'Serb Republic of the Krajina' (where in March 
1995 the Serbs occupy 30 percent of Croatia's territory) and a 'Serb Republic' 
(which holds 70 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina). In reaction to this 
Serb behavior the Croats living in Bosnia announced a 'Croatian Union of Herceg- 
Bosna.' This left only about 20 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina — a multi-ethnic state 
and former showcase of peaceful ethnic coexistence — for the Muslim population, 
landlocked and divided in six enclaves. The vital problem for Bosnia's President 
Alija Izetbegovic has been that the Muslims have virtually nothing to offer either the 
Croats or the Serbs. 
The limited interest of the superpowers - and especially the limited interest 
of the United States — in the fate of the former Yugoslavia forced European leaders 
to confront the Yugoslav problem. For several different reasons both the trans- 
Atlantic and the European regional security organizations failed to resolve the crisis 
and bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. The institutional settings were too weak 
to deal with the problem, and reflected the lack of political will of the member 
governments. The adaptation to the post-Cold War era had just begun. 
In the first six months of the crisis, in 1991, American, British and French 
diplomacy seemed to be fairly pro-Serb, whereas Germany was more sympathetic 
to Slovene and Croat claims. When the United Nations appeared on the scene in 
1992, mediation and dialogue with all parties became the official rule. Classic 
impartiality supported the status quo in occupied territory and thus hampered 
humanitarian aid to reach the victims. The nations acting together in global or 
regional security organizations ~ the U.N., CSCE/OSCE, E.C./EU, WEU and 
NATO ~ could only partially counterbalance with burden-sharing the challenges 
xvi 
raised by the Yugoslav crisis. This crisis has re-established the United Nations as the 
sole practicable international authority to mobilize military force for hazardous 
interventions abroad. Experience has also shown that the absence of U.S. leadership 
has undermined prospects for achieving the aims laid down in the United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions. 
The United States in spring 1995 is back on the scene, with the Clinton 
administration returning to its 1992 "lift-and-strike" proposal in a changed 
environment. The United States seizing the diplomatic initiative may encourage the 
United Nations to move more decisively towards re-establishing international order 
and preventing the aggressors from being rewarded. The March 1995 U.S. initiative 
to restore Croatian sovereignty to all parts of Croatia has presented Milosevic with 
an unexpected/a# accompli in Croatia. It is for the international community to join 
the initiative, to work out a solution for the minority status of twelve percent of the 
population, the "Serbian Croats" presently occupying 30 percent of Croatia's 
territory. 
The United Nations implementation of a revised Yugoslavia policy, with the 
United States taking the lead, might stop the Serbian attempt to dominate the region 
militarily. The United Nations could live up to its commitment to prevent and never 
again permit atrocities like those carried out during the Second World War. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 
DIE DYNAMIK DER KRISE IN JUGOSLAWIEN 
Gerald A. Möller —Fregattenkapitän, 
Bundesmarine der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Diplompädagoge, Bundeswehr Universität München, 1980 
Master of Arts in National Security Affairs — März 1995 
Diplomarbeitsbetreuer: 
Professor Dr. Donald Abenheim und Professor Dr. David Yost, 
Department of National Security Äff airs 
Diese Diplomarbeit erkundet die Dynamik der Krise in Jugoslawien. Drei 
herausragende Ereignisse stehen hervor und sind besonders bedeutend: ethnisch 
verankerter Nationalismus, ökomischer Niedergang und die Veränderungen im Feld 
der international Sicherheitspolitik. Ethnisch verankerter Nationalismus wurde 
manifest beim Wettstreit um Landbesitz und politische Vorherrschaft unter den 
Serben, Kroaten, Bosniens Moslems und anderen. Ethnisch verankerter 
Nationalismus hat jahrhundertalte Wurzeln und kam erneut zum Vorschein in den 
Jahren nach 1980, zum einen Teil, weil Tito im Jahre 1980 starb, zum anderen Teil 
auf Grund der ökonomischen Mißwirtschaft der achtziger Jahre. Dies führte zur 
Suche nach Sündenböcken und verstärkte Mißgunst und Rivalität zwischen den 
Bevölkerungsgruppen. Die bedeutendste Veränderungen im Feld der international 
Sicherheitspolitik war der Zusammenbruch der Sowiet Union, welcher half, den 
Konflikt in ehemaligen Jugoslawien zu beschleunigen. Die Bedrohung durch die 
Sowiets stand nicht länger zur Verfügung, um die zusammengesetzten Nationalitäten 
der Jugoslawischen Föderation zu vereinen, und sie zur Zusammenarbeit zu 
verpflichten. Der Konflikt in Jugoslawien kann sich ausbreiten, wenn nicht 
internationale Sicherheits-Organisationen wie NATO und die Vereinten Nationen 
Lösungen formulieren können. Ihr Versagen beim Bemühen den Konflikt 
einzugrenzen und zu lösen könnte ein gefährliches Beispiel setzen. 
Eine bedeutende Kontinuität in der Geschichte des Balkan ist der 
Nationalismus der Serben, das Streben der Serben nach einem serbischen 
Nationalstaat, das mit Gewalt verfolgt wird gegen die anderen ethnischen 
Nationalitätengruppierungen auf dem Balkan. Geschichtliche Analyse zeigt, daß der 
erste   jugoslawische   Staat   (1919-1941)   zerbrach,    zum   Teil   weil   er   die 
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Nationalitätenfrage nicht zu lösen vermochte. Im Jahre 1919 und nochmals im Jahre 
1945 wurde Jugoslawien als Staat auf der Grundlage einer politischen Idee 
geschaffen, mit wenig kultureller und geschichtlicher Stimmigkeit. Bei beiden 
Gelegenheiten, wurde die Idee eines Vereinigten Jugoslawien 'von oben verordnet' 
und dadurch eher bürokratisch als demokratisch wahrgenommen. Beidesmal 
zerbrach Jugoslawien an der Nationalitätenfrage. Der serbisch-kroatische Gegensatz 
verbleibt als der Kern der heutigen Feindseligkeiten. 
Der Konflikt in Bosnien-Herzegovina rührt zum großen Teil von den 
Serbien's Kampf her, das zu beherrschen, was vom ehemaligen Jugoslawien 
übergeblieben ist. Die in Bosnien und Kroatien lebenden Serben wollen nicht in 
Staaten leben, getrennt von einem Nationalstaat Serbien. Serben verkündeten eine 
"Serbische Republik Krajina", (wobei Serben im März 1995 dreißig Prozent vom 
Hoheitsgebiet von Kroatien besetzt halten), und eine "Serbische Republik", (die 
siebzig Prozent des Hoheitsgebiets von Bosnien-Herzegovina umfasst). Als Reaktion 
zum Vorgehen der Serben verkündeten die in Bosnien lebenden Kroaten eine 
"Kroatische Union von Herceg-Bosna". Dies läßt von Bosnien-Herzegovina -jenem 
Vielvölkerstaat und Schaufenster friedlichen Zusammenlebens — nur ganze zwanzig 
Prozent für die moslemische Bevölkerung übrig, umringt von Nachbarstaaten, ohne 
Adriahafen und auf sechs Enklaven verteüt. Das entscheidende Problem für 
Bosniens Präsidenten Alija Izetbegovic besteht seitdem darin, daß die Moslems 
weder den Kroaten noch den Serben irgendetwas anzubieten haben. 
Das begrenzte Interesse der Supermächte ~ und besonders das eingeschränkte 
Interesse der Vereinigten Staaten ~ am Schiksal des ehemaligen Jugoslawien zwang 
die europäischen Regierungschefs sich mit dem Problem Jugoslawien auseinander 
zu setzen. Aus mehreren verschiedenen Gründen verfehlten beide, die trans- 
atlantischen als auch die regionalen europäischen Sicherheitsorganisationen, die 
Krise zu lösen und Friede in das ehemalige Jugoslawien zu bringen. Die 
verfassungsmäßigen Grundlagen waren zu schwach ausgelegt, um das Problem 
aushandeln zu können, auch spiegelten sie den Mangel an politischer Bestimmtheit 
der Regierungen der Mitgliederstaaten wider. Die Anpassung an die Zeit nach dem 
kalten Krieg hatte gerade erst begonnen. 
In den ersten sechs Monaten der Krise, im Jahre 1991, erschienen die 
amerikanischen, britischen und französischen diplomatischen Bemühungen eher 
serbenfreundlich; während Deutschlands Sympathie eher mit den Slovenen und den 
xx 
Kroaten ging. Als die Vereinten Nationen im Jahre 1992 die Bühne betraten, wurden 
Vermittlung und Dialog mit allen Beteiligten die offizielle Norm. Klassische 
Unparteilichkeit unterstützte indes den status quo in den besetzten Gebieten, ihre 
Folgen hinderte humanitäre Hilfe daran, die Opfer zu erreichen. Mit der 
jugoslawischen Krise wurden Herausforderungen an die internationale 
Staatengemeinschaft gestellt, die Nationen, welche in weltweiten und regionalen 
Sicherheitsorganisationen zusammenarbeiten — den V.N., KSZE/OSZE, EG/EU, 
WEU und NATO —, nur teilweise durch Lastenteilung meistern und ausgleichen 
konnten. Die Krise in Jugoslawien hat die Vereinten Nationen als die einzige 
handlungsfähige überstaatliche Autorität wiederhergestellt, die in der Lage ist, 
Streitkräfte zu mobilisieren für gefährliche Einsätze weltweit. Die Erfahrung hat 
ebenfalls gelehrt, daß die Abwesenheit der Vereinigten Staaten in der Führungsrolle 
die Aussichten untergraben konnte, diejenigen Ziele zu erreichen, welche in den 
Verlautbarungen des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen niedergelegt wurden. 
Im Frühjahr 1995 kehrten die Vereingten Staaten auf die Bühne zurück, 
wobei sich die Clinton-Regierung ihrem Vorschlag von 1992 zugunsten "lift-and- 
strike" (d.h. Aufheben des Waffenembargos und chirurgische Aktionen durch die 
Luftwaffe) in veränderter Umgebung erneut zuwandte. Indem die Vereingten 
Staaten die Führung der diplomatischen Initiative an sich nehmen, vermögen sie die 
Vereinten Nationen zu ermutigen, bei der Wiederherstellung der internationalen 
Ordnung bestimmter voranzuschreiten und Angreifer davon abzuhalten, belohnt zu 
werden. Die amerikanische Initiative im März 1995, welche die Souveränität 
Kroatiens widerherzustellen soll für alle Gebiete ganz Kroatiens, hat Milosevic 
unerwartet in Kroatien vor vollendete Tatsachen gestellt. Es ist der internationalen 
Staatengemeinschaft anheim gestellt der Initiative zu folgen und an einer Lösung 
mitzuarbeiten für den Minderheitenschutz für diejenigen zwölf Prozent der 
Bevölkerung, die serbischen Kroaten, welche derzeit dreißig Prozent vom 
Hoheitsgebiet von Kroatien besetzt halten. 
Wenn die Vereinten Nationen eine überarbeitete Jugoslavien-Politik 
durchsetzen, angeführt von den Vereinigten Staaten, mag dies den Versuch Serbiens 
beenden, die Region militärisch zu beherrschen. Die Vereinten Nationen könnten 
dann zu ihrer Bestimmung aufleben, nie wieder Grausamkeiten gegen die 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: WHY AND HOW TO EXPLORE THE DYNAMICS OF 
THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS 
Yugoslavia's nightmare has been underway since mid-1991. 
The first great mistake of European and American diplomacy in the 
Yugoslav crisis was a failure to diagnose what had gone wrong. Or 
worse, and [Misha Glenny suspects] nearer the truth, they realized the 
country was breaking apart but considered the squabbles of a rather 
unappealing group of Balkan politicians to be insignificant when 
measured against the drama of the Gulf War and the rapid erosion of 
the Soviet Union. (President Bush's desire to prevent the latter was 
reflected in James Baker's demand in Belgrade that Yugoslavia 
remain whole.) The steady disintegration of Yugoslavia led to 
dramatic shifts in identity and consciousness among the peoples who 
lived there. This was one of the most terrible times in their history. As 
in a bad dream, they were being dragged into an inferno, aware of the 
fate awaiting them and unable to do anything about it.1 
This observation underscores the importance and relevance of exploring the 
dynamics of the Yugoslav crisis. This introduction to the thesis outlines the 
methodology and theories used to understand the events. The theories employed 
concern ethnic nationalism, economic decline and dislocation, and changes in the 
external security environment. The Balkans are analyzed as a region influenced by 
global and regional organizations for defense and collective security; and a historic 
overview of Yugoslavia's political development is provided. Finally, the purpose and 
the plan of this thesis are addressed. 
A. IMPORTANCE AND RELEVANCE 
This thesis argues that despite all the efforts already undertaken to bring the 
war to an end in the former Yugoslav federation, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
a solution acceptable to all parties has yet to be defined. It explores the dynamics 
of the Yugoslav conflict with a view to identifying possible solutions. This study is 
1
 Glenny, Misha, "Yugoslavia: The Great Fall" in: The New York Review of Books 
(New York, volume XLH, number 5, March 23, 1995), p. 56. 
important because the war of Yugoslav succession has already caused incalculable 
suffering and loss and could lead to a longer and wider war. The Balkan region is 
relevant because United States and Western interests are involved in the Bosnia 
conflict. The war is also relevant to Western Europe, because this conflict may 
spread and because internationally agreed commitments to human rights are being 
violated. The credibility of international security institutions such as NATO and the 
United Nations (UN) is at stake and their failure could set a dangerous precedence. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND THEORIES 
The methodology used is qualitative historical analysis, based on primary and 
secondary sources. Sources include books, periodicals, and scholarly journals on 
current events and Balkan history and about international relations theory. Daily 
newspapers and press releases are also incorporated. 
The theories useful in explaining the dynamics of the ongoing crisis concern 
ethnic nationalism, economic collapse and changes in the external security 
environment. 
In 1985 it became obvious that the cohesion of the Yugoslav Federation was 
breaking down. That cohesion had resulted from Tito's unique position vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union (the external security environment) and successful economic support 
by the West, which enabled the Yugoslav Communists to create relative prosperity 
in Yugoslavia compared to the rest of the Communist world. In order to stay in 
power Serbia's President Milosevic successfully recreated cohesion within his Serbian 
ethnic group through the use of ethnic nationalism. He revived the idea of a Greater 
Serbia. 
1.  Ethnic Nationalism 
Yugoslavia was never able to create Yugoslav nationalism. A Yugoslav 
identity as a basis for patriotism was never achieved, despite temporary purposeful 
close amalgations of the Yugoslav peoples of Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia and 
Macedonia. The separate peoples never forgot their national agendas. 
It is a well-known constant of political life that even slight differences 
in interregional economic standards may awaken sharp feelings of 
resentment that catalyze, where they coincide with ethnic divisions, 
surges of nationalism. Jealousy kindles collective affectivity and 
ethnocentric behavior, often resulting in violence and even civil war. 
The revived Serb nationalism provoked imitations: Croatia's President 
Tudjman created Croatism and Macedonia's President Gligorov turned towards the 
idea of a "Greater Macedonia." Serb, Croat and Macedonian nationalism are all 
examples of "hyper-nationalism", which Stephen van Evera.defmes as the 
glorification of one's national character, history, symbols, religion, 
etc, and of the rightness and legitimacy of one's case, while maligning 
the claims of others.3 
The leaders of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia (after 1989) 
embarked on nationalism because, as Kissinger wrote: 
...the ethnic splinters from disintegrating empires, such as the 
successor states of Yugoslavia ...are obsessed by historic grievances 
and age-old quests for identity, they strive primarily to prevail in 
ancient ethnic rivalries. The goal of international order is beyond their 
fields of interest and frequently behind their imagination.4 
This situation was only possible because of Yugoslavia's economic decline, 
which began in the early 1980s and accelerated in 1989. Adciitionally this situation 
was the result of the change in the external security setting, with the threat of the 
2
 Ramet, Sabrina P., Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia (Indianapolis, 
Indiana University Press, 1992), 2nd Ed., p. 136. 
3
 van Evera, Stephen, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War" in: 
International Security (1991), pp. 23-24. 
4
 Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 807. 
Soviet Union gone by 1991. Both events led to the breakdown of the allocation of 
responsibilities and powers in the federal system of Yugoslavia. 
2.  Economic Decline and Dislocation 
The federal units, administrative areas created by Tito, were economically 
very different developed. With regard to these interregional inequalities, Sabrina 
Ramet writes that, 
...the policy of aid to the underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia 
was viewed by the Tito regime and the Titoists who ruled Yugoslavia 
after his death from 1980 to 1987, as the key to eliminate the 
nationalities question altogether. 
...Alternatively, the failure to ease interregional inequalities, it 
was argued, 'would threaten the integrity of the Yugoslav community 
and throw into question the common interest of all its regions and 
nationalities'.5 
After the failure of numerous five-year and one-year plans a common fund 
was raised to foster development. In 
February 1965, the federal Assembly passed a bill creating the Federal 
Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped 
Republics and Kosovo (FADURK)....The fund was to be financed by 
a 1.85 percent tax on the social product, to be paid by all federal 
units....Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo were declared 
eligible for assistance under the new program.6 
The controversy between the republics about where to invest the money led 
to polemics instead of encouraging development. 
The trick of Yugoslav federalism - if it is to work — must be to 
accomplish the Madisonian feat and so arrange the political order that 
5
 Ramet, Sabrina P., Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1992, p. 137. 
6
 Ramet, Sabrina P., Ibid, 1992, p. 150. 
the outcome of interrepublican debate is the same as it would have 
been had the republics been seeking the Yugoslav general interest.7 
However, beginning in the 1980's (shortly after Tito's death in 1980) the 
federal units pursued their own individual interests - consistently and as a matter 
of policy. The units were motivated by exclusive interests, and they pursued these 
interests whenever they had the opportunity. In the period from 1984 until 1990 
rigorous efforts were undertaken by the republics and by the government to stabilize 
the economy. Ramet writes that 
It used to be axiomatic that the more developed republics favored 
economic liberalization and decentralization and the less developed 
republics favored economic centralism and the maintenance of 
centrally controlled state funding. By the mid-1980s, first Slovenia, 
then Croatia, and finally economic liberals in all the republics came 
around to the idea that the return to private enterprise was necessary 
and inevitable if there was to be any substantial economic recovery.8 
The effects of the decline of the economy reached the underdeveloped poorer 
southern republics first, but the developed republics had also to face hunger and 
poverty. 
The Yugoslav economy, which had seemed promising and even 
resilient in the mid-1970s, was in deep trouble by the late 1980s. In 
Zagreb, capital of the 'developed' republic of Croatia, some five 
thousand households were functioning without electricity as of 1989 
because the families could not afford to pay for power. Moreover, as 
economic conditions deteriorated, economic crime increased. In the 
first eight month of 1989, Croatia alone registered a record of 37,000 
crimes, most of them involving theft or embezzlement. Wracked by 
problems of economic insolvency, foreign debt, unemployment and 
7
 Ramet, Sabrina P., Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1992, p. 174. 
8
 Ramet, Sabrina P., Ibid, p. 174. 
inflation, the Yugoslav economy was further strained, in 1987, by an 
especially widespread rash of strikes, some of them protesting a 
national wage freeze decreed by federal prime minister Branko 
Miculic...Conditions became so bad that on August 20, 1989, some 
30,000 citizens -mostly local Montenegrins — demonstrated in Niksic 
to protest their hunger and poverty.9 
After nationalization in 1946 and collectivization in 1952, the still-communist 
Yugoslavia supported decentralization on a limited scale as early as in 1952. For 
Yugoslavia as a whole in 1971 decentralization and de-collectivization included the 
"triplex depolarization" program, consisting of "de-etatization", decentralization and 
democratization. In 1989 Belgrade was ready to even consider re-privatization. 
By June 1989, [the official Yugoslav newspaper] Borba was calling 
reprivatization 'the last chance for socialism' - a claim not without 
irony. And the election of noncommunist governments in Slovenia, 
Croatia, Macedonia, and in Bosnia in 1990, the process of 
reprivatization quickened....By September 1990, more than 30,000 
private companies were operating in Yugoslavia.10 
For Milosevic the ruined economy immediately required the naming of scape- 
goats and in a first step all the non-Serb elements of the federal presidency had to 
be blamed. Later on he purged what remained of the Communist party of any 
people not loyal to his form of nationalism. 
3.  Changes in the External Security Environment 
With the break-up of the Soviet Union the external threat to Yugoslavia was 
gradually reduced, and it almost disappeared in 1991. 
For Gorbatchev the trio of new commitments — to political change, 
against the use of the Soviet army as a safety net for other Communist 
regimes in trouble in their own countries, and against imposing 
compulsary emulation of Soviet processes elsewhere — formed one 
9
 Ramet, Sabrina P., Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1992, p. 174. 
10
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aspect of his strenuous effort to end the Cold War and erase the 
Soviet Union's image in Western eyes as an expansionist, militarist, 
aggressive, imperialist 'evil empire'. For most East Central European 
Communist regimes, it tolled doom.11 
The glue that kept the Yugoslav federation together was opposing a possible 
invasion by the Soviet Union. This was completely gone in 1991 and with it the 
support for cohesion within the federal state. This contributed to the breakdown of 
the allocation of powers and responsibilities in the federal system. 
C.  THE BALKAN REGION 
Cathal J. Nolan has offered the following definitions of the Balkans and the 
Balkan states'. 
Balkans'. The region below the Danube, surrounded by the Adriatic, 
Aegean, Ionian and Black Seas, and containing the Balkan states. 
Balkan states: The states occupying the Balkan Peninsula of southern 
Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, the European portion 
of Turkey and Yugoslavia — since 1991 broken into successor states of 
Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia (and 
counting).12 
It is not solely the uniqueness of the physical geography of the Balkans that 
has given them notoriety. It is the overall propensity of the region's population to 
form antagonisms along numerous fault lines. Today, the Muslim and Christian 
religions, and the divisions between Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic 
believers, create complex internal structures. All of these groups believe in distinct 
ethnicities — Slovene, Croat, Serb, Bosnian, Macedonian or Albanian. Beyond these 
major groups, the population is further divided into ethnic splinters like the Sunni 
11
 Rothschild, Joseph, Return to Diversity (New York, Oxford University Press, 
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Gegs (the same ethnic Albanians as live in Kosovo) and the Bektashi Tosks13. 
Further segregation is based on language families and dialects. Finally, the Serbo- 
Croat language can be written by Croats in Latin and by Serbs in Cyrillic letters. 
"Balkanisation"14 in the Balkans seems always to take place when the power 
of subjugating force has faded. With the Cold War gone, the strategic importance 
of the Balkans has gone as well. The Balkans, especially Yugoslavia, first politically 
and then militarily faded in significance as the Soviet Union disintegrated. The 
Balkans are no longer considered an important European sub-region in the strategic 
analyses of many external observers. Mathias Jopp, a research fellow at the Institute 
for Security Studies of the WEU, argues nonetheless that today's war in the Balkans 
has important implications for Western Europe's future security policy development. 
He writes that 
[t]he Yugoslav crisis, for which the West Europeans have been 
attempting to find a solution since its outbreak, has become the 
bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Second World War, a drama for 
the peoples concerned and a threat to the stability and security of all 
the Balkans. But its implications go far beyond sub-regional effects...it 
has influenced the restructuring of post-Cold War security relations 
and has complicated Western Europe's development of a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and search for a new role in 
international affairs.15 
It seems likely that the Yugoslav crisis will have enduring effects on the 
framing of a common European security and defence policy. European integration 
13
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(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 3. 
14
 Nolan writes that to "balkanize [means] to divide a country or region into 
small, ineffective and quarrelsome states, such as those in the Balkans." Nolan, 
CathalJ., The Longman Guide to World Affairs (New York, Longman, 1994), p. 29. 
15
 Jopp, Mathias (Ed.), The implications of the Yugoslav crisis for Western 
Europe's foreign relations (Paris, Institute for Security Studies WEU, 1994) Chaillot 
Papers 17, p. 1. 
has slowed since Maastricht. The involvement of the European Union and the 
Western European Union in the Yugoslav war again may hinder the development 
of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
D. HISTORIC OVERVIEW ON YUGOSLAVIA 
Slavic tribes arrived in the Balkans during the sixth century and settled in 
the area which later formed the territory of the state of Yugoslavia. These tribes 
were autonomous units until the Turks began to expand the Ottoman Empire during 
the twelfth century. None of the medieval Christian kingdoms in the Balkans could 
resist the Muslim Turks and one after the other was conquered: Macedonia in 1371, 
Serbia in 1389 first and finally in 1521, Bosnia in 1463, Albania in several steps 
between 1463 and 1479, Croatia in 1541. 
The Southern Slavs -- »juzni slaveni" or "jugoslaveni" ~ had been living in 
Christian kingdoms, however divided by Catholic or Orthodox faith. Once 
conquered by the Muslim Turks, the dividing line between the jurisdiction of 
Christian powers and the Muslim Ottoman empire reinforced the earlier division as 
a major cultural divide. During the period of the rise and decline of the Ottoman 
empire and again during World War H the Southern Slavs were ruled by various 
foreign powers, including Turks, Venetians, Hungarians, Austrians, Italians and 
Germans. 
World War I began shortly after the assassination of the heir apparent to the 
throne of Austria-Hungary, who was killed in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, by a 
Bosnian student. As one result of World War I the Southern Slavs were brought into 
a common state: people who saw themselves in 1918 as Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, or 
Montenegrins lived together with non-Slavic peoples such as Hungarians, Austrians, 
Germans, Italians and Albanians in close proximity to Slavic Bulgarians and Greek 
Macedonians. 
The inter-war "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croatians and Slovenians» tried to 
solve the so-called national question by down-playing the differences among its Slavic 
peoples or even by denying the differences. The government also changed the name 
of the state to the «Kingdom of Yugoslavia" in 1929, hoping in this way to create 
loyalty towards »Yugoslavia" and to enforce a "Yugoslav" identity. 
Political loyalty to the state had to be insured after the Second World War. 
Tito, the head of Yugoslavia's postwar communist regime, created within the 
federation of Yugoslavia along ethnic lines the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, 
Montenegro andMacedonia. The ethnic and religious heterogeneity of the population 
of the Vojvodina (which today includes 400,000 Hungarians) and especially of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina made the Communist party hesitate. The Vojvodina became an 
autonomous province and Bosnia-Herzegovina became a republic where Serbs, 
Croats and Muslims were declared to have equal rights. The southern part of 
Yugoslavia, given to Albania during Yugoslavia's occupation during the Second 
World War,  was reconquered by Tito's partisans. Despite its predominantly 
Albanian population, it became the second autonomous province, called Kosovo- 
Metohija. 
Tito's Yugoslavia began as a centralized state of the Stalinist model, but after 
1952 became a federation comparable to Lenin's early communist state. 
Decentralization should have granted the representatives of the six republics and two 
autonomous regions an opportunity to become spokesmen for their nationalities. 
The collective leadership, created by Tito, was able to limit the influence a 
single nationality could achieve during Tito's rule through May 1980. The 
autonomous regions as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina never achieved true 
representation, free of Serbian influence. 
After Tito's death, the collective leadership intended to follow "Tito's path" 
to avoid a break-up of Yugoslavia. However, the increasing economic deterioration 
of Yugoslavia could not be avoided; and the federal balance, the distribution of 
power between the federation and the federal units, was blamed for the collapse. 
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The Communist party, which was still in control of Yugoslavia, could not 
achieve a consensus on how to ease the economic problems, ^either by change or 
continuity in the power structure or by enforcing or preventing decentralization. 
In March 1981, in Yugoslavia's poorest region, Kosovo, students at the 
University of Prishtina protested for freedom of the press, for equal rights for ethnic 
groups (particularly for the same rights to job access for Albanians in Kosovo 
compared to Montenegrins and Serbs), and for the status of a republic. In April the 
student demonstrations spread all over Kosovo, and violence exploded. The 
Yugoslav army occupied Kosovo, reestablishing order. This was the first open 
outbreak of interethnic tension leading to violence in post-Tito Yugoslavia. 
During the following years the Slovenian and Croat leaders pushed for 
economic reforms to transform Yugoslavia into a true federation, whereas Serbia 
tried to eliminate the autonomous regions. Free elections were held in the spring of 
1990 in Slovenia and Croatia, and the parties openly discussed possible secession 
from Yugoslavia if reforms failed. In Kosovo, Vojvodina, Serbia and Montenegro 
the Communist party representatives closed ranks and controlled four of eight (50 
percent) of the votes of the collective presidency, thus enabling Milosevic to block 
every reform attempt should Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia vote together with 
Slovenia and Croatia. 
In the summer of 1990 the Serb "uprising" in Croatia started the war of 
Yugoslav secession, which became a fuU scale war in the summer of 1991. Serbia 
with its satellites Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro formed rump-Yugoslavia, the 
"Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (SFRY), later renamed the "Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia" (FRY). In June 1991 the Yugoslav People's Army attacked 
Slovenia. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia in July 
1991, and received their recognition in spring 1992. Macedonia left Yugoslavia in 
1992 and received recognition, currently backed up by UN peacekeepers monitoring 
its Yugoslav frontier. Bosnia-Herzegovina's republic-wide referendum to decide its 
status within the Yugoslav federation in April 1992 led to Bosnia's declaration of 
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independence and to a secession war in which the Bosnian Serbs have so far 
occupied 70 percent of the territory. 
Since then, numerous cease-fires have been negotiated, approved and 
violated. Peace plans and peace conferences have been executed, and international 
and regional security organizations have contributed efforts to reestablish peace 
without ending the war. Over 40,000 peacekeepers are deployed in the region, with 
23,000 forming the United Nations Protection Forces Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). 
15,000 peacekeepers are in Croatia, where they hold the ring between the Serbs and 
the Croats in Krajina. The Serbs hold one-third of Croatia's territory. 
A United Nations Security Council resolution approved in September 1994 
calls for an end to any political dialogue with the Serbs until they accept the Contact 
Group Peace Plan. Despite this, the American Ambassador to Bosnia, Mr. Victor 
Jankevich, finds the Serbs' ability to set the agenda in Bosnia excruciating and the 
Clinton Administration's reluctance to use even mild force to back up diplomacy 
dismaying16. In December 1994 even former U.S. President Jimmy Carter - clearly 
acting for the Administration - was engaged in the shuttle diplomacy between Pale 
and Sarajevo which led to the current cease-fire. Thus the United States, in a sharp 
reversal of policy, has now taken the lead in talks with the Serbs. 
Despite all the failed efforts previously undertaken in order to bring the war 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina to an end, a solution for a durable peace acceptable to all the 
parties must be developed. Understanding the dynamics of the Yugoslav conflict is 
a necessary first step to contributing to a viable solution. A settlement for this 
conflict is crucial because its continuation may well challenge the stability of Europe. 
16
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At present, this war involves the states of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
the rump-Yugoslavia and the religious and ethnic groups of Bosnian Muslims, Serbs 
and Croats therein. Neighboring countries run the risk that the conflict will spread 
into their territory. Because the United Nations agreed to enforce an embargo on the 
former Yugoslavia, some nations have suffered major economic losses caused by 
trade deficits. Moreover, the number of refugees leaving the former Yugoslavia 
without intending to return as long as the war continues, surpasses the capacity of 
neighboring countries to accept them without financial and political complications. 
The Balkan region is relevant because U.S. and Allied interests are involved 
in the solution of the Bosnian conflict. U.S. troops act on behalf of the United 
Nations in Macedonia, U.S. aircraft support Operation Deny Flight and U.S. ships 
participated until November 1994 in Operation Sharp Guard. U.S. disengagement 
certainly could set a dangerous precedent. The international commitments imposed 
by the United Nations could no longer be honored because U.S. allies - like NATO 
acting as an executive arm of the UN - seem to need U.S. support to achieve credible 
deterrence. 
Moreover, internationally agreed upon commitments to human rights have 
been violated by the belligerent parties and this cannot be accepted, because the 
credibility of international security institutions is at stake. 
E.  PURPOSE AND PLAN 
This thesis explores the dynamics of the Yugoslav conflict. The Serbs have 
always wanted to fulfill their national ambitions; and since 1991 they have found 
international conditions more favorable to this end than for well over a thousand 
years. The present sponsor of this revived Serb nationalism is Slobodan Milosevic. 
For the Serbs the emphasis on ethnicity and nationalism represents a return to an 
accepted value system, with significant historical roots. Serb nationalism was also 
manifest after the defeat of the occupying Third Reich, after the defeat of Austria- 
Hungary and during the decline of the Ottoman empire. 
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Chapter II of this thesis deals with the history of the Balkans, with special 
attention to the history of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Albania and the creation of the 
myth of the quest for a Greater Serbia. 
Chapter m deals with Communist Yugoslavia and how Tito dealt with its 
multiethnic population. Multiethnicity became Tito's justification for a federal 
system in which ethnic and republic boundaries coincided. The federal government, 
the six republics and the two autonomous regions built the nine-actor balance-of- 
power system between 1960 until 1989. 
Chapter IV analyzes how Slobodan Milosevic successfully dismantled Tito's 
constitutional heritage to win Serb control over Yugoslavia and thereby may have 
lost the opportunity to build a Greater Serbia which would allow all Serbs to live in 
one state. It also deals with the other major internal dynamics at work during the 
break-up of Yugoslavia: Tudjman's Croatism, Kucan's Slovenia and Gligorov's 
Great Macedonia. 
Chapter V explores how the collective security system reacted, and how the 
regional security systems failed to stop the war. It highlights the stands of the United 
States, Great Britain, France and Germany and explains the absence of a major 
military intervention. The reluctance of the Western powers to end the conflict by 
force may be explained by various factors, notably the judgement that the financial 
costs or casualties would outweigh any gains and the fear that the Russians would 
see a provocation and might side with Serbia. 
Chapter VI provides analysis and synthesis. Findings are offered regarding 
the decisive causes for the fighting and the permissive factors, including the 
reluctance of the outside powers to impose a peace by diplomacy, by force or by 
coercion so far. 
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H. HISTORY OF THE BALKANS 
A.     BALKAN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY 
Today's political geography includes five entities which earlier formed the 
Yugoslav Federation. These are, from north to south: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzigovina17, Serbia and Montenegro, and Macedonia. The Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia was founded after the Second World War (29 November 
1945), was politically organized into six provinces and two autonomous areas, and 
lasted until June 1991. The federal units were known as Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzigovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, plus the two autonomous 
areas of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Besides Serbia with its two autonomous provinces 
and Macedonia, every republic of the former Yugoslavia had access to the Adriatic 
coast. When the Cold War was over and the Soviet Union no longer existed, the 
international security incentives to remain united within a Socialist Yugoslav 
Federation also came to an end. The Yugoslavia of 1945 - 1991 was situated on the 
edge of the Soviet sphere, and fell apart when the Soviet empire crumbled. The 
struggle for the Yugoslav succession has created the present crisis in the Balkans. 
1. Unbroken Continuity: Geography 
Physical geography seems to be the only unbroken continuity in the Balkans. 
The political landscape throughout recorded history has been either eruptive, like 
an active volcano, or (during periods when an overwhelming dominating power 
controlled everything) as silent as a churchyard. Once Soviet power had diminished, 
the centrifugal forces became preponderant, especially in Slovenia, Croatia and 
Macedonia. As the geography of power does not allow for any vacuums, the Serbs 
felt the need to fill that vacuum. The Serbs, in a first step, annexed Kosovo and the 
17
 Except for citations, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in this paper will 
be called Bosnia-Herzegovina. In newspapers since 1992 "Bosnia" and "Bosnian" 
have been used to stand for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzigovina. 
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Vojvodina areas. Both lost the status of autonomy. Today Kosovo and the Vojvodina 
are part of Serbia, and together with Montenegro, form what is called the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) or "Rump-Yugoslavia." 
Inside the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzigovina18 it seems 
that the struggle between (a) the centrifugal forces fighting for a sovereign and 
multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzigovina and (b) the centripetal Serbian forces contending 
for a greater Serbia provides evidence about the prevailing tensions which need to 
be relaxed before a new eruption engulfs the Balkans as a whole. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is landlocked a fact which aggravates the situation with 
respect to direct outside accessibility.19 The "Rump-Yugoslavia" has some ports on 
Montenegrin soil on the Adriatic coast, but these ports are subject to the United 
Nations embargo. All the other neighbors of the former Yugoslavia, besides Austria 
and Hungary, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) have sea 
access - either to the Mediterranean Sea or (in the case of Bulgaria and Romania) 
the Black Sea. 
2. Discontinuity in Political Geography 
The last occupying power (Germany) and the liberating power (Russia, then 
the Soviet Union) no longer have common frontiers with today's belligerent parties 
in the Balkans. The former Yugoslavia's physical access to Germany is restricted by 
Austria, Switzerland and Italy. Russia is hidden behind the former "cordon 
sanitaire" of Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. Turkey was neutral during the Second 
World War and has a common frontier with Bulgaria and Greece. Italy, adjoins 
Slovenia. 
18
 Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence and received recognition of its 
sovereignty by the United Nations in 1992. 
19
 Plans existed for Bosnia-Herzigovina to have an Adriatic port, perhaps 
through a corridor access solution through Croatia. 
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However extensive the boundaries of Serbia, no direct frontiers will be 
established with countries that were formerly eager to establish direct or hegemonial 
influence in the Balkans, such as Habsburg-Austria-Hungary, Hitler's Germany, 
Tsarist and Soviet-Russia, Mussolini's Italy and Ottoman Turkey. 
History suits as a prerequisite for understanding the turmoil in the Balkans 
and facilitates exploring the dynamics of the Yugoslav crisis. The Balkan situation 
has changed throughout history. A historical evaluation contributes to understanding 
the present crisis in the Balkans. This historical analysis examines continuities and 
discontinuities in politics and culture. Breaks in continuity resulted from 
personalities and ideas. These ideas influenced this part of the world and shaped the 
behavior of its population. 
B.  HISTORY OF THE BALKANS 400 - 1826 
The historical period examined in this analysis begins with the barbaric 
migrations to the Balkans. The history of the Balkans is pursued through a selection 
of major events influencing the Balkan peoples until 1995. For this purpose the 
epochs covered are divided into six periods. The first four periods are discussed in 
this chapter. 
The first period includes the settlement of the migrating tribes in the fifth 
century, the spread of medieval Christianity, and the expansion of the Muslim 
crescent by the Turks. It also saw the rise of the Ottoman Empire, the ambitious 
Habsburgs20 desire for hegemony, Napoleon and the Vienna peace settlement of 
1815. 
The second period considers the different ideas about Europe which in the 
19th century led to a system stabilized by a balance of power. 
20
 Two spellings of the Habsburg dynasty exist: Hapsburg and Habsburg. The 
latter version was used by the Habsburgs themselves and will be used throughout 
this thesis, except for citations. 
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The third period deals with the post-Vienna era, including the Crimean War, 
when the equilibrium was lost and badly reestablished, and the Berlin Congress of 
1878. With Pan-Slavism materializing the Great Serbian dream became manifest, 
and finally the rise of nationalism dominated Europe. The First World War broke 
out when Serb nationalists forced their agenda onto Bosnia-Herzegovina by 
assassinating the heir to the Habsburg throne. 
The fourth period covers the First World War and the inter-war period until 
1939. 
The Yugoslav Civil War, the Second World War and Tito's Yugoslavia are 
discussed in the next chapter. The ten years since 1985, which included the ascension 
to power of Serbia's present ruler, Slobodan Milosevic, are dealt with in Chapter 
IV. 
1. History of the Balkans 400 - 1453: From the Barbaric Migration to the 
Early Middle-Ages 
With the demise of the Roman Empire during the period of the Barbarian 
Migration (375-568), some migrating tribes in the 5th century finally settled in the 
Balkans. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia derived their names from these tribes: 
Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians and Serbs. 
Other migrating tribes passed through the area, arrived and vanished, as did 
Attila's central Asian Huns, and contributed to the final defeat of the Western 
Roman Empire in 375 AD. Again invading out of Asia'a steppes, Gengis-Khan's 
Asian Horde devastated Europe in the 12th century and contributed to the further 
decline of the Eastern Roman Empire. 
Other Hun tribes continued to migrate during the 10th century and ravaged 
Europe. Some finally settled in the plains north of the mountainous forested areas 
of the Balkans and became known as the Hungarians. For the Balkans the Slavs 
became important: 
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The Slavs21, a major branch of the Indo-European family of peoples, 
originally lived in the Pripet Marches. The area settled by Slavs later 
included parts of Poland, White Russia and the Ukraine. During the 
early centuries the history of the Slavs was connected with that of the 
Germans (Goths), Huns, Alani and Turkomans....From the 6th 
century Byzantine writers spoke of the Sklavenoi, placing them along 
the Lower Danube, but also in the Eastern Alps....Groupings of Slav 
tribes: The Eastern Slavs (Russians subdivided later into Ukrainians, 
White and Great Russians),the Western Slavs (Poles, Pomerani, 
Abodrites, Sorbs, Czechs and Slovaks), and the Southern Slavs 
(Slovenes, Serbs, Croats and Bulgars).The unity of the Slavic World 
was disrupted by German colonization in the Danubian area and the 
Eastern Alps after the destruction of the Avar kingdom and by the 
migration of the Magyars to the Hungarian plains.22 
The year 650 marks the approximate date of the completion of the Slav 
occupation of the Balkan area. 
Part of the Slav people extended as far west as Carniola and 
Carinthia, but these [the Slovenes] were conquered by the Franks in 
the early 9th century and were thenceforth part of the German 
Empire.23 
The Croats had been conquered in the same campaign as the Slovenes by the 
Franks, but revolted in 818 and were again subdued. 
In 924 Tomislav became King of Croatia, accepting his crown from 
the pope. He ruled over later-day Croatia and over a territory as far 
south as Montenegro....In 1102 Croatia was joined with Hungary in 
a dynastic union, after the defeat of the last ruler, Petar, by King 
21 (Slovene from slovo = the word) 
22
 Kinder, Hermann and Hilgemann, Werner,  The Anchor Atlas of World 
History, (New York, Anchor Books Doubleday, Penguin Books, 1974), p. 111. 
23
 Langer, William L., An Encyclopedia of World History (Boston, Massachusetts, 
Houghton Mifflin Co, 1980), p. 264. 
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Ladislav. This involved the definitive victory of the western orientation 
in Croatia and the separation from other southern Slavs.24 
This early alignment of Slovenes and Croats to the Western European 
civilization and the Roman Catholic faith had stayed unchanged to this day. 
The Serbs inhabited the mountainous areas of the Balkans and were 
organized in clans and tribes. In 960 occurred the 
death of Chaslav, who had made the first effort to unite the 
Serbs....Technically the territory was under Byzantine suzerainity, 
which when the Eastern Empire was strong, was effectively exercised. 
By the end of the 10th century the inhabitants of present-day Serbia 
and eastern Bosnia had for the most part accepted eastern 
Christianity, while western Bosnia and Croatia leaned toward Roman 
Catholicism. But the conflict of the churches drew the southern Slavs 
this way and that, becoming frequently an important political as well 
as religious issue.25 
The Southern Slavs were already separated by political lines and religious 
orientations which marked the fault lines along which the fractures would follow, 
leading to violence and war. 
North of the Balkans settled the Hungarians, organized in various tribes of 
which the Magyar was the leading one. In 906 they destroyed the rising Slavic 
kingdom of Moravia. Some fifty years later they were defeated by Emperor Otto in 
the Battle of Augsburg in 955. They settled, established frontiers, and were defeated 
by the Great Mongol Invasion in 1241. King Bela and his army had to flee to the 
Adriatic. The Mongols pursued him but turned away when the news of the death of 
the Great Khan reached them.  The Mongols devastated Hungary and left. 
24
 Langer, William L., An Encyclopedia of World History, p. 265. 
25
 Langer, William L., Ibid, p. 265. 
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Immediately Frederick of Austria took advantage of the situation and appropriated 
some of Hungary's western provinces. While Bela defeated Frederick of Austria, the 
last of the Babenbergs, Ottokar n, expanded his Kingdom of Bohemia. This led 
Ladislas IV, Hungary's King from 1270 until 1290, into an alliance with Austria's 
King Rudolf of Habsburg; and together they succeeded in breaking Ottokar's power 
in 1278, and Bohemia and Moravia became Imperial Estates in 1306. 
During the early Middle Ages numerous former Slav states had already been 
absorbed into larger political entities. Slovenia in the 9th century became linked to 
the German Empire. The western Slav tribe of the Czechs settled in Bohemia and 
Moravia and built powerful kingdoms. Both in 1306, today forming the Czech 
Republic, became German Imperial Estates. Hungary, closely linked to Croatia since 
1102, was leaning towards the German Empire and willing to form alliances with 
Austria, ruled by the Habsburgs since 1270. The scene for serious events to come 
is was already set. 
In Anatolia in 1061 the Turks arrived, migrating out of Baktria into an area 
shared between Greek and Kurd settlers and nomads. The Turks spread throughout 
the next centuries into the Arab areas of the Arab peninsula. The Turks used their 
triumph over the subdued states to spread Mohammed's teachings and subsequently 
conquered the littoral of Asia Minor, the Holy Land, and Egypt, and pressed on in 
North Africa to conquer almost all of Spain. They invaded Europe through the 
Balkans. 
2. History of the Balkans: Rise of Islam 1389 - 1453 
May 29,1453, is still of as much importance today as it was some 500 years 
ago. On his day, the Ottoman Sultan Mohammed H converted the largest church of 
Christianity, the Hagia Sophia, into a Mosque. Mohammed H became "Mehmet", 
"The Conqueror", as he turned Constantinople (Greek for Constantin [founded] 
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City) into Istanbul26and put an end to the Byzantine Empire. Anecdotes state that 
Mehmet allowed Emperor Constantin XI to die on duty, defending his city. This 
violent end of the Byzantine epoch, during which European culture based on Roman 
and Greek heritage and Christian faith had prospered, definitively marked the 
beginning of the Greek-Turk antagonism27 
3.  The Rise of the Ottomans: Defeat of Christianity at the Two Kosovos, 
1389 and 1448 
The Fall of Constantinople in 1453 was not only a shock to Christianity but 
an achievement reflecting Muslim fighting superiority. It marked the establishment 
of Turkish power. The Ottoman Islamic Empire now began consolidating its 
domains. It is regarded as a short stop in Ottoman expansionism before three 
generations later the Turks arrived in front of Vienna - the Habsburg capital - in 
1529. This event mobilized all of Christendom. 
Neither Europe nor the Austrians still celebrate the defense of Christianity, 
which was to be their final victory. However, in another Ottoman campaign in the 
Balkans, led by Sultan Murat, "the [by God/Allah] Wanted" in 1389 is still yearly 
celebrated by the Serbs on June 28, as the Saint-Veits-Day. The total defeat of the 
south Slav-Serbian army commanded by Lazar I. Hrebeljanovic in an area called 
"Kosovo"28 in Serbo-Croatian is annually remembered. 
Kosovo for a second time became of interest when Sultan Murat the Second, 
during another stop on his Balkan campaign on October 19, 1448, finally defeated 
26
 (phonetic: eesh-tarnn-bull means in greek: in we go and turkish/arabic: here- 
we-are) 
27
 At this very moment 1,235 UN peace-keepers for roughly $ 47 million (annual 
cost) keep Greek-speaking Cypriots away from Turkish-speaking Cypriots. Turkey 
and Greece are both members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
28
 Kosovo means "blackbird field", or German "Amselfeld." 
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the Hungarian Johann Hunyadi, who commanded the Christian Hungarian-Polish 
army of Poland's King Wladislaw.29 
The same Murat conquered the Greek port of Saloniki30 on the Balkans 
from the Venetians, thus controlling the shipping from and to the Bosporus. Many 
Mediterranean islands, such as Corfu, Crete, Rhodes, and Cyprus, had fortified 
ports with huge Venetian fortresses protecting the sea lines of communication to the 
Orient from the Adriatic through the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, where 
the Turkish hegemony blocked trade and shipping. Numerous crusades were 
undertaken to loosen this economic constraint. Murat H found his final resting place 
in the year 1489 in the marvelous mosque in Hadrianopolis.31 Adrianopolis was the 
Ottoman capital before Istanbul, which Murat the First had conquered 90 years 
earlier. 
4.  Consolidation and Decline of the Ottomans 
The Ottoman Empire lived through the classic four periods of all Great 
Powers32 — its rise (1071-1453), its consolidation and achievement of Great Power 
status (1453-1699), its decline and end (1700-1923), finally its survivor's 
consolidation (1924-today). 
29
 The myth of Kosovo is an important element in Serbia's arsenal of polito- 
historical symbolism. In 1989 the 600th anniversary was extensively used by 
Milosevic. 
30
 The Saloniki of the Bible or today's Thessalonike is the second largest city of 
Greece and capital of the Greek region of Macedonia. In the Balkan region it is the 
most important Mediterranean port accessible immediately outside the Adriatic Sea, 
which is covered by the U.N. embargo. 
31
 Hadrianopolis (Greek for Hadrian founded city) dates back to the Roman 
Emperor Hadrian, 130 A.D. He built the limes 'Hadrian's Wall' in England and 
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32
 Paul Kennedy outlines these four phases in his book The Rise and Fall of The 
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York, Random House,1988). 
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In 1699, at the largest expansion of the Ottoman empire, the peace 
agreements of Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) finalized the period of the Turkish War 
(1683-1699). After 1529, again the Muslim Ottomans had arrived in front of Vienna 
in 1683 and were barely stopped by the Holy League. The peace agreements were 
divided into three separate treaties between the Ottoman Empire and Venice, the 
Ottoman Empire and Poland, and the Ottoman Empire and Austria. In the Balkans, 
Hungary without the Banat, and Siebenbürgen, without huge parts of Croatia and 
Slovenia, became part of the Habsburg dynasty's territory. Austria-Hungary, with 
Croatia and Slovenia, reached now to the port of Trieste on the Mediterranean. In 
1699, for the last time, the Habsburgs were ascending to their apex in Great Power 
status. With the Crimean war in 1856, the Habsburgs were in a period of steady 
decline. 
5. Russia Reviving the Muslim-Christen Antagonism 
Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus was another Great power during the 
Thirty Years war and on its decline when Russia was ascending on the scene. The 
Swedes were defeated by the Russians, who in turn gained a port on the Baltic. 
Russia then started coalition warfare with Austria. On completion of the Austrian- 
Turkish war in 1606, Austria's ruler was acknowledged Emperor and recognized by 
the Sultan. Russia had fought alongside Austria in order to further Russian 
interests, while at the same time fighting for Christianity. The Tsar wanted to 
expand Russia to the south in pursuit of the Black Sea. As a first step in 1699, the 
Sultan lost Podolia, the Polish Ukraine. In several other wars with the help of the 
Catholic Austrian Emperor, the Orthodox Russian Tsar, during the campaigns of 
1768-1774 and 1787-1792, gained all Turkish areas north of the Black Sea, from the 
Kuban river to the Dnjepr river. During the Russo-Turkish war of 1806-1812, 
Russia conquered the remaining Turkish areas between the rivers Bug, Dnjestr and 
Pruth. The Ottoman Sultan and Kalif, the political ruler and religious leader, also 
had to admit that he — himself acting as the superior of all his Muslim subjects - 
would now respect both the Protectors of Christianity, the Tsar and the Kaiser. Both 
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were allowed to act with respect to religious affairs for their newly gained Christian 
subjects inside the Ottoman Empire. 
6. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Defending Christian Europe 
One line of argumentation indicates continuity ever since the divergence in 
faith. Since the very beginning of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzigovina in 1992, deep 
differences in religious practices have been apparent. Despite more than four 
decades of almost peaceful coexistence, the antagonisms between Christians and 
Muslims are still sufficient to stimulate citizens to embark upon atrocities against 
humanity. Jealousy, rivalry and mistrust are justified as "ancient hatred." The 
argument of defending Christianity against its enemies is still used in the present 
crisis in the Balkans. Serbs pretend to justify "ethnic cleansing" within their area 
of influence by returning to this argument ~ the supposed need to stem Islamic 
influences in a Greater Serbia. Serbs and Croats, as if driven by paranoia, attempt 
to justify their atrocities by referring to their fear of having any community of 
Bosnian Muslims (evoking the phantom of an Islamic fundamentalist state) in their 
neighborhood. The martyrdom of the early Serbs at both the battles of Kosovo 
provides the ultimate justification. 
C. IDEAS ABOUT EUROPE IN COMPETITION 
The idea of unifying Europe under the leadership of the Catholic faith was, 
in principle, buried at the end of the Thirty Years war. The idea of Divine Law was 
also buried with it. This nostalgia was revived by the Habsburgs, however; and it 
has affected today's situation. This approach is in opposition to the French idea of 
"raison d'etat". 
1.  The Habsburg Idea: Europe United by Catholicism 
Nobody in Europe besides the Habsburgs could have wished to create a 
united Holy Roman Empire. As Kissinger puts it: 
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Had the Holy Roman Emperor succeeded in establishing central 
control over all the territories technically under his jurisdiction, the 
relations of the Western European states to it might have been similar 
to those of China's neighbors to the Middle Kingdom, with France 
comparable to Korea or Vietnam and Great Britain to Japan.33 
With the Reformation weakening the Papacy, and the Protestant states 
breaking away from Rome and with it breaking away from religious universality, 
the nostalgia of a universal monarchy had to be replaced by a new order of 
principles. It was the French Catholic Cardinal Richelieu who linked the concept of 
"raison d'etat" to the concept of "balance of power" and wanted his "Most Christian 
French kings" to enhance French security and enable France to expand eastward. 
Germany as the divided battlefield was no threat to France. Richelieu's vocation as 
cardinal, however, did not keep him from seeing the Habsburg attempt to 
reestablish the Catholic religion as a geopolitical instrument. Austria intended to 
achieve dominance in Central Europe; and Vienna, would thus have reduced France 
to a second class state. 
2. Hie French Idea: liberate Europe Along Nationa! Self-Determination 
With the French Revolution the monarchial state was replaced by the French 
nation. The monarch was succeeded by an elected ruler of a democratic government 
and former Capet subjects became French citizens. The first citizens of a nation- 
state, the French inspired much of Europe to go the same way with them. The 
French Napoleonic campaign through Europe built a French empire. Even though 
its decline followed promptly, Napoleon exported the revolutionary idea from Paris 
to Rome, Madrid, Vienna, Berlin and St.Petersburg. Napoleon's influence also 
reached the subjects of the Tsar in Russia, the whole of the Austrian Empire and 
the Balkans down to the Straits of the Bosporus. In the short run, the patriotic 
nationalistic idea only partially succeeded in France. In the long run, this idea 
33 Kissinger, Henry A., Diplomacy (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 57. 
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remained influential. As a result nationalism has been used and misused in various 
ways. The history of Yugoslavia has illustrated almost all the variations what 
Nationalism can be used for. 
3. Vienna 1815: Preserving Privileged Positions 
The Napoleonic campaigns brought war and disaster to Europe, Moscow and 
back to France. The preservation of international peace and the creation of a system 
to guarantee stability became the major task to be achieved at Vienna. Norman Rich 
wrote that, 
[a]fter the Napoleonic Wars the leaders of the European great powers 
[i.e.Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia], conditioned by 
almost a quarter-century of revolution and warfare, had become 
convinced that the primary objective of their diplomacy must be the 
preservation of international peace and stability, for only through 
peace could the civilization they cherished, and their privileged 
position within it, be maintained.34 
Additionally 
[t]he peacemakers at Vienna consolidated Central Europe into the 
German Confederation, ending the power vacuum which had tempted 
French expansionism. The Quadruple Alliance was formed to block 
French aggression. European congresses, the last of which was held 
in Berlin in 1878, met periodically to sort out solutions to Europe's 
major conflicts.35 
Consequently after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Europe should have 
stayed stable. This Congress peace did not create a power vacuum as "the Peace of 
34
 Rich, Norman, Why the Crimean war ?A Cautionary Tale (University Press of 
New England, Brown University, 1985), p. 1. 
35
 Kissinger, Henry A.,Diplomacy (New York,Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 324. 
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Westphalia (1648) [did on the eastern] border of a military heavyweight" as 
Kissinger wrote, because the stronger power "Louis XTV France...found the 
temptation to expand at the expense of weaker neighbors irresistible."36 
4. Post-March 1848: Restoring the Eroding Power-System 
The merits of the French Revolution were (next to the discovery of Liberte, 
Fraternite and Egalite), the interpretation of a state and its subjects as a nation and 
its citizens. The citizens should participate in their governments via democracy. The 
birth of nationalism made the established European powers very uneasy. 
Russia was the only great power in continental Europe whose 
government had not been overthrown or severely shaken by the 
revolutions of 1848. In the course of those revolutions Russia had 
come to the aid of Austria to suppress revolution in the Habsburg 
dominions, and it had provided support and encouragement for the 
suppression of revolution everywhere else.37 
On completion of the eruptions of March 1848 the "Concert of Europe", that 
informal system of mutual cooperation among the great powers, had already 
"seriously eroded."38 Order was, however, re-established but ignored the nationality 
issues. Everywhere in Europe nationalities were seeking freedom from foreign rule. 
D. HISTORY OF THE BALKANS    1826-1914 
In the period after the Congress of Vienna, the established balance-of-power 
system initially worked well.  The decline of Ottoman rule in the Balkans allowed 
36 
37 
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Serbia to pursue a more aggressive agenda to the benefit of the Serbian nation. 
During the Crimean War the equilibrium was lost and badly reestablished. The 
Berlin Congress of 1878 prevented a break-up of the balance-of-power system but 
left most of the powers frustrated. Nationalism manifested itself in different forms. 
Pan-Slavism materialized in Russia's western regions and the Great Serbian Dream 
became unmistakable. Finally the rise of nationalism dominated Europe. The First 
World War broke out when Serb nationalists forced their agenda onto Bosnia- 
Herzegovina by assassinating the heir to the Habsburg throne. 
1.  Prelude: Post-Vienna Serbia Enters the Scene 
The core of today's crisis in the Balkans is Serbia, even though the center of 
actual fighting has shifted and is now limited to Bosnia-Herzegovina's Muslim areas 
of Bihac and Sarajevo. Serbia's history is embedded in the Balkans and takes its 
unique appearance from the arrival of nationalism. 
During the Napoleonic wars the ideas of the French Revolution were 
spreading. With Napoleon's campaigns and in the aftermath of his defeat, the idea 
of national Serb sovereignty was revived. 
From 1804 until 1806 the Serb leader, Kara Georg Petrovic, called 
Karadordes (Black George), revolted and led an uprising in Belgrade against the 
Ottoman janissaries. This led to a short period of Serbian autonomy. The autonomy 
attested to the Serbs in the peace of Bucharest in 1812, however, only lasted until 
1815 with the signing of the Vienna Congress. A new uprising in 1815 led by Milos 
Obrenovic achieved autonomy again, and the Serbs was granted the title of a 
"Principaute of succession" under Ottoman sovereignty. Sovereign Serbia installed 
a parliament called the Skupschtina and proclaimed a constitution. Milos Obrenovic 
in 1819 was established as the ruler, with a right of dynastic succession. When he, 
despite the Serb constitution, began to rule in a very autocratic fashion, he was 
forced to resign in 1835. 
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In 1844 I. Garasanin developed the "Greater Serbian Program." This 
program promoted the idea of a single unified nation for all Southern Slavs, which 
in 1844 included part of Habsburg Austria. 
2. The Decline of Habsburg-Austria: Crimean War 1856 
The President of the second French republic, Louis Napoleon, elected in 
December 1848, believed in his mission to restore France to a position of dominance 
in Europe. He tried to achieve this by supporting the ideological principle of 
nationalism, with a view to reorganizing Europe along national lines under French 
political and moral leadership. 
At the very end of the Crimean War - deliberately evoked by 
Napoleon in provoking a crisis with Russia in the Near East in Spring 
1850 - the mutual confidence among the European statesmen essential 
for the belief in the "Concert" was destroyed.39 
Within the autocratic "Holy Alliance", Russia, the former Friend of Prussia 
and Protector of Austria, was defeated and humiliated in the Crimean War. 
However, Russia was not eliminated as a threat. Austria's neutrality antagonized all 
the powers; and it lost its role as a military power and its leading position in 
diplomacy. Prussia was almost dismissed as a major power. 
France could not reestablish predominance in Europe by championing 
the nationalities movement. Britain after this inglorious war withdrew 
largely from continental affairs, but stayed apprehensive about the 
revival of French power.40 
39
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The Crimean War showed the Great powers which guaranteed the Vienna 
peace   agreement   weak;   it   therefore   invited   Serbia   to   push   its   agenda. 
3. Pursuing the Great-Serbian Dream: the Ottoman Retreat 
As a result of the Crimean War, the relative importance of the great powers 
became self-evident. In the eyes of Serbia, the Austrian Empire at the end of the 
Crimean War was considered weak. The Ottoman Empire, to which Serbia was 
nominal subject, could hardly be considered a power. 
In 1835 Milos Obrenovic, who had ascended to power in 1819 and had 
established inheritable succession, was forced to resign. Karadordes' son Alexander 
was elected by the Serb parliament and ruled after 1842. 
After the Ottoman setback in the Crimean War, the Skupschtina in 1858 
forced Alexander, the Karadordevic, to abdicate power. The very autocratic Milos 
Obrenovic was recalled to power to succeed Alexander. 
In 1867 it was Milos' son, Michael Obrenovic, now ruler of the Serbian 
Principaute, who successfully achieved the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from 
Serbia. Michael had to make this arrangement with the powers surrounding Serbia. 
By compromising, he became a target for those who still glorified the 1804 
revolutionary Karadordes. Michael was assassinated by fanatics in favor of the 
Karadordes dynasty. Assassination became one of the characteristics of Serbian 
diplomacy. Despite the aspirations of the "Karadordevics," Michael was succeeded 
in 1868 by his nephew Milan I. Obrenovic. 
The Congress of Berlin in 1878 established a completely sovereign Serbia, 
enlarged to the south by 11,000 square kms. In 1882 the Principaute of Serbia was 
renamed the Kingdom of Serbia. Encouraged by the status of kingdom and 
motivated by the growing Great Serbian dream, Serbia decided in 1885 to attack 
Bulgaria. Bulgaria under the leadership of von Battenberg had given in to Bulgarian 
nationalist desires and took the lead in reunifying Bulgaria with East Rumelia. 
Rumelia was a province full of Christian Bulgarians under the Turkish yoke that 
wished to be united with their brother Bulgars. This unification occurred at the 
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expense of the Ottoman Empire. With tactical fortune, von Eattenberg, was able to 
save his Bulgaria as the young ruler immediately countered Serbia's attack. Only 
the strong intervention of Austria-Hungary saved Serbia. And again during the 1886 
Bucharest peace talks, Austria-Hungary had to intervene and saved Serbia. 
Fortunately for Serbia, no territorial compensation had to be handed over to 
Bulgaria. Aggression ~ open, by force, or in more subtle ways - to support the 
dream of Great Serbia has been a continuous phenomenon in the repertoire of 
Serbian diplomacy. 
4. The Russian Fear of Fan-Slavism and the Austro-Hungarian Design 
Nicholas I, the Russian Tsar and Head of the Orthodox Church, felt entitled 
to act alone as the defender of his Orthodox Christian subjects against the Turkish 
yoke. During his Crimean campaign he was completely rebuffed in his expansionist 
dreams to reach the Straits and also repelled in his quest for pan-Slavism. During 
the Berlin Congress, Alexander Hi's Russia was reestablished. Bismarck worked as 
the honest broker, who was very much in favor of Russia, but could not prevent the 
Tsar from retaining his expansionistic dreams.41 
Nicholas I felt offended when von Battenberg, the newly established ruler in 
Bulgaria, took the lead in uniting his Slavic state in a clearly defined Russian sphere 
of interest in East-Rumelia. Alexander HI wanted to be the Tsar of the pan-Slavic 
41
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made in the proceeding secret agreements, but there was much trouble and friction 
about details, especially after the Anglo-Russian agreements leaked out....Bulgaria 
was divided into three parts...Macedonia, which was to have certain reforms. 
Austria was given a mandate (June 28) to occupy Bosnia and Herzigovina and to 
garrison the Sandjak and Novi Bazar, a strip laying between Serbia and 
Montenegro. The territory given to Serbia and Montenegro was reduced. The 
Greeks were put off with promises for the future. Serbia, Romania and Montenegro 
became independent states....The upshot of the treaty was that it left Russian 
nationalists and Pan-Slavs profoundly unsatisfied and left the aspirations of Serbia, 
Bulgaria, and Greece unfulfilled. Cited in: Langer, William L., An Encyclopedia of 
World History, p. 781. 
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world and felt that only he should be allowed to act in protecting his subjects from 
the Turkish yoke. 
Alexander's irritation became even greater when with respect to saving 
Serbia, a Slav territory, it was unfortunately not the Russian authority that stopped 
Bulgaria's counterattack. It was the weak Austrian-Hungarian ruler who intervened 
in an area that Russia's monarch considered his backyard. Russia still maneuvered 
how to lead pan-Slavism when Vienna develloped Austro-Hungarian designs to 
influence the Balkans with Great Power politics. After its 1866 war against Prussia, 
Austria was unable to dominate the German Federation. Bismarck's North-German 
Confederation was a Prussian tool. Locked with no prospect of expansion to the 
North (Prussia), to the West (German Confederation and Italy) nor to the East 
(Russia), Austria and Hungary (the double monarchy since February 8, 1867) 
concentrated on influencing the Balkans. There the Ottoman Empire still existed, 
and Russia had not reached the straits. 
5.  Correcting Serbia's Dynastic Successions for The Great Serbia 
In Serbia in 1889 King Milan I Obrenovic abdicates power in favor of his 
son, Alexander I Obrenovic. This Serbian ruler did not steer a course of aggressive 
foreign policy and as a result Alexander I became the last Obrenovic ruler . He and 
his wife again were victims of the blood-feud between the Karädores and Obrenovic 
families which began in 1817, when Kara Georg Petrovic returned from his exile in 
Austria and was assassinated. Some of King Alexander's high-ranking officers killed 
him and his wife in 1903. 
Again, Serbia looked back to the times when the strong arm of Karadordes 
fought the janissaries. The Serbian national assembly elected Peter Karadordevic 
and crowned him King Peter I. of Serbia. He ruled Serbia until the end of World 
War I. In 1903 his foreign minister, Nikola Pasic, who enjoyed the Tsar's trust, 
revived the Greater Serbian dream. 
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The pre-1918 kingdom of Serbia, whose politicians, generals and civil 
servants ruled the new state, had been an ally of czarist Russia. The 
prime minister of Serbia, Nikola Pasic, had enjoyed the czar's trust, 
and he and his cabinet had based their foreign policy, both before and 
during the First World War, on close relations with Russia, which 
they had seen as their protector against Austro-Hungarian and 
German Military expansionism.42 
6.  The Bosnian Annexion Crisis 1908 to 1909 
Russia's obsession to reach the straits and access to Europe and the 
Mediterranean and to gain warm water ports motivated Russia to approach Austria- 
Hungary. In Buchlau on September 16, 1908, both states arranged an agreement, 
signed between the Secretary for Austria-Hungary's Foreign Affairs, Count 
Ährental, and the Russian Foreign Minister, Iswolskij, over the Straits, Bosnia and 
the Herzegovina. It was a profitable deal for Austria-Hungary, since it could now 
annex the states of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
For Russia the subject of the Straits was still an open issue due to British 
influence and resistance. But the same year, a consolidation of British-Russian 
entente occurred during a meeting in Reval between of King Edward VH and Tsar 
Nicholas H. A larger treaty, the Baltic Treaty between Russia, Germany, Sweden, 
and Denmark signed in St. Petersburg, settled other pressing disputes; in this case 
it conserved the status quo in the Baltic. 
On the Balkans the Sultan had to respond to the Turkish national "Young 
Turk" movement. The Young Turks represented extreme Turkish nationalism, in 
which the Islamic way of life was to preside over all Ottoman subjects. The Young 
Turk movement would have also included all Muslims in the Balkans as well. The 
movement weakened Turkish foreign policy and gave Ferdinand I of Bulgaria the 
opportunity to declare Bulgaria's independence on October 5» 1908. He established 
42
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himself as ruler with the title of Tsar of Bulgaria, a title which was later recognized 
by Russia and Turkey. 
Germany, under the rule of Wilhelm II since 1888, was still on its way to 
establishing itself as a Great Power. Willing to play a partner role with Britain, 
Germany refused to begin the role as a junior partner. Without the presence of 
Bismarck as Chancellor, William n tried to act in the tradition of the Congress of 
Berlin in order to impress London as an honest broker, but found no friends. 
To give Turkey compensation for the annexion of Bosnia and Herzigovina, 
Germany forced Austria-Hungary to accept financial agreements with Turkey. 
Meanwhile in Turkey, incited by the Young Turk movement, Sultan Abdul Hamid 
H was replaced by Mohammed V. 
While acting in favor of Turkey against Austria, Germany forced Russia to 
drop its support to the Serbian government. Russia had to demobilize after an 
Austria-Hungarian ultimatum and again felt humiliated. Taking the blame, the 
Russian Foreign Minister, Iswolskij, was forced to resign. 
Together with Britain, Russia successfully attacked Persia in the Middle East 
and forced Persia to adopt a constitution. At the same time, Britain started to build 
eight Dreadnought battleships43. 
On October 24,1913, Russia signed the secret treaty of Racconigi with Italy. 
Both powers agreed on the prolongation of status quo in the Balkans, and both 
partners would compensate the other in case of a change. The former German 
Chancellor von Bülow, acting as special ambassador in Rome, failed in 1914 to hold 
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Italy back from joining the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary, the 
"Nibelungen." 
7.  The Balkan Confederation and the End of the First Balkan War 1913 
On March 13, 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria signed the Serbian-Bulgarian 
defense agreement which was widened into the "Balkan Confederation" in October 
1912 and integrated Montenegro as well as Greece. This defensive treaty was 
actually a secret offensive alliance against Turkey. The expected occasion arrived 
when Italy attacked the Ottoman Empire in Tripoli, a Mediterranean port in North 
Africa, today the capital of Libya. The Balkan Alliance presented Turkey an 
ultimatum for reforms in Macedonia which was refused by the Sultan. War was 
declared against Turkey on October 18, 1912, with the goal of partitioning Turkish 
interests in Macedonia44. Bulgaria invaded Thrace and laid siege to Adrianople. 
Serbia and Montenegro conquered the Sandzak and Novi Baz&r.45 After the start 
of the offensive Greece, together with Bulgaria, followed its own priorities and 
conquered Saloniki and the territories up to Epirus. 
Turkey was beaten on all fronts and had to agree to the loss of most of its 
European territory. Turkey defended its remaining interests in Constantinople. It 
also lost almost all the Aegean Islands in signing this treaty in London on May 10, 
1913. 
Bulgaria, dissatisfied about the results of its gains in Macedonia, decided on 
June 19, 1913, to attack Greece.46 Greece was defended by the Turks. However, 
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Bulgaria in coalition with Romania, defeated Greece, which in turn sued for peace. 
Greece lost most the gains that it had obtained in the 1912 Balkan War. 
Serbia in 1913, with Russian support, had established itself as the biggest 
power in the Balkans and had mobilized its forces for the pursuit for a Greater 
Serbia. 
8.  Albania and Austria-Hungary Limit the Great Serbian Dream 
Serbia has gained territory and successfully proved its aggressive foreign 
policy of nationalism towards a Great Serbia at the expense of the hated Muslim 
world. The blame for its earlier defeat by the Bulgarians under von Battenberg's 
command was erased, but access to the Mediterranean sea via the Macedonian port 
of Saloniki was still denied, and Serbia remained landlocked. 
The Serbian territorial claims to gain access to the Mediterranean sea in the 
Adriatic were also denied during peace negotiations in London in 1913. Instead of 
sea access Serbia got a new neighbor called Albania. 
During the Turkish Young Turk movement — a term that stood for a 
enforced campaign of Turkish nationalism, in which the Islamic way of life was to 
be brought to all Ottoman subjects, including those in the Balkans ~ the resistance 
against Turkish rule in the Albanian part of the Balkans led to revolt in 1910. 
During the Balkan War, on November 11, 1912, Ismail Kemal Bei proclaimed the 
independence of Albania. The long-standing idea of Albanian sovereignty was finally 
realized and ratified in London at the end of the Balkan Wars on July 29, 1913. 
Albania was part of the Serbian Empire of Stephan Dusan in 1343. It was 
impossible for Albania to resist the expanding Ottoman Empire. After the final 
defeat of the North Albanian leader, Prince Gjergj Kastriota, who died in 1468, 
most of the Christian population escaped to Southern Italy and Sicily. Those who 
stayed converted mostly to Islam. Since this time, the Orthodox church has 
Independence to Recognition (RFE/RFL Research Report, Vol 3, No 1, 7 January 
1994), p. 119 cited in: Human Rights Watch Helsinki, The Macedonians of Greece, 
(New York, May 1994), p. 4. 
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supported uprisings in the southern part of Albania and the Roman Catholic church 
has subsidized uprisings in the northern part of Albania. 
In 1913 Serbia had to accept the existence of a sovereign Albania as a Serbian 
neighbor.47 
To the West, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia was still confronted with 
Austria-Hungary, whose plans for expansionism conflicted with those of Serbia and 
still baned the realization of the Great Serbian dream. When Russia was defeated 
by Japan on its far eastern border, Russia turned its interest back to pan-Slavism 
and again became a strong supporter of the Great Serbian idea. The idea of uniting 
all southern Slav nationalities of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire under Serbia had 
already led to growing tensions throughout the years. Austria's General Staff under 
von Hötzendorf had developed several plans for preventive war against Serbia as 
well as against Italy. 
Serbia also had a long tradition of achieving goals by means other than 
diplomacy: war, terrorism and assassination are found in the tool box. When the 
heir-apparent of Austria-Hungary, Franz Ferdinand, and his wife visited Sarajevo, 
both were killed by a Bosnian student on June 28, 1914. 
It soon became evident that the attack was not from a misled lunatic. The 
assault was sponsored by the Serbian government and welcomed by the pan-Slavic 
nationalist public. In its ultimatum of July 23,1914, Austria-Hungary demanded the 
punishment of the terrorist and Austrian participation in the commission of inquiry. 
Serbia reluctantly agreed, but pointed out that foreign participation in the inquiry 
was a challenge to Serbian sovereignty. 
9.  Conclusions on Serbia, the Balkans and the Great Powers 
Analyzing the Balkan history, beginning with the arrival of the Slavs in the 
early Middle Ages until a young extremist of the most fanatical armed Serb faction 
47
 Ever since 1913, Albania had to steer a course avoiding a collision with its 
much more powerful neighbors, Yugoslavia and Italy. 
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of the Yugoslav movement murdered the heir to the Austrian-Hungarian throne, 
makes various layers of motivation perceptible. These incentives accumulated 
throughout the centuries and led in 1914 to a war between Serbia and Austria- 
Hungary. Belgrade fought for a unified state of all Southern Slavs. The Serbs 
throughout history have felt themselves given a unique mission distinct from the 
other Balkan inhabitants. This mission in the beginning of the 20th century 
crystallized, they felt, into their task of achieving a nation-state for all southern 
Slavs. 
Various momentums encouraged this conviction about Serbia's historical 
mission. 
The religious momentum: The defeat during both the battles of Kosovo 
created a sense of special Serbian responsibility for the duty that is only achievable 
through religious martyrdom. Serbia sacrificed itself in defending Christianity 
against Islam and the conquering Turks. 
The nationalist momentum: The Serbs still remember with pride their early 
Serbian Empire of the 14th century, even though the crowned Tsar of Serbs and 
Greeks, Stephan Dusan, failed to conquer Constantinople and with it the imperial 
crown. Since 1343 the Serbs have felt that they have lived through centuries under 
a foreign yoke. But in reviving and pursuing their idea of a Greater Serbia they 
made enormous progress in reshaping their Balkan territory. At the beginning of the 
20th century their vision of achieving a nation-state for all southern Slavs was in 
reach again. 
The momentum of force: Serbian convictions about the legitimacy of the use 
of force, including violence, to achieve national goals are founded in the legacy of 
the Great Serbian dream. Aggression, invasion and war against neighboring 
territories to ensure the expansion of Serbia were considered legitimate methods. 
The assassination of the ruler (and his wife) to extinguish a dynasty or as simple 
political course-correction was considered proper policy. 
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The momentum of power polities', political arrangements in the Balkans 
resulted from power politics. The Great Powers used the nationalism of the different 
ethnic groups to weaken the other Great Powers. The ethnic groups and smaller 
nations of the Balkans thus realized that their fate shifted under the influence of the 
Great Powers. Great Powers rose, expanded and declined. Smaller nations were only 
allowed to act in coalition with Great Powers. Smaller nations formed part of the 
greater power's zones of interests, either used as buffers or traded as compensation 
among the Great Powers. The Great Powers competed with each other, and their 
goals in the Balkans were directly influenced by success or defeat elsewhere. This 
worldwide correlation on the eve of the First World War may be explained for 
Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary as follows: 
For Britain the existence of the Ottoman Empire and Turkish control of the 
Straits was a cheap but weak guarantee to keep the Russians away from the 
Mediterranean, where London planned to establish a link via Egypt to India and the 
African colonies, with access to Persia. 
Russia had reached the Pacific but its fleet was defeated by Japan, which 
established itself as a Great Power trying to dominate East and South East Asia and 
even China. The former Spanish overseas empire had declined and the Spanish 
Pacific possessions (i.e. the Philippines and other islands, sighted during the period 
of discovery by them) became interesting to the Americans and the Japanese. Unable 
to influence the events on the Pacific rim in Russia's pursuit of glory, Russia could 
concentrate in European politics and sponsor members of the pan-Slavic movement. 
France was left to isolation because of Bismarck's diplomacy, but profited 
from every mishap in German foreign policy. France dedicated its efforts to colonial 
extension in Africa. France's foreign policy centered on getting back Alsace-Lorraine 
and arranging a treaty network at the expense of Germany. 
Germany under Prussia's lead felt itself misunderstood by all the Great 
Powers and was unable to establish herself as a partner of Great Britain. Germany's 
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isolation brought her closer to its remaining partner, the unpredictable and weak 
Austria-Hungary. 
In the Double Monarchy Austria, however, was far from realizing its 
weakened position and unable to conduct a course of Realpolitik. Exclusively 
obsessed with the goal of expanding southward, Austria was unable to counter the 
domestic threat presented by the multiple ethnic groups in the Austrian part of the 
Double Monarchy. Unrest had reached the Polish population in Galicia and Silesia, 
and the Czechs and Slovaks in Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia. In the Balkans the 
Croatians, Slovenians and Bosnians were all ready to fight for their own sovereign 
nation at the first opportunity. 
E. HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE, EUROPE AND THE 
BALKANS, 1914 - 1945 
1.  The First World War 
Once the decision was made in Austria to go to war, despite all the diplomatic 
efforts of Germany and Great Britain to avoid the confrontation, Austria declared 
war on Serbia on July 28,1914. The other powers checked via their diplomats that 
the earlier agreed treaties would work (the French President Poincare, for example, 
visited Russia on July 20 to 23), and then mobilized their armed forces and declared 
war in accordance with their treaties. 
Serbia declared war on Germany. Russia already at war with Germany, 
declared war on Austria-Hungary on August 6, and two Austrian offensives against 
Serbia in 1914 failed. On October 6, 1915, a coalition of German and Austria- 
Hungarian troops crossed the Danube river and conquered Belgrade on October 10, 
1915, and completely defeated Serbia for the rest of the war until the Oriental Army 
of the Allies reconquered Belgrade on November 1, 1918. This and the defeat of 
Bulgaria were primarily accomplished by the Serbian troops of the Allied Oriental 
Army. 
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Serbia became part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes 
which was proclaimed on December 1, 1918. 
The protector of Serbia, the Russia of Tsar Nicholas n, was replaced by a 
revolutionary Russia before the war ended. Nicholas II abdicated power after the 
February Revolution in 1917, but he and his family were assassinated on July 17, 
1918. 
The Double Monarchy ceased to exist on October 10, 1918, when Emperor 
Charles promised to establish Austria-Hungary as a Confederation. On October 20, 
1918, a revolution in Vienna led to a sovereign Hungarian Government, which was 
established on November 1, 1918. 
2.  The Decline of the Versailles Treaty 1919 - 1939 
On January 18,1919, the Paris peace conference began without Germany and 
worked on the conditions for a peace agreement, which was handed over to the 
German delegation on May 7, 1919, and accepted by the protesting German 
National Assembly on June 28,1919. The newly elected democratic German National 
Assembly congregated for the first time in Weimar. The assembly responded to the 
London Ultimatum and agreed on 132 Billions of Gold Marks on May 5, 1921, as 
the total amount of reparations to be paid. 
Austria had to sign its peace treaty in St. Germain en Laye on September 
10.48 Thus marking the very end of all Habsburg's imperial designs, Austria had 
to agree to a sovereign Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary. Tirol went 
to Italy as did Trieste. Istria and areas in Dalmatia went to Yugoslavia. 
Hungary signed the Trianon treaty in which the Banat area was divided 
between Romania and Jugoslavia. The treaty took away Croatia and Slovenia from 
48
 Austria had to sign its peace treaty in St.Germain en Laye on September 10, 
where 500 years earlier on September 10, 1414 at St. Germain en Laye the 
electorate Assembly of the Holy Roman empire decided not to elect the French King 
Francois I but instead agreed on a Habsburg King to become their Emperor. 
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Hungary what later became Yugoslavia. Slovakia became part of Czechoslovakia and 
Siebenbürgen went to Romania. 
Bulgaria in the Neuilly Treaty (signed November 27,1914) lost all territories 
in Thrace to Greece and no longer had any access to the Mediterranean in the 
Aegean sea. 
The Versailles Treaty did not work out as the "Peace without Victory" that 
had been earlier proclaimed by United States President Wilson. It did not bring the 
Nations peacefully together as intended in the League of Nations. Instead of 
neighbors living peacefully together old ideas were revived in the competition for 
power and resources. 
In Russia the Revolution favored the Bolshevik party; and with Lenin's 
proclamation of Communism, Russia's pan-Slavic dream was revived to help in 
dominating Russia's area of interest. The countries liberated from the Ottoman yoke 
to achieve national sovereignty should now, Moscow argued, form an International 
Communist Union, and Russia would help all communist parties in the world to 
export revolution, so that in the long run the capitalist countries could be defeated. 
In Germany public opinion became more and more reluctant over the years 
to accept the treaties. The democratic parties and political coalitions of the Weimar 
republic were not able to produce confidence in democratic procedures, especially 
when the world economic crisis reached Germany and a huge amount of the 
population became unemployed. Extremist parties portrayed their political 
opponents as scapegoats, and promised an end to the Versailles humiliation, 
rearmament and work for everybody; these parties thus became more and more 
popular. 
Whereas communism was used in Russia to justify worldwide expansionism 
and replaced under Bolshevik rule Russian nationalism as a label (but not as an 
idea), in Germany nationalism was used to get away from the humiliation of the 
draconian Versailles treaty and to reestablish Germany as a sovereign power. 
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In  1933  Hitler assumed  power,   employed  almost  everybody  in huge 
governmental projects, and rearmed Germany. When the Polish leader Pilsudski 
sounded out Paris about assistance against Nazi Germany in early 1933, he achieved 
nothing and therefore in May 1933 undertook a rapprochement with Hitler. The 
conclusion of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement on July 18, 1935, allowed Hitler 
more freedom in foreign affairs. The sanctions imposed against Italy by the League 
of Nations pushed Mussolini into Hitler's arms, and France chose to accept Hitler's 
occupation of the Rhineland on March 7,1936. Chamberlain's "appeasement" policy 
was intended to integrate Germany and Italy in a four-power European order which 
could replace the Versailles settlement. On January 27,1939, Hitler decided to build 
a powerful German High Seas Fleet, breaking the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. 
Hitler's open expansion started with the incorporation of Austria into the Third 
Reich on March 13, 1938, followed by the Sudetenland after the Munich pact of 
September 29,1938. The remainder of Czechoslovakia was dismantled on March 15, 
1939. When on March 31,1939, Britain guaranteed Polish independence (following 
Germany's establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the 
inclusion of Slovakia as a German satellite), Hitler arrived at the limits of "peaceful" 
extension. 
3.  The Second World War 
Hitler was willing to wage war in order to subjugate Europe. The Second 
World War devastated much of Europe and killed fifty-five million people. It led 
directly to the Holocaust, D-Day, the unconditional surrender, the Nuremberg trials, 
and a divided Germany (in accordance with the London Protocol of September 12, 
1944). 
In the Balkans in April 1939 Mussolini invaded and annexed Albania and 
used Albania as basis to attack Greece on October 28, 1940, - without success, 
however. The Soviet Union on June 28,1940, annexed Romania's part of Bessarabia 
and the northern part of the Bukovina. Bulgaria and Hungary got back their 
44 
territories which were annexed by Romania in 1919:  Siebenbürgen and the 
Bukovina. 
Yugoslavia at the outbreak of World War II stayed neutral. However, warned 
by Mussolini's actions, Belgrade decided in December 1940 to sign a friendship 
agreement with Hungary and to join the Three Power Pact (Rome-Berlin-Tokyo) on 
March 25, 1941. This bowing to foreign pressure led immediately to a putsch by 
Serbian officers who overwhelmed Prince Regent Paul and his president Dragisa 
Cvetkovic. They proclaimed Peter H as King and ruler on 27 March, 1941. 
When Yugoslavia on April 4, 1941, signed a Yugoslavian-Soviet agreement 
on friendship, Hitler decided to react as well. The German Army conquered 
Yugoslavia: air strikes on Belgrade on April 6 were followed by the occupation of 
Zagreb on April 10, the occupation of Belgrade on April 12 and 13 and the 
capitulation of the Yugoslavian army on April 17, 1941. 
Simultaneously Bulgarian troops invaded Thrace and Macedonia. When 
German troops conquered Saloniki on April 9, 1941, they broke the Greek Metaxa 
defense line and the British Thermopylae defense line, and proceeded to occupy 
Athens on April 27, and the Peloponnesus, the Greek islands and Crete during the 
rest of May. 
The invasion of Yugoslavia in Spring 1941 created an independent Croatia, 
the Croatia of Ante Pavelic. A German military administration was installed in 
Serbia, with a German dependent Serb government established under the Serb 
General Milan Nedic on August 30, 1941. 
Areas north of Croatia were annexed by the Third Reich. Laibach, 
Montenegro and Dalmatia became part of Italy. Parts of Macedonia went to 
Bulgaria, with other parts of the territory transferred to Hungary. King Peter H 
and his government fled to London, as well as King George H of Greece. 
In Yugoslavia basically two groups initiated in partisan warfare to fight the 
occupation forces: the monarchist movement of General Draza Michailovic and the 
communist movement of Josip Broz. Tito formed a provisional government and 
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unified the partisan movement. He gained the support of the Allies in 1943. 
However, during the period Yugoslavia was controlled by the occupation force of the 
Wehrmacht a total of 1.7 million Yugoslavs, including partisans and civilians killed 
in retaliation, became victims of the war. 
Churchill's 1943 plan to attack Italy with an Allied invasion force and to 
disembark in the Po river delta to contain a huge amount of German troops prior 
to an invasion in Normandy was not accepted. This opened the Balkans as an area 
of influence for the Soviet Union. 
4.  Conclusions on Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Germany 
I. Garasanin's 19th century program for a Great Serbia was realized after 
the First World war by uniting the Kingdom of Serbia-Montenegro under the 
dynastic rule of the Karadordevic Alexander I with some former parts of Austria- 
Hungary, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the southern part of Steiermark, the 
Vojvodina and areas of western Bulgaria, the Kosovo and Macedonia. The Serbs 
were determined to dominate this multi-ethnic and multi-religious state. 
The first constitution in 1921 officially stated the predominance of the Serbs 
and therefore was not accepted by the Croats. The federative-oriented Croat party 
of Stjepan Radic refused parliamentary cooperation until 1924, and then joined a 
coalition from July 1925 to April 1926. In June 1928 Stjepan Radic and two other 
Croat members of parliament were assassinated. King Alexander I proclaimed the 
Dictatorship of the King and tried to reorganize Yugoslavia by creating a 
supranational Yugoslavian patriotism. He did not achieve his goal and was 
assassinated by Macedonian and Croat extremists on March 9, 1931. A new 
authoritarian constitution and very restricted elections assured a majority for a 
government in favor of the military and the police. Relatively free elections in 1935 
strengthened the opposition, and on August 26, 1939, the government agreed in to 
create a province of Croatia with strong autonomy. 
A first conclusion on Yugoslavia might be that only an external threat of 
immense magnitude is able to bring the different ethnic groups together. Whenever 
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the Serbs have felt their rule endangered, they have used force and assassination to 
act in favor of keeping power. The Croats seem to have always been ready to accept 
a loose organization, working together (if necessary) in a federation, but prefering 
to be autonomous. 
The Soviet Union continued the tradition of Russian expansionism and 
exchanged through revolution the idea of Russian pan-Slav nationalism for a new 
ideology of international communism. Once the Bolshevik rule was established and 
Stalin took over, nationalists and other competitors in achieving power were 
eliminated. Stalin allowed himself all sorts of alliances, even a Hitler-Stalin pact, to 
achieve his Soviet expansionism. 
In Germany Hitler gained power by using the public's dissatisfaction with the 
"unfair" Versailles treaties and the readiness of the population for an ambitious 
form of German nationalism, which might lead to a better future. To achieve his 
goals he allowed himself all sorts of coalitions. To fight the Social Democrats, he 
even united his Brown Shirts with the Communists. Once in power he used all sorts 
of propaganda and demagogism. And when he could no longer achieve his goals 
"peacefully", he did not hesitate to use force, which led to war. 
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m.  FROM YUGOSLAV CIVIL WAR TO TITO'S HERITAGE 
A.  PRELUDE 
A Croat, Josip Broz, called Tito, made his way to become the most powerful 
man in Yugoslavia. He managed to rule the Yugoslavia he created until he died in 
980. However, Tito's political system contained weaknesses which explain why Tito's 
heritage in the 1980s could not survive and why Titoism eventually had to collapse 
with or without his leadership. 
This chapter argues that the Yugoslav people's nationalism was used by Tito 
to establish and maintain power. The manipulation of Yugoslav nationalism was 
administered by the Yugoslav League of Communists (YLC) using a "federal 
arrangement." This Socialist federalism was too fragile to stand on its own. The 
rationality to run the Yugoslav economy by so-called "self-management" is examined 
and reasons given why this economic model was unable to endure. Both the "federal 
arrangement" and "self-management" systems were incapable of providing a 
sufficient economic basis. They are held responsible for the non-viability of Tito's 
heritage. 
The first section deals with inter-war Yugoslavia and the unfinished business 
left over from Versailles and the second section shows how Tito used the 
uncertainties during the war to achieve power and succeeded in obtaining external 
Allied support for the partisan movement. 
The third section explains how Tito used the Yugoslav people's nationalism, 
which he embodied in the myth of the heroic partisans. During this process he was 
able to get all other aspirants to power exterminated. Tito's vision of international 
communism reveals the impossibility of cooperating with General Dragoljub 
Michailovic. General 'Draza' Michailovic fought against the occupying German 
forces for a royal postwar Yugoslavia. Because of his perception of Serbia's national 
interest, he was reluctant to fight the Serbs of Nazi Germany's Serbian puppet 
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General Milan Nedic. Tito succeeded in aligning all the peoples of Yugoslavia 
towards the Communist camp, against all expectations based on Yugoslavia's earlier 
anti-communist history. 
Yugoslavia's King Alexander, a former page at the Russian imperial 
court at St Petersburg, provided refuge and generous material support 
in Yugoslavia for thousands of post-1917 anti-communist Russian 
exiles. This help even included setting up and maintaining an officers' 
school for cadets who had escaped to Yugoslavia after 1917. Even 
after the king's assassination in 1934, Yugoslavia continued its anti- 
communist policy and was one of the last European states to establish 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1940.49 
Section four considers Tito's method of pushing the international Communist 
post-war agenda too quickly for the Kremlin's leadership. This forced Yugoslavia 
out of the Soviet camp by 1948 when Stalin decided to impose the break. Tito, 
however, arranged that his type of communism in the following years was 
considered to be a bulwark against the Soviet Union by the West as well as by 
independent Communists and the later "Non-Aligned-Countries". In doing so, Tito 
assured American and western support for Yugoslavia. Henceforth any attempt by 
Moscow to dominate Yugoslavia would harm East-West relations. 
A federal political structure was created to deal with the nationalism within 
Yugoslavia. This structure was supposed to provide for socialist federalism and was 
labeled "brotherhood and unity". Its purpose was to counterbalance the several 
ethnic entities by a federal bureaucracy before they might break away in nationalist 
divisions. 
Section five shows that Titoism did not create a viable Yugoslav socialism, a 
"Third way" or a path to "Open Socialism". All Socialist scientific planning, Five- 
Year and One-Year plans, funds and programs to help Yugoslavia's underdeveloped 
regions failed. Yugoslav socialism worked only with money pumped into the 
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economy from outside. Credits supplied by Western anti-Soviet fear alone kept the 
economic system going. Private ownership of means of production was banned. 
Worker "self-management" was simply a public relations exercise. 
Section six illustrates the weakness of Tito's heritage as the fertile ground for 
the events of the 1990s. 
B.  INTER-WAR YUGOSLAVIA: THE AFTERMATH OF VERSAILLES 
Inter-war Yugoslavia can be regarded as a result of the unfinished business 
left over from Versailles, where the peacemakers intended to provide: 
...the permanent diminution of German power, the permanent 
containment of Russian power, and the permanent restoration of 
international order in Europe."50 
Furthermore, Joseph Rothschild writes, 
At the close of World War I, the four defeated empires that had 
dominated and ruled East Central Europe — the German, Habsburg, 
Ottoman, and Russian empires — were replaced by a dozen new or 
restored or enlarged would-be nation-states, all of which based their 
asserted legitimation on the reigning politico-moral principle of 
national self-determination....The territorial arrangements ... for all 
their admitted flaws...still freed three times as many people from 
nationally alien rule as they subjected to such rule.51 
These 25 per cent, those who ended up under "alien" rule, contributed to the 
internal weaknesses and external vulnerabilities of the peace settlement which caused 
cross-border ethnic tension. Explaining the inter-war background, Joseph Rothschild 
suggests that 
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... as a general rule in interwar East Central Europe, common 
borders entailed hostile relations.... Simply to list the area's internal 
irredentist disputes may convey an impression of their cumulative 
complexity, though not of their bitter and well-nigh paralyzing 
intensity.52 
In Italy's case, despite Rome being with the winners after the war, the peace 
settlement frustrated Italian hopes to dominate both sides of the Adriatic Sea. In 
Italian, the Adriatic Sea is still called "our sea" (mare nostro). In 1919, Italy's 
design for Yugoslavia was reaching even further out: 
Italy craved Yugoslavia's Dalmatian littoral on the Adriatic Sea and 
schemed to fragment the entire Yugoslav State into its ethnoregional 
components. It also aspired to control Albania directly and to 
intimidate Greece into subservience. Indeed, Italy's ambitions also 
included the establishment of diplomatic protectorates over Austria, 
Hungary, and Bulgaria, in order to redouble the pressure on 
Yugoslavia. But in contrast to Germany and the Soviet Union, Italy 
lacked the economic and military muscle to realize its political 
designs.53 
To allow every ethnic group or self-defined "nation" to become a nation-state 
under its own rule was President Wilson's vision, which created large difficulties in 
the Versailles settlement: 
The determination of a newly independent state to 'nation-ize' not 
only its cultural and political patrimonies but also its economic wealth 
was often a key motive behind such seemingly social and 'class' 
programs as land reform and etatist industrialization. They were 
politically easiest where property of 'alien' landlords and 
entrepreneurs could be expropriated for the benefit of 'native' 
peasants and bureaucrats. Such an amalgation of ethnic and social 
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policy was facilitated by the fact that ethnic, religious and class 
differences and identities often coincided or at least overlapped....In 
the Balkans, the entrepreneurial class was Greek, Italian, and Jewish 
and only incipiently native, while in several areas the landlords were 
still Muslim or Magyar.54 
In inter-war Yugoslavia the problems almost immediately started with the 
formal ideology of a "Yugoslav" nationality, which appeared to be a manipulative 
device screening the Serb domination. The Serbs intended to politically control 
Yugoslavia, even though as the Croatian economy and culture was by far more 
developed. Yugoslavia's first constitution in 1921 stated the predominance of the 
centralistic Serbs and therefore was not accepted by the Croats* The Croat party of 
Stjephan Radic refused for years any parliamentarian participation. 
Forms and styles of governmental activity - some of which persist to 
this day - passed through several similar sequences in interwar East 
Central European countries. Yet throughout these changes and phases 
the bureaucratic political class formed the effective...virtually 
autonomous ruling class.55 
The Great Depression eroded the parliamentary regimes of the 1920s, which 
had protected the bureaucracy's ongoing power. This led to a replacement of the 
"old regimes" by royal, military or political dictatorships. 
In June 1928 Stjephan Radic and two Croat parliament members were 
assassinated. In 1929 King Aleksandar abolished the constitution and declared royal 
dictatorship over Yugoslavia. He tried to save Yugoslavia by creating a 
supranational Yugoslav patriotism. He was ready to abolish even the royal name of 
the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovens" in favor of Yugoslavia, meaning "South 
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Slavs". Slovenian, Serbian, Croatian and Macedonian extremists had, however, their 
own agendas for the future of Yugoslavia. 
The imposing domestic and diplomatic successes of the Nazis, which 
contrasted so vividly with the apparent stagnation and decadence of 
France, gave the impression that authoritarian dictatorship was the 
wave for the future. States of lesser power, especially new or restored 
states, generally take as their model the political institutions and 
values of the seemingly strongest and most successful Great Power of 
the day. On the morrow of World War I, it appeared to be France; 
after the Depression, it became Germany....Furthermore, and with 
specific reference to East Central Europe, Nazi Germany's policies 
rendered territorial revisionism realistically 'thinkable', and ethnic 
xenophobia.. .psychologically 'respectable. 'S6 
In   March   1931   Yugoslavia's   King   Aleksander   was   assassinated   by 
Macedonian and Croat extremists and a new authoritarian constitution in favor of 
police and military control was established. Germany meanwhile 
supplied capital goods for industry, encouraged the diversification of 
vulnerable one-crop agricultures, and offered a steady market at 
reasonable prizes. Nazi Germany's economic policy and behavior thus 
effectively supplemented its ideological, political, military, and 
diplomatic prowess in attracting Danubian and Balkan Europe to itself 
in the second half of 1930s. Though the Serbs recoiled at the last 
moment, the Yugoslav governments had also climbed on this 
bandwagon.57 
Despite the Versailles Treaty's aim of permanent diminution of German 
power, the post-Depression circumstances allowed Nazi-Germany to embark on a 
war in which Germany would be replaced by the Soviet Union as the region's 
hegemonic power: 
Nazi Germany acquired control over the region's economy by first 
dominating its exports, then (through exports) controlling its imports, 
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and finally rendering it utterly dependent on continued German 
purchases, supplies, spare parts, and infrastructure. In this way, 
Germany achieved a position approaching both monopsony and 
monopoly. By 1939 on the eve of World War n, Germany's economic 
hegemony over East Central Europe was more categorical than it had 
been in 1913, demonstrating that the political advantages that 
occurred to it from the replacement of the Habsburg Empire by 
several smaller states were paralleled by economic opportunities. Thus 
the combination of Nazi Germany's ideological, diplomatic, political, 
and economical drives paved the way for its military conquests. In one 
form or another, all the states of the region eventually succumbed to 
German offensives, as resisting victims (Poland, Yugoslavia), as 
passive victims (Czechoslovakia), as calculating satellites (Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria), as ephemerally 'independent' dependencies 
(Slovakia, Croatia), or as trophies from the mid-war collapse of Italy 
(Albania).58 
That Yugoslavia is listed as "resisting victim" ~ contrary to Croatia — became 
Tito's merit. The Communist movement in Yugoslavia had not influenced the course 
of events before Tito actually appeared on the scene. 
1.  Tito's Biography Before 1927 
Josip Broz, later known as Tito, was born in 1892 in Kumrovec in Croatia. 
The Croat town of Kumrovec is situated at the Sutla river, forming the border to 
Slovenia, in the province known as Zagorje. Few noteworthy events of his childhood 
are known. Nora Beloff59 wrote that "the details of his early life are hard to come 
by". The only evidence of Tito's achievements was his own testimony. 
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According to Tito's former friend and later critic, MilovauDjilas, who 
was very close to Tito throughout the war, "everyone, except his most 
slavish toadies, took Tito's self-mythologizing as harmless fun."60 
In Tito's case a distinct streak of "mythomania" added to the difficulty that 
influenced biographies. With regard to Tito's birthplace, Nora Beloff reports that 
both Croatia and Slovenia were, of course, still parts of the Habsburg 
Empire and both were Roman Catholic. But Croatia had belonged to 
Hungary for some 800 years and at that time formed part of the 
Hungarian side of the dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was not 
until the mid-nineteenth century that serfdom was abolished in the 
region (Tito's grandfather was one of the beneficiaries). Slovenian 
lands, on the other hand, were part of the hereditary Austrian 
territories and in the eighteenth century the peasants were already 
benefiting from Joseph H's enlightened despotism.61 
Due to the Habsburg tradition of preserving administrative records, Tito 
biographers know that as a child he survived a nearly-fatal diptheria attack. Once 
he finished school and had grown up, Tito 
went first to Zagreb, where he worked as a general mechanic in a 
workshop and then to Kamnik in Slovenia, where he joined the Sokol, 
a pan-Slav and pro-Yugoslav society....He was soon off to Bohemia, 
then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire...He then went on to 
Munich and worked for a while at Mannheim at the Benz automobile 
factory before going on to Vienna, where he was employed by 
Daimler....He obediently went home, when he was aged twenty-one, 
and was summoned for military service. He was assigned to a Croat 
infantry regiment and soon became the youngest NCO [non 
commissioned officer] in this unit.62 
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Nora Beioff reports that in 1908 Tito joined the Imperial Army. During this 
time many educated young people in Croatia and Slovenia were taken up with the 
idea of the unification of the Southern Slavs: Serbs, Croats and Slovenes merged 
into a single independent state. But in 1908 the Habsburgs formally annexed Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, two Slav provinces formerly within the Ottoman Empire. The 
Dual Monarchy responded to growing Slav restlessness by a mixture of carrot and 
stick: on the one hand, material concessions, on the other, the exploitation of latent 
differences between its Orthodox and Catholic subjects. When Tito came to power, 
he employed similar methods, earning him the sobriquet "the last of the Habsburgs". 
In June 1914 Gavrilo Princip, an eighteen-year-old, was recruited, armed and 
trained by the most fanatical wing of the Yugoslav movement. This armed faction 
was the Serb minority. 
Their leaders sent Princip to murder Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian 
throne. When war was declared Tito experienced warfare in the Imperial Army. 
There is no record that he had any misgivings about marching against 
Serbia but, in any case, a few month later his regiment was moved to 
the Russian front....For Tito's wartime experience, we have to rely 
almost entirely on his personal testimony. As he recalled, his 
regiment, having reached a tributary of the Dniestre River, was 
suddenly attacked and overwhelmed by fierce Circasssian warriors. 
Figthing off one Circassian bayonet, he was pierced in the back by 
another and left bleeding and unconscious....Tito claims he was 
takenby stage to the little town on the Volga near Kazan, where he 
spent a year in an Orthodox manastery which had been transformed 
into a military hospital. He was subsequently employed as a mechanic 
on the trans-Siberian railway.*3 
Nora Beloff continues to report that 
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According to his story, he made his way to Leningrad (then 
Petrograd), participating in Bolshevik demonstrations against the 
Kerensky Provisional Government...was locked up in the fortress of 
St Peter and St Paul and then sent to Omsk in Siberia. After the 
Bolsheviks took over he and other prisoners joined the Red Guard and 
helped protect the railways. When Omsk was recaptured by the 
Whites, Tito found refuge in the home of a beautiful fifteen-year-old 
Russian girl, already member of the Communist party, Pelagea 
Byelusnova, generally known a Polka. In flight from the the Whites, 
he said, he found a job as mill operator, in the services of...a Kirgiz 
tribal chieftain... [and]...when the Reds got back he returned to 
Polka, followed her into the Communist party and early in the 1920s 
married her in the little Orthodox church of Bogo\jubskoye near 
Omsk though he and Polka stayed long enough in Siberia to 
witness the Bolsheviks final victory, ....the young couple packed their 
few possessions, turned their back on the revolution and made their 
way, slowly via Leningrad and Vienna, to his childhood home 
Kumrovec,...now in a different country under another dynasty.64 
From 1921 to 1925 Tito worked in Zagreb as a flour mill operator and Polka 
produced four children, of which only one survived. Polka returned to Russia in 
1929 while Tito  was serving a prison sentence. 
2.  Tito's Ascent to Power 
In Yugoslavia the Bolshevik triumph in Russia, a contrast with the general 
chaos at home, helped the Communist party. 
In the first parliamentary elections for the Yugoslav assembly, they 
polled 12.4 per cent of the votes, notably by exploiting the discontent 
of ethnic minorities not yet adjusted to the new Yugoslavia. But they 
knew they could never win power by due electoral processes and they 
tried instead to break up the state by inciting separatism and 
revolution....In their frustration, the Communists resorted to terror. 
They tried and failed to assassinate the Prince Regent, later King 
Alexander I But they did manage to shoot and kill the Yugoslav 
Minister of the Interior, Milorad Draskovic... After Draskovic's 
murder the 59 elected Communist deputies were deprived of their 
mandate....Most of the Communist leadership fled the country, 
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established a Communist Central Committee abroad and involved 
themselves in esoteric doctrinal disputes.65 
It took Tito 13 years to achieve power in the Communist Yugoslav Party. At 
the mill in Zagreb in 1921 Tito had ample time to tell 
... nostalgic stories about his role in the Russian revolution. Having 
allowed his sympathies to be known, he was spotted in 1924 by Stevo 
Sabic, an educated middle-class Croat and former army officer, first 
in the Austro-Hungarian than in the Red Army. Unlike Tito he had 
stayed on in Russia to become part of the revolutionary apparatus.66 
It was the Comintern, as secret arm of Soviet foreign policy, which 
gave paid employment first to Sabic and, later, to the man who was 
to present himself as the incarnation of Yugoslav patriotism....It was 
as a trade-union organizer that Tito, guided and financed by his new 
friend Sabic, began his thirteen years' ascent from a rank-and-file 
member of a front organization to being endorsed by Stalin as 
Secretary General of a reconstituted Yugoslav Communist Party. 
Tito's zeal and flair impressed his colleagues. After successfully 
inciting strikes, first at the KraVJevica shipyard on the Adriatic, then 
at the railway repair workshop at Smederevo near Belgrade, he was 
appointed in 1927, legally, local secretary of [the] Zagreb Metal 
Workers' Union and, illegally, member of the party local Committee. 
By now he was a professional revolutionary, living off the Russians 
until 1939, when...the Yugoslav Communist Party was able to finance 
its operations from its own funds.67 
Tito was twice arrested and sent to prison both times. In the royalist era Tito 
even managed to get the son of his judge, Vladimir Bakaric, to become one of his 
closest followers. Tito was out of prison in 1928, during the perennial Serbo-Croat 
quarrel over the centralist Yugoslav state. 
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An extremist Montenegrin deputy shot Stjepan Radic. the popular Croat 
peasant leader. In the subsequent round-up, the police found a cache of weapons in 
Tito's lodging and he was subsequently arrested. The new regime handled its 
political prisoners differently. After Tito had declared himself Communist, an illegal 
act, he was sent to jail for an additional five years. Freed in 1933, Tito was ordered 
to go back to Kumrovec and report daily to the local police station, where the local 
police chief was an old schoolfellow. 
Within a few months of his release, Tito was invited to the Party's 
headquarters in Vienna and co-opted into the Central Committee. Tito returned with 
authority bestowed by membership in the Central Committee, and in September 
1934 he convened a Communist conference in the castle of Gornji Grad outside 
Ljubljana. The Comintern had already selected two of the younger of 30 
conspirators (Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kidric) for Moscow training, men who later 
became Tito's closest collaborators. 
In 1934, King Alexander I. attempted to save Yugoslavia in another effort 
to strengthen the bonds of the Little Entente, a group sponsored by France and 
formed by Yugoslavia, Romania and Czechoslovakia. Tito, by now a well-educated 
and trained believer in the communist international movement, did his best to break 
up Yugoslavia into the "worker-and-peasant states in Croatia, Dalmatia, Slovenia, 
Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Vojvodina." Tito intended to use the nationalism of 
these entities within the proper Marxist-Leninist context to push forward towards 
a future socialist world, in which there was no need and no place for a "Yugoslavia." 
Alexander set out for an official visit to France where he arrived on October 
9, 1934, and was murdered by an Ustasha terrorist in Marseilles. In Yugoslavia, 
Communists and their Ustasha associates became immediately targets of police 
investigations and action. Fearing police repression, Tito departed for Vienna and 
Moscow. In Moscow he was given a job in the Balkan section of the Comintern and 
in 1935 appointed Secretary of the Yugoslav delegation. 
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...in Moscow in 1938,...he and a colleague, Vladimir topic (later 
liquidated in the Stalinist purges) jointly translated Stalin's History of 
the Soviet Communist Party....Before he became party leader he 
virtually had no personal property, but in 1939, when the Yugoslav 
communist party, by then under his direction, ceased to depend on 
Russian subsidies...he drew on party funds to buy himself a 
vineyard.68 
Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union Stalin realized that Hitler no longer needed 
the German Communists to demolish the Weimar Republic. Instead, Hitler diverted 
national energies towards rearmament and preparations for war. Therefore all 
parties in Yugoslavia had to join in a "Popular Front" and support the new "anti- 
Fascist" line of parties opposed to Nazism throughout Europe. 
C.  THE SECOND WORLD WAR: CIVTL-WAR YUGOSLAVIA 
Tito successfully used the uncertainties of the war to achieve power over his 
rivals. His exploitation of ethnic nationalism to suit his agenda is well-documented. 
As a trained Communist, Tito followed Stalin's revolution from above, a 
revolutionary principle he admired. "Stalinism" became fixed, too, in the 
international movement. The Komunisticka partija Jogoslavihe (KPJ, Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia) was no exception to this rule. 
Stalin's task for Tito with respect to his responsibilities in Yugoslavia became 
very difficult. First, the Party had to cooperate with any other anti-Fascist political 
group. Second, Tito had to abandon his popular support for ethnic separatism and 
promote the defence and unity of Yugoslavia. Tito planned to prepare Yugoslavia's 
Communists for war and Yugoslavia as a potential ally for the Soviet Union. 
After the Axis aggression in April 1941, the royal government of 
Yugoslavia, headed by King Peter H, fled the country and ultimately 
established itself in London as an Allied government in exile. After the 
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Yugoslav armed forces capitulated to the Germans on April 17, the 
territory of Yugoslavia was either portioned outright among the Axis 
partners and their satellites (Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria) or 
incorporated into special occupational zones (Serbia, Banat). The 
unannexed portions of Croatia with Bosnia-Herzegovina formally 
became a new Axis ally, the Independent State of Croatia.69 
The Soviet government agreed to respect the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Yugoslavia in an effort to prevent the expansion of the war into the 
Balkans. Stalin signed a "Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact" with Belgrade in 
Moscow only hours before the Axis forces attacked Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941. 
Diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia were terminated by the Soviet Union on May 
8, 1941. 
In October 1940 the Yugoslav Communist party had 6,600 members. It began 
armed resistance with 12,000 members in 1941, with an end strength of 140,000 in 
1945.70 
In order to cooperate with other anti-Fascist groups Tito could count upon 
17,800 additional members in the Savez koministicke omladine Jogoslavije (SKOJ, 
League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia). By June 1941 he was able to inform 
Stalin that he had reached an agreement with DragUjub Javonovic, the leader of 
Servia's Left Agrarians. The aims of the agreement were full of communist 
revolutionary enthusiasm: 
(1) Joint struggle against the occupiers. 
(2) Joint struggle for Soviet power and alliance with the USSR. 
(3) Joint struggle against English agents and attempts to restore the old 
order. 
(4) Joint struggle against the stirring up of national hatred. 
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(5) Joint committees of the worker peasant alliance.71 
Tito formed the elite First Proletarian National Liberation Shock Brigade on 
December 21,1941, Stalin's birthday. He also openly embraced the iconography of 
international communism, a five-pointed red star and hammer and sickle. By doing 
so, he promoted the aims of International Communism too fast for the Soviets, 
because the survival of the Soviet Union depended on a strong coalition with the 
United States and Great Britain. 
As nothing could be done to offend the British or their Yugoslav clients in 
London, Stalin even proposed that Tito cooperate with the Commander of the 
Royalist Yugoslav Army. The Royalist Serb soldiers were called Chetniks and 
commanded by General Draza Michailovic. General Michailovic' acted as the 
Minister of War for the Yugoslav Government, which was exiled in London. He and 
Tito met first on September 17, 1941, and a second time on October 19, 1941. 
What was to be remembered however is that Tito and his men never 
wavered in their intention of using the collapse of the Yugoslav state 
as an opportunity for replacing it by a Communist dictatorship and 
that this inevitably brought them into collision with Michailovic's 
people who were fighting to preserve precisely what the Partisans were 
trying to destroy.72 
For the second meeting Tito set up a "National Committee of Liberation" and 
submitted twelve conditions to Michailovic as a concession for going into 
partnership: 
As an officer, still pledged to the King, he refused to recognize the 
authority of Tito's committees and rejected the proposal for joint 
court martials to carry through purges inside the armed forces.73 
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Michailovic still regarded the Partisans as dangerous, but assumed they were 
on the Yugoslav side against Nazi Germany. Tito's view was completely different. 
He and the other Communists disagreed over when Michailovic should be 
eliminated. 
By the end of 1941, fighting both between the Yugoslavs and against 
the occupiers had spread into Bosnia, Montenegro, Dalmatia, Lika 
and other Serb-inhabited areas all over the country. But it was at 
Ravna Gora that the Partisans and Michailovil's forces initiated a 
conflict which was to last until 1947, by which time Michailoviö had 
been shot as a traitor, and the last bands of Chetniks had been 
rounded up and executed by the Partisans and the Communist secret 
police.74 
British support for Michailovic faded away because Britain's priority was the 
struggle on the ground against the Axis powers. 
To this end they [the British] were to support whoever was prepared to kill the most 
Germans.... There were in fact three reasons why the British dropped Michailovic 
in favor of Tito. In the first place, Tito had convinced them that, unlike Michailovid, 
he was a serious ally against the Germans. But he had also given a strong impression 
that, also unlike Michailovic and his largely Serb Chetniks, he and his partisan 
movement enjoyed broad support among all Yugoslav nations. Finally his forces 
controlled a much larger territory.75 
Tito benefited greatly from the spy activity in Cairo's Special Operations 
Executive Office (SOE). Well-placed disinformation supported the Communist case 
in London. 
74
 Beioff, Nora, TUo's Flawed Legacy, pp. 70-71. 
75
 Cviic, Christopher, Remaking the Balkans, p. 20. 
64 
1. Disinformation by Communist Spies 
A revisionist school of thought argues that the decision to drop Michailovil 
and to support Tito was a tragic mistake. London's decision was due partly to overly 
optimistic reports by some British liaison officers on Tito's military capabilities. It 
was also due to deliberate pro-Tito and anti-Michailovid disinformation by 
communists and fellow-travellers in key British organizations such as the SOE: 
In the European continent, in those days, the words 'British 
Intelligence Service' still evoked a highly coordinated network of 
professional agents, masterminded undeviatingly in the higher interest 
of the British Empire. The reality, as Graham Greene, Malcolm 
Muggeridge and many others personally involved have told us, was 
very different. The miscellaneous bunch who staffed the ad hoc special 
services tended to spend as much time fighting each other as fighting 
the enemy. And as Andrew Boyle has shown, the intrigue, secrecy and 
unaccountability of these proliferating bodies provided ideal conditions 
for subversive activities.76 
Furthermore to Tito's advantage, the internal organisation of the British 
foreign service was adjusted in a way that would inadvertently help the Partisan 
cause. 
The opportunity of the Westerners dedicated to the Partisan cause 
came in 1943 primarily because of the changed military situation. 
Responsibility for contacts with the resistance movements in 
Yugoslavia consequently shifted from London to Cairo and whereas 
the personnel in the London office was stolidly anti-Communist and 
consistently underestimated both the fighting strength and the internal 
discipline of the Partisans, the key people in Cairo were ideologically 
and, at least in one case operationally, committed to the Communist 
cause. As these were in control of British and, until 1944, also of 
American intelligence-gathering, they were in an unchallengeable 
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position to select, direct and repress material coming from the 
(Yugoslavian) field. 77 
These circumstances (fortuitous for the Yugoslav Partisans) demolished 
Michailovid and helped Tito gain power. But the strategic power play to organize the 
post-war geography — and with it to determine the destiny of Yugoslavia ~ was 
coordinated between the Allied Powers in defeating the Third Reich. The 
Percentages Agreement of October 9,1944 negotiated between Winston S. Churchill 
and Stalin in the Kremlin, designed only as wartime arrangement, became very 
important. 
Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in 
Romania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. 
Don't let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and 
Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have 90 percent 
predominance in Romania, for us to have 90 percent of the say in 
Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia.78 
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The Percentages Agreement became the base-line for the iron curtain. In 
order to receive British respect and support Tito had glorified his Partisan 
movement. The main argument the British Premier Winston S. Churchill used to 
impress President Franklin D. Roosevelt in order to gain American support for Tito 
was that the Yugoslav Partisans had the ability to pin down 33 Nazi Divisions. This 
again became an important well-placed disinformation. 
D.  CONSOLIDATING TITO'S POWER 
Tito's aims were in harmony with the "national" aims of the peoples of 
Yugoslavia. Above all, Tito's vision of Yugoslavia would provide protection against 
the enemies they feared: the Slovenes feared Germany and Italy, the Croats feared 
Italy and Serbia and the Macedonians feared Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. 
In November-December 1942 the Central Yugoslav leadership met at the first 
Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation and accepted in its declaration that each 
group's future would be determined in accordance with each group's wishes: 
The National Liberation Movement fully recognizes the national rights 
of Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia and all other regions. It is a 
movement which is as much Croatian, as it is Slovene and Serbian. It 
guarantees that the national rights of all peoples of Yugoslavia will be 
preserved.79 
In November 1943, however, now with the full recognition of Tito's 
leadership by the United Kingdom and the support by the United States, and most 
important with the end of the war at hand, Tito dropped visions of national rights 
for the various Yugoslav peoples: 
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On the basis of the right of all nations to self-determination, including 
the union with or secession from other nations, and in accordance with 
the true will of all nations of Yugoslavia, tested during the three 
years of common national struggle for liberation which has cemented 
the indissoluble fraternity of all the peoples of Yugoslavia, the Anti- 
Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia passes the 
following decisions: 1. The peoples of Yugoslavia do not recognize and 
never have recognized the partition of Yugoslavia by Fascist 
Imperialists, but have proved in the common armed struggle their 
firm will to remain united in Yugoslavia.80 
This statement completely ignored the civil war realities and should therefore 
read, as Walker Connor states, 
that the nations of Yugoslavia have proved by their propensity to 
engage in interethnic, genocidal conflict with their neighbors, their 
firm will to achieve independent statehood.81 
1.  Solving the National Question by Creating the Myth of the Heroic 
Partisans 
Conventional history portrays the Second World War as Yugoslavia's anti- 
fascist struggle. A closer examination reveals numerous nationalist agendas. Tito 
owed his Partisan victory to his understanding of these national concerns. He 
successfully manipulated and skillfully exploited them for his own international 
communist power-seeking ends. 
Michailovic's Chetniks shared a fear with most Serbs of the Croats of Ante 
Pavelic's so-called Ustasha 'insurgent' regime. The Ustasha tried to expel the ethnic 
Serbs living in Croatia to German-occupied Serbia. Once this became impossible, 
they were sent to concentration camps. But the Serbs fought not only Bosnian 
Muslims and Albanians; Serbs also opposed Serbs in civil war: Serb Royalists 
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against Serb Partisans, Royalists against the German puppet Nedic's army, and 
Nedic's army against the Partisans. During the war, when all sides annihilated 
opponents challenging their leadership, the Serb factor within the Partisans grew 
steadily. Many Serbs living in Croatia joined the Partisan ranks in Croatia in 1941 
to avoid the persecution of the Pavelic regime and many Chetniks joined after Tito 
proclaimed an amnesty in 1943. Tito's mobilization in Serbia in 1944 to repulse the 
Germans and the final victory without Soviet Russian help increased the total 
number of Serbs in the later Yugoslav army. 
2. Purpose and Reality of 33 Fabricated Axis Divisions 
Christopher Cviic states that the present vigorous debate about who was or 
was not really fighting the Germans and why, and about the actual role of the 
Communists in the British change of policy is still in full spate: 
For the pro-Partisans at Cairo the demolition of Michailovic was not 
enough. In order to justify maximizing military and political support 
to their friends it was also necessary to convince Western governments 
of the ^dispensability of the Partisans in the war effort....By the 
summer of 1943 Churchill, briefed by SOE Cairo, felt able to inform 
Roosevelt that the Partisans were 'pinning down' 33 Axis divisions. In 
reality Axis troops in Yugoslavia never exceeded 30 divisions of which 
at that time only seven were German and most of these were battered 
and diminished units back from the Russian Front or youngsters in 
training. One of them was an SS division composed of locally 
recruited volunteers under German cadres, most of them Yugoslavs 
of German ethnic origin. The Italians never had more than sixteen 
divisions in Yugoslavia, all qualitatively below average strength, and 
the rest of the occupation force was recruited, either voluntarily or 
forcibly, from the native communities. Some Moslems preferred to 
serve in an SS division rather than join the Pavelic Croat army....On 
24 September 1943 the Commander-in-Chief of the German forces 
visited Hitler to protest that he was expected to hold down a front of 
5.000 km with ten poor-quality divisions; In October 1943, that is 
after the Italian collapse, the occupation troops in Yugoslavia 
consisted of fifteen German and eight Bulgarian and Croat divisions, 
nothing like enough to make up for the units lost by the Italian 
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withdrawal. By June 1944 the Germans had no more than eighteen 
divisions of their own in the whole Balkan theatre.82 
Once the Allied leadership was convinced of the value of the Partisan 
movement, Tito exploited it to destroy his rivals and build patriotism around it. The 
theme of the patriotic struggle could be used as unifying propaganda, whereas the 
historical record suggests that the real Partisan war contribution was doubtful: 
According to the official German war records, the German losses 
between 22 June 1941 and 1 April 1945 for the entire Balkan theatre, 
both killed and missing, were 20,256 men including 394 officers. These 
included casualties incurred in Albania, Bulgaria and Greece as well 
as Yugoslavia (against both Michailovic's and Tito's forces). Most of 
the losses weresustained not against the Partisans but during the 
Soviet and Bulgarian attacks on the retreating army in 1944/45.83 
The Partisans claimed losses of 305,000 killed and 425,000 wounded; but - 
they said — they participated in the victory 'without' Soviet-Russian help. In the 
end, however, the Red Army forced the Germans into retreat, thus liberating 
Belgrade. In the Spring of 1945 the Communists attained power over the whole of 
Yugoslavia, which became a Socialist Peoples Republic on November 29, 1945. 
E.  CREATING TTTOISM 
Tito was elected as the Committee Secretary General in 1945 and immediately 
embarked on nationalization and industrialization programs. Tito's foreign policy 
challenged the Western Allies in Austria and Italy, with territorial claims — 
unsuccessfully, however. These territorial claims upset the Western Allies and 
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caused major problems for Stalin, who wanted to keep his sphere of influence as 
agreed by Churchill in October 1944 unchallenged. Stalin expected to achieve 
ideological and overall supremacy in world Communism for the Soviet Union's 
Communist party by creating the Cominform: 
Delegates from nine Communist parties - the Soviet, Polish, 
Czechoslavak, Hungarian, Yugoslav, Romanian, Bulgarian, French, 
and Italian - attended the founding session of the Cominform 
(Communist Information Bureau) in the Silesian Spa of Szklarska 
Poreba on September 22 to 27,1947. The hithero acceptable notion of 
distinctive national paths to socialism (which had left the pace and 
forms of political andsocioeconomic transformation to local discretion) 
was rejected. 
Of course, the more the Soviet Union insisted on uniformity, 
radicalization, imitation of itself, and unquestioning acknowledgement 
of its imperial priorities in East Central Europe, the more it was 
obliged to intervene explicitly in the domestic affairs of the area's 
states and to seek direct administrative control of their Communist 
parties. This proclivity, however, brought it into conflict with Tito's 
Yugoslav Communists, who, their own radicalism and admiration of 
the Soviet model notwithstanding, treasured even more their autonomy 
and cohesion, hard-won as they had been during the bitter wartime 
Partisan struggles.84 
Tito was convinced to press for International Communism and in following 
Stalin's communist economic model Yugoslavia in 1946 -1947 started comprehensive 
nationalization that took in everything down to the smallest village shop. 
1.  Pushing Communism Too Fast: Dropped by the U.S.S JR. 
So deep were the divisions in Yugoslav society in 1945 that the 
Communist party had little with which to hold the country together 
except the partisan myth, promises of a future cornucopia, and 
coercive force. The break with the Cominform certainly helped in this 
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respect, for even anticommunists rallied to Tito rather than risk 
Sovietization.85 
To reach out to the "promising" future, despite the very poor shape of their 
economy, Yugoslavia's leaders enhanced their revolutionary self-respect by pushing 
forward with collectivization, showing that despite Soviet criticism, Yugoslavia's 
communist orthodoxy was still intact. 
Tito's foreign policy was guided by the vision of establishing Communist rule 
throughout the Balkans to prepare for the final Communist stage of international 
revolution. He therefore supported the Greek Communists in the ongoing civil war 
in Greece in 1945. Stalin pursued his method for imposing political and structural 
order on the East Central European Communists. The Soviet interests made it 
essential for Moscow to break with Tito, whose actions in the Balkans threatened to 
destabilize the entire Percentages Agreement.86 
Despite Stalin's moves to restrain Tito, the Balkan region recaptured the 
attention of the United States'. The U.S. and the Western Europeans incorporated 
both Greece and Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. When the 
expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform on June 28. 1948 finally became 
manifest, Tito decided in 1949 to close his frontiers to Greek guerrillas. Relations 
with Stalin deteriorated to such a degree that the Western powers had to provide 
economic and military aid and to protect Yugoslavia from Soviet threats of 
aggression. In 1953, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey concluded a Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation in Ankara. In 1954 these same countries signed a treaty 
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containing a formal pledge of mutual military assistance in case of attack.87 Later 
the U.S. made it obvious that Yugoslavia despite its Communist government would 
be supported by American financial aid and a fifty-fifty solution was again achieved. 
2. Western Policy: Keeping Tito Afloat 
Western aid helped to deny Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union and thus was a 
relatively inexpensive means of strengthening NATO's Southern Flank. The Truman 
administration provided $20 million in aid in 1949. 
By 1955, at the end of the first period of large-scale Western aid, 
Yugoslavia had received $600m worth of American economic 
assistance, of which only $55m was in the form of repayable loans. 
Military aid provided by the United states during the same period 
amounted to just under $600 m. By 1960, Western aid and 'soft' 
credits had reached $2 billion. Later Western aid continued to be 
channeled mainly through international organizations, such as the 
IMF, the World Bank and the European Community.88 
Without such enormous substantial support, it would have been impossible 
for Yugoslavia to sustain its independence after 1948, especially since Stalin imposed 
an economic blockade by the Soviet Union and its satellites. More important for the 
further development of Yugoslavia was the fact that foreign Western aid allowed 
Tito to create the federal framework for Yugoslav development. This framework 
allowed each Yugoslav republic to pursue its own economic policy,within the bounds 
of centrally determinated parameters. Yugoslavia's economy subsequently depended 
on Western loans. 
3. Tito's Creation: Yugoslavia's Federal Units 
In 1945, Tito owed his Partisan victory to his understanding of Yugoslav 
national concerns. He successfully manipulated and skillfully exploited them for his 
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own international communist power-seeking ends. After the Soviet-Yugoslav break, 
Moscow's support for Yugoslav communism faded while Tito continued to define a 
unique communist path for Yugoslavia. To promotes positive interethnic relations 
in an interepublican context, he tried to satisfy the nationalities by granting limited 
sovereignty in the form of autonomous federal units. 
Contrary to popular belief, Yugoslav decentralization did not originate 
in 1965. The Communist party of Yugoslavia (CPY) became the 
League of Communists (LCY) in 1952, and that transformation 
expanded the jurisdiction enjoyed by republican and local party 
organizations over economic enterprises and projects. As early as 
1950, the textile and leather industries had been transferred from 
federal to republican control: coal, electrical, chemical and certain 
consumer-goods industries followed, and by the end of 1952, it was 
possible to speak of effective economic decentralization....By 1965, the 
federal government no longer had any direct means of control over 
enterprises.89 
Federal units were created for different purposes: the most important one was 
the nationality issue: creating eight federal units to prevent the Serbs from 
dominating Yugoslavia. During the final Partisan victory huge numbers of Serbs 
were involved. The Serbs therefore received a republic consisting of Serbia proper 
with the nominally autonomous provinces of Vojvodina in the north and (most 
important from a cultural and historical viewpoint in Serbian eyes,) Kosovo, the 
center of Serbia's medieval state, in the south. In addition, during the first two 
decades of the postwar period, the Serbs enjoyed a dominant position in Croatia and 
Bosnia, despite being a minority in both republics. This political domination lasted 
until 1966, when Tito dismissed Alexander Rankovic, a Serb and powerful security 
chief and party cadre secretary. Rankovic's brutal policies against ethnic Albanians 
in Kosovo and ethnic Hungarians in the Vojvodina could no longer be tolerated. 
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Gale Stokes calls Rankovic's rule a "rebirth of Serbian hegemonism"90 By replacing 
Rankovic, who "viewed the Serbo-Croatian-speaking Muslims as a religious, not an 
ethnic group," Tito lifted "Rankovic's iron-handed sway." Tito allowed the Bosnian 
Muslims in 1968 to be classified as "nation."91 The other setback for the Serb 
agenda was the abandonment of Macedonia, called "old Serbia" in pre-war 
Yugoslavia, and since then beyond the reach of Serbia's influence. The last two 
republics formed were Croatia and Slovenia. 
With the proclamation of the authority of each republic's party and the 
confirmation by the Ninth Party Congress of March 1969, the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia comprised eight constituent bodies, one each for the 
republics and one each for the two autonomous provinces. The conflicts among the 
eight constituent bodies became dominated by the national cleavages beginning in the 
1970s. 
F.  SUSTAINING TTTOISM 
The declaration of eight federal units, with their size forced upon Serbia by 
Tito, could not alone solve the nationality problem nor could decentralization and 
re-collectivisation create a functioning and balanced economy. 
1.  Funding Yugoslavia's Underdeveloped Regions: FADURK 
Once the Communist administration set to work, Yugoslavia's agriculture and 
its war-torn industry had to be developed : 
There are two basic strategies of directed economic development: (1) 
sector development, emphasizing the optimal development of each 
sector of the economy, with a view to the well being of the entire 
country and (2) regional development, treating each of a plurality of 
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regional units as a discrete subject of policy and giving rise to 
tendencies towards autarky. Although the former strategy has the 
advantage by utilitarian calculations, it confronts the difficulty in 
multiethnic environments, of alienating entire nationality groups.92 
The first Five-Year plan and the following One-Year plans (1947- 
51,1952,1953) displayed appreciation for the need to develop the southern regions. 
These plans were ruined by the Cominform blockade and the Soviet embargo. 
Decentralization in 1952 enabled the federal units to control their enterprises 
without central influence and to invest in prestigious projects.93 Parallel 
development in the northern regions94 encouraged competition which was largely 
unsuccessful in the poorer southern regions. The result was a widening north-south 
economic gap. It became clear by the early 1960s that the policy of attempting to 
accelerate the development of the underdeveloped regions through unregulated 
federal grants had failed. In February 1965, the Federal Fund for the Accelerated 
Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and Kosovo (FADURK) was created. 
The Tenth Congress of the LYC in May 1974 evaluated the results and concluded 
that within its first decade the program had failed to narrow the developmental gap 
between the north and the south. Yugoslavia was still living on foreign loans without 
catching up with West European standars of economic performance. 
2.  Running Yugoslavia's Economy: Self-Management 
Yugoslavia's leaders argued for a so-called "third way", a small path situated 
between capitalism and communism. A market economy combined with central 
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planning was supposed to lead Yugoslavia to prosperity. After a horrendous 
drop in agricultural production in 1953 the decision to de-collectivize was made. 
'Land ownership' more extensive than a so-called 'agrarian maximum' of 10 
hectares, however, was not allowed; and no real profits could be made. 
As for industrial production 'self-management' of the worker was supposed 
to enable them to share communist achievements. In broad lines this system of self- 
management developed 
in three main phases, covering three decades. The first, in the 
1950s, allowed the workers' councils to share in the management of 
their factories, though the state held on to the main levers of economic 
power. The second, in the 1960s, represented a 
tentative move towards a market economy. The third, 
in the 1970s, marked a regress back to state-control, though,...the 
controls were now dispersed between the Federation's eight units.9s 
To attain the benefits of this economic system Yugoslavia embarked upon 
socialist planning: One-Year and Five-Year Plans. 
Borba, Yugoslavia's offificial newspaper, unveiled on July 16, 1984, that "the 
common characteristic of development of many if not all One-Year and Five Year 
Plans is, that during the past decades they are never realized." IT the Yugoslavs 
could be shown to have created a free and relatively prosperous 
society, there would still be a little hope left for those who believe that 
collectivism is not necessarily incompatible with democracy. At first, 
indications to this effect were encouraging: the Communist takeover 
in Yugoslavia coincided with the early phases of the country's 
industrial take-off period: this meant, for a time, dazzlingly rapid 
rates of economic growth. These were paid for...primarily by 
exploiting the peasants and by inflation rather than savings and they 
were prolonged by a continued influx of foreign credits. Yet for 
Westerners disgusted by the blemishes of their own free enterprise 
society there was a desperate search for any possible alternative. And 
for believers in workers' cooperatives and co-ownership, Yugoslavia 
seemed to be providing a fascinating pilot-plant. Few who went to see, 
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had the intellectual honesty of Professor Harold Lydall96, who, 
having been deeply impressed by the success of the Mondragon Co- 
operative in Spain decided to make a detailed analysis of Yugoslavia, 
which he had supposed "was the world's only predominantly labour- 
cooperative economy". A closer look induced a reluctant confession: 
"In view of all the high hopes and instinctive beliefs associated with 
the idea of self-management, it is disagreeable to have to concede that 
it has turned out to be not much more than a vast public relations 
exercise."97 
Despite the various plans and decades of plan-fulfilling, the average Yugoslav 
never could enjoy economic growth or benefit from his labour. Many workers 
earned their money in Western Europe (a huge percentage laboured as guest- 
workers in Germany) to support their families left behind in Yugoslavia. The 
information from abroad brought into Yugoslavia by such workers may have taken 
away the last illusion that self-management would ever be successful. 
G. TTTO'S WEAKNESS: HIS HERITAGE 
Tito created Yugoslavia with a vision: to create a revolutionary Marxist 
state. In it the nationalities would be treated equally in a voluntary union of separate 
peoples. The state's leadership was bonded together by the Partisan experience and 
Tito's unquestioned authority. This Yugoslavia 
created by the Partisans [was] finally buried in June 1991, when the 
so-called People's Army outside legitimate political control attacked 
one of the nation states making up the Partisan-created federation: 
Slovenia.98 
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The masterpiece he left behind fell apart within one decade. 
Under Tito, Yugoslavia created a unique system which was considered 
to be a viable alternative to the Soviet bloc of Socialistic states. And 
for a long time in fact it was. Tito was a masterful politician. His 
quest for power was stronger than his loyalty or fear of the USSR and 
he was clever enough to let the West pay the price for Yugoslav 
independence from the Soviet Union. As a result, the Yugoslavs lived 
well and had a reputation and a political clout in world matters way 
beyond their real economic or demographic significance." 
Once the international security environment changed, the coercive power of 
the Soviet Union had faded away and with it the strategic importance of Yugoslavia 
for the West. The various peoples of Yugoslavia then left their voluntary union and 
within some months 'Brotherhood and Unity' disappeared. The chance to reform the 
Yugoslav Utopia and to prepare for real independance and sovereignty most 
probably was given away already in the mid-sixties, as Magas Branka wrote. The 
political order established by Tito had some 
"significant negative elements", as it was "far from democratic, 
however more open and liberal than the Soviet alternative."...In the 
mid-sixties Tito personally intervened to stop economic reforms, as he 
felt his communist power bases could be threatened, and for the same 
reason removed the Serb and Sloven liberals from the Communist 
Party and the government. In looking back that was the first real 
opportunity to change the future course of events.100 
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None of the heirs of Tito's legacy, neither the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia, nor the federal units themselves were able to keep the Yugoslav 
Federation together. 
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IV      MILOSEVIC'S YUGOSLAVIA: GREATER SERBIA 1985-1995 
A.  INTRODUCTION: TITO'S HERITAGE 
The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the tragic consequence of an 
extremely unfavorable confluence of international and internal 
developments. The end of the division of the world on the basis of the 
confrontional blocs had coincided with the first steps toward the 
establishment of democratic institutions in Bosnia. However, the 
process of establishing the basic integrative elements of a democratic 
society had only begun when war overwhelmed the new state. 10112 
The internal developments in former Yugoslavia with respect to the ongoing 
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina are examined in this chapter. Yugoslavia's internal 
dynamics required Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia to take the road to 
international recognition and sovereignty. To proceed in this way was impossible for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The chapter identifies the tensions which spurred Yugoslavia's 
internal development and the origins of the war. Because Gorbachev's reforms in 
the Soviet Union contributed to the fall of Communism, the Yugoslav Communist 
leaders deliberately avoided any reform in their systems for as long as possible for 
fear that their power base would be threatened. 
Nationalism in its most radical form of politicized ethnicity was one of the 
vehicles former communist leaders used to promote their "hidden" and nationalist 
agendas. Four previous communist leaders are acting as presidents in the former 
Yugoslavia's constituent parts in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and 
Macedonia. The way these leaders were able to achieve recognition by the United 
Nations for their countries is also analyzed. Explaining internal tensions and what 
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in the future has to be done to overcome them - if this is at all possible - is also 
addressed. 
The introduction examines Tito's clever arrangement, which froze the internal 
multiethnic, multireligious and economic situation he inherited and partly created 
in Yugoslavia. The following section highlights the Belgrade Serbs' motives and their 
common and distinct support for all Serbs inside Yugoslavia: the Croatian Serbs as 
well as the Bosnian ones. Section three displays how nationalism united the Croats 
in response to Serbia's revival of nationalism. 
The Slovenes were able to "row their boat ashore" (Section four) before being 
capsized in the rough seas from the Greater Serbian blast - one that is still 
vehemently roaring through the Balkans - when the Serb agenda collided with the 
Croat one. The Macedonians were able to arrange international recognition for their 
sovereignty (Section five) well before the war between Croatia and Serbia 
highlighted the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina region (Section six). The chapter 
concludes on the internal aspects of Milosevic's Yugoslavia (Section seven). 
1.  A Yugoslavia Beyond Real Economic and Demographic Significance 
Josip Broz, called Tito, was the Croat partisan leader who organized 
a local later national resistance movement during World War n. This 
movement was first directed against occupying Nazi Germany. Tito 
later turned to the Soviet Communist party in order to achieve 
supremacy over the former Serbian Royalists of the 'Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovens', called the Chetniks, fighting the fascist 
Croatian Ustasha and all other political formations striving for power. 
Of the 1.7 million Yugoslavs killed during World War n, one million 
were victims of the civil war that raged within the larger conflict. Tito 
constructed his Yugoslavia as a delicately balanced mechanism 
designed to prevent a resumption of the ethnic slaughter among the 
south Slavs.102 
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The structures Tito developed for his communist country resembled Lenin's 
Soviet Union during the twenties, where a federal organization attempted to reduce 
the genuine, ethnic Russian influence inside the Soviet Union. However, soon after 
Lenin's death Stalin, the Georgian, tilted Lenin's balancing structures in favor of 
the Russians. 
Tito's containment of the Serb majority within Yugoslavia was carefully 
designed to restrict a Serbian state and the Serb ethnic group within the ethnic 
spectrum of Yugoslavia. His plan consisted of three major facts: a strong 
Communist party apparatus provided the power basis, a reliable police apparatus 
among other agencies of repression (including the Yugoslav army) controlled the 
states, and finally a Socialist Yugoslavia as a federation. 
Tito gave two Serb provinces autonomy as federal entities, creating a Serb- 
dominated Montenegro (a geographical rather then a political entity meaning "Black 
Mountains") as another independent federal part. He also cemented the imperial 
Austro-Hungarian-created Croatian border of Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus dividing 
Croatian Serbs from Bosnian Serbs. This arrangement presented the ethnic Serb 
group from uniting and becoming demographically dominant with respect to 
Yugoslavia as whole. Instead, the Serbs became "dominant minorities" inside Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Croatia.   Tito's Yugoslavia 
created by the Partisans [was] finally buried in June 1991, when the 
so-called People's Army outside legitimate political control attacked 
one of the nation states making up the Partisan-created federation: 
Slovenia.103 
Under Tito, Yugoslavia created a unique system which was considered 
to be a viable alternative to the Soviet bloc of Socialistic states. And 
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for a long time in fact it was. Tito was masterful politician. His quest 
for power was stronger then his loyalty or fear of the USSR and he 
was clever enough to let the West pay the price for Yugoslav' 
independence from the Soviet Union. As a result, the Yugoslavs lived 
well and had a reputation and a political clout in world matters way 
beyond their real economic or demographic significance.104 
The political order established by Tito had some 
significant negative elements [and was] far from democratic, however 
more open and liberal than the Soviet alternative....In the mid-sixties 
Tito personally intervened to stop economic reforms, as he felt his 
communist power bases could be threatened, and for the same reason 
removed the Serb and Sloven liberals from the Communist Party and 
the government. In looking back that was the first real opportunity to 
change the future course of events. It also was a strong blow to the 
Serbs.105 
In 1974 
Tito gave his blessing to the constitution which made Yugoslavia a 
con-federal federation and conferred the status of statehood on both 
Yugoslavia and its republics....[a]t the same time. ...Serbia was 
reduced in political status to a second-rate republic in Yugoslavia, 
since two of its provinces were elevated into federal units.... This was 
the second blow to the Serbs....After Tito the loss of positive political 
dynamics produced internal pressures and tensions. The first to 
surface openly were the economic tensions, caused by Yugoslavia's 
increasing foreign debt, superimposed on an increasingly growing 
inefficient economic system dubbed the 'contractual economy' since it 
was neither a command nor a market driven one.106 
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At Tito's death in 1980 an authentic outpouring of Yugoslav 
patriotism could be observed, however the country had already 
entered a period of dramatic and disintegrative change. The two paths 
at the crossroad led towards democratization [necessary to arrive at 
a liberal market economy] or towards repression [and keeping the 
communist bureaucracy in power]....Already 1981 in Kosovo force 
was used against student-led demonstrations and in 1984 in Belgrade 
intellectuals were put on trail for taking part in unofficial debating 
societies....In the sixties Tito's Yugoslavia had embarked in the 
decentralization which was embodied in the country's 1974 
constitution. This should preclude the federal Party and state organs 
from acting as effective instruments for conservative reaction 
especially as those were spearheaded by active or retired army and 
police chiefs... 
Tito's decentralization intended to strengthen the power of the 
republics and provinces but without significant loosening of the still 
communist ruling party's monopoly of political initiative.107 
In the political and economic debate following Tito's death, the big question 
was, which economic reforms and which political changes have to be implemented 
in order to revive the economy? "Milosevic was then a young upcoming liberal 
reformer."108 
The federal Party and state were already in a deep crisis over a multitude of 
questions which the Thirteenth Congress in 1986 had done nothing to resolve. The 
disarray of the ruling party became evident at its 1988 all-Yugoslav conference, 
which brought to public attention the existence of two main ideological fronts within 
it: one represented by Milosevic, the other by the Slovene leader Milan Kucan. 
Kucan sought a democratic reform within the framework of the party, one which 
would guarantee minority rights. This demand was denounced as an attack on party 
unity, causing the first step towards the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Kucan's idea 
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would have meant recognizing the right of each republic to follow its own path to 
socialism. 
In the absence of a positive and progressive alignment of the political 
forces and in the presence of a deteriorating economic situation, the 
politicians in the various republics perceived the situation as a zero- 
sum game ~ the gain of one being the loss of the other - thus the logic 
of the situation became increasingly confrontional.1 109 
Before the outbreak of the crisis no political force in Yugoslavia - not even 
the Slovenes -considered the maintenance of Yugoslavia an impossibility: the 
objective was to change Yugoslavia's economic and political structures. Two possible 
paths might have led Yugoslavia out of Tito's heritage - already referenced as 
reform or repression. The Slovene leader Kucan became President of Slovenia, 
whereas his opponent, the former 'young upcoming liberal reformer' Milosevic, 
became Serbia's President. The personalities of these two are important to analyze 
as their development is directly related to the fate of their particular republics. An 
effort will be undertaken to paint a portrait of Milosevic first, then note Kucan, as 
he led his country successfully through a ten-days war with Serbia and on to a better 
future. Thirdly, a discussion of Tudjman, who is still at war with the Serb leader, 
is important because of his attempt to cut a deal with him in slicing up President 
Izetbegovic's Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kiro Gligorov assembled the Macedonians into 
a sovereign state, one which is still distrusted and not recognized by Greece. 
It is almost impossible to deal in unbroken chronology with the goals of the 
different republics once they shifted their emphasis away from maintaining the 
integrity of the Yugoslav Republic. All of them, not only the Serbs in Belgrade, in 
the Krajina, in Bosnia, in the Vojvodina and in Kosovo, but also the Slovenes, the 
Croats in Dalmatia, in Herceg-Bosna and on the River Sava, the Macedonians as 
well as the Albanians in Kosovo and the Montenegrins, pursued their own agendas 
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and self-interest, and most of these agendas at the expense of what was once Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. 
B. REVIVAL OF SERB NATIONALISM AND GREATER SERBIA 
Serb Nationalism bears the greatest responsibility (albeit not exclusively) for 
the tragic outcome of the attempt to change Yugoslavia's political and economic 
structures. One cannot study Yugoslavia nor understand Serbia and the war of 
Yugoslav succession without examining the role of Slobodan Milosevic, who as the 
leader of Serbia is widely regarded as the initiator and instigator of the war in the 
region. He is the leader of Serbian imperialism and implicitly responsible for many 
of the war crimes in Bosnia-Herzigovina. The irony is that Serbia needed Yugoslavia 
the most: it was the arrangement by which all Serbs lived in one country. Now as 
Yugoslavia is destroyed, the Serbs are the biggest losers from the destruction. Once 
the economic and political structures of Yugoslavia could be changed, the three 
objectives for Serbia were as follows: 
1) to improve Serbia's position within the former Yugoslavia by becoming a stronger 
Serbia 
2) the establishment of a Greater Serbia from the ruins of Yugoslavia 
3) the inheritance of a "Rump-Yugoslavia" 
As Mihailo Crnobrnja puts it 
the simplistic logic that these goals - a stronger Serbia in Yugoslavia, 
a Greater Serbia and a Rump-Yugoslavia were, like the Russian dolls, 
contained one in each other, proved to be not only wrong but very 
costly. These goals were mutually exclusive and everyone of them 
required a different tactic. Through this confusion Serbia found itself 
in a war, pulling others in as well and without losing on the 
battlefield, Serbia lost practically everything it wanted to achieve, 
gaining, in the process, an extremely negative image.110 
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What brought about the resurgence of nationalism in Serbia? During Tito's 
reign, despite some expressions of nationalism in all republics, it was never an 
important issue. The Serb political leadership before Milosevic tried to solve the 
Serbian grievances without recourse to nationalism, but failed. Calculating that he 
could attain a strong position of power and stay there, Slobodan Milosevic brought 
Serb nationalism back on the political stage. His rise to power illustrates the revival 
of the great Serbian dream. 
1.  Slobodan Milosevic: The March Through The Federal Institutions 
As a member of the Communist party in Yugoslavia, Slobodam Milosevic 
somehow managed to stay in power through the fall of Communism and take over 
the presidency of Serbia. This political skill, accompanied by a ruthless drive for 
power, heightened problems and contributed to the bloodshed. Some call him the 
"new Hitler."111 
In January 1986 Milosevic succeeded Stambolic as Chief of the Serbian party 
when Stambolic became President of Serbia. 
He seemed to everyone a staunch party conservative, a kind of 
younger and more energetic version of Russia's Yegor Ligachev, ready 
to fight those communists in Yugoslavia who aspired to be 
Gorbachevs.112 
Contrary to the trends prominent in Serbia by then, the Slovenian and 
Croatian communists were beginning to introduce intra-party elections with more 
than one candidate, a major step toward multiparty elections. 
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A brief resume of events since 1987, the year in which Milosevic' won 
untrammeled power in Serbia, demonstrates a clear pattern of anti- 
federal campaign. First, anti-Albanian sentiment was fanned by the 
Belgrade mass media, while Serbia's intellectual elite grouped in the 
academy of Arts and Sciences and the Writers' Association — fresh 
from drafting a new national program for a "greater Serbia" (the 
notorious 1986 memorandum) ~ set about organizing a rebellion of the 
Serb minority in Kosovo against Albanian majority rule. The Kosovo 
issue was then used at the climatic Eighth Session of the Serbian 
Party's Central Committee in the autumn of 1987 to eliminate the 
more constitutionally-minded wing of the Party loyal to the republican 
president Ivan Stambolic.113 
While president of the Serbian League of the Communist Central Committee 
Presidium (LCCC) in 1988, Milosevic still touted the communist line, stating: 
"Nationalism is a cuckoo's egg planted into the Yugoslav workers class...by the class 
enemy. Our fate, our future will depend on our harmony."114 At this time, with 
the Communist party still firmly in power, he rejected any change in favor of 
reforms. 
A so-called 
'anti-bureaucratic revolution' was set in motion designed to extend 
Milosevic's power across all Yugoslavia. After he felt strong enough 
to directly attack the Vojvodina Party and state leaders, accusing them 
of being 'autonomists' [which meant being against Serbian state 
unity], they were brought down in October 1988 by carefully 
organized 'spontaneous' mass mobilization, after which the Vojvodina 
Party too was purged.115 
By then Milosevic's aim became clear, he did not want just to return to Tito's 
pre-constitution situation of 1974, but he wanted to have a complete revision of the 
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post-war-settlement based on the principle of national equality. In the name of a 
"strong [Serbian-led] federation" the Belgrade Serbs wanted nothing less than the 
destruction of the federal arrangements. 
The method used by Milosevic to mobilize a Serb nationalist force 
capable of destroying the federal order was relatively simple. 
Systematic recourse was made to Stalin's old trick of creating enemies 
against whom mass anger could be turned: Albanians, 'bureaucrats', 
Vojvodina 'autonomists', Slovenes, Croats, and 'Muslim 
fundamentalists' were denounced in succession as enemies of Serbia 
and Yugoslavia.116 
Kosovo, Serbia's other province, proved a tougher nut to crack, since 
the Albanian population rose as one in November 1988 and February 
1989, defending not so much their leaders as their hard-won national 
rights enshrined in the provinces autonomy. Azem Vllasi was expelled 
from the Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) 
for defending Kosovo's autonomy. Although the mass demonstrations 
were peaceful, the province was immediately placed under a state of 
emergency, voted for by the federal state for fear of Serbia's forces 
marching into the province on their own....Mass pressure was also 
brought to bear on the Montenegrin Party and state leadership, which 
was forced to resign from office in January 1989. As a result of this 
'march through the institutions', by 1989 Serbia had acquired control 
of four out of eight votes on the federal state presidency, five out of 
nine votes on the federal Party presidency. These federal bodies were 
thus completely paralysed.117 
From now on Milosevic successfully worked in exporting Serbia's "anti- 
bureaucratic revolution." Two major events help to explain his procedure: the 17th 
plenum YPCC and the 14th Congress of the LCY in April 1990: 
October 1988 the seventeenth plenum of the Yugoslav Party's Central 
Committee took place and the split between Serbia and the other 
republics now simultaneously deepened and broadened. The 
representatives of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo (for 
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the last time) and partly Macedonia tried to persuade the Serbian side, 
that Yugoslav and Party unity could not be built by force. Belgrade 
rejected all charges of 'hegemonic aspirations' or wishing to create a 
'Greater Serbia'. This marked the last desperate attempt to preserve 
party unity....However the fall of the Montenegrin leadership in 
February 1989 proved beyond all doubt that Milosevic indeed would 
export the 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' and that the republics would 
accordingly have to protect themselves.118 
Once Kosovo had been crushed and Vojvodina and Montenegro 
swallowed up, the resistance to Milosevic was inevitably led by 
Slovenia and Croatia whence came a first strategic counter-offensive 
in the decision taken in winter of 1989 to hold up multi-party elections 
in April 1990. The final parting of the ways between the pro-Milosevic 
and anti-Milosevic forces took place in February-March, at the 
Fourteenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
(LCY), a congress which was also its last.The disintegration of the 
LCY was followed by multiparty elections throughout Yugoslavia, in 
which the Communists albeit under a new name won only in Serbia 
and Montenegro.119 
Yugoslavia thus did not die a natural death: it was destroyed for the sake of 
a Greater Serbia. Once he got the army on his side Milosevic felt confident of 
victory. What Serbia had failed to gain in two Balkan wars and two World Wars 
suddenly seemed within reach. Milosevic's attempt at winning over the Army in 
order to achieve 'All Serbs in one land'120 developed also successfully: 
Finding the cadres in the communist party ready to fight his political 
battles was easier for Milosevic than winning over the Yugoslav 
Peoples Army (YPA). But circumstances helped ~ the officer corps 
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Slovenia and Croatia moved towards secession and their officers left 
the army. Slovenian and Croatian anti-army pronouncements also 
drove the army to look for a protector, and Serbia was the obvious 
choice...it was a formidable task to transform the YPA into the 
fighting arm of Serbian nationalism. The army which saw itself as the 
protector of Yugoslavia and not of any national group believed in the 
principle of 'brotherhood and unity' proclaimed during the Second 
World War by communist led partisans and was permeated with 
Titoist communism....The army was the most antidemocratic and 
reactionary of all communist institutions. It unofficially approved the 
attempted coup d'etat against Soviet President Michkail Gorbachev in 
August 1991.121 
Having consolidated his power over the Yugoslav army, the search for a 
compromise was no longer necessary for Milosevic, even when "at the time of the 
1991 secessions, the Yugoslav federal government was dominated by non-Serbs."122 
After the elections, Slovenia and Croatia, flanked by Macedonia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina offered Serbia a confederal compromise, that is 
the transformation of Yugoslavia into an association of sovereign 
states. Elections in Serbia were held in December 1990, eight months 
after Slovenia and seven months after Croatia. The Great Serb bloc 
rejected the federal offer out of hand, believing that the army could 
deliver whatever it wished....Slovenia was allowed to go after a brief 
mihtary incursion in June 1991, by mutual consent...,But neither 
Croatia nor Bosnia-Hercegovina were allowed to leave and would be 
squeezed to relinquish as much of their territories as the army could 
hold. As the war progressed, that began in earnest in August 1991, the 
contour of the projected racially homogeneous "Greater Serbia" 
became increasingly visible.123 
As illustrated the Serb Nationalist Goals in the longer run are 
(1) "All Serbs in one Land" meant keeping Yugoslavia together, 
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(2) overcome Tito's 1974 Constitution for the "Serb National" benefit, 
(3) use nationalism supported by politicised ethnicity as mass movement for power 
support and 
(4) once Greater Serbia is shaped, reform the economy. 
C.  CROATISM AND THE CROATIA'S AGENDA OF COMPLICITY 
In order to understand the outbreak of the ongoing war it is necessary to 
investigate how the leaders in the other constituent parts of Yugoslavia acted during 
the period when Serbian Nationalism was growing. In the provinces favored by the 
constitution in Milosevic's view, Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and Milan Kucan in 
Slovenia had already made arrangements to protect their power bases. In doing so 
they added to the tensions already originated by the Belgrade Serbs. 
When Croatia sought independence - Croatia's government proclaimed 
independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991 - 
Tudjman organized the defense of his claims by embarking on almost the same type 
of nationalism that Serbia had earlier used. Tudjman's Croatism was a call for a 
Greater Croatia. Croatia proper would include the Serb-populated Krajina, where 
historically the rural Serbs had settled for centuries, and later would encompass 
areas not claimed by the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There Mate Boban would 
establish a "Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna". 
Serbian nationalism, in the authoritarianism and exclusivism 
epitomized by Milosevic, is very similar to the Croatian nationalism 
of Njofra 'Franjo' Tudjman and the nationalism combined with 
Muslim radicalism of Bosnia-Herzegovina's President Ali ja 
Izetbegovic.124 
Franjo Tudjman came to power in April 1990 on the wings of Croat revolt against 
Milosevic's nationalist provocations, having successfully tapped the powerful vein 
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of Croat disenchantment with communism and Yugoslavia that had been silently 
mounting since at least 1971.12S 
The reactions to Croat nationalistic propaganda were based on prewar 
experience: 
The discussion...none the less revealed how these simple Serb peasants 
have been traumatized by unscrupulous politicians wishing to realize 
their politics of nationalist fantasy. A confused tale of real and 
perceived discrimination emerged. It was largely but not exclusively 
based on hearsay from friends and relatives elsewhere in Krajina, as 
Knin was safe country for Serbs from the beginning. The rural Serbs 
in Krajina, but also the Serbs in other parts of Croatia, were 
absolutely convinced that following the victory of Franjo Tudjman and 
his Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 
HDZ) in April 1990, Croats began to install the infrastructure of a 
fascist state in Croatia. The Krajina Serbs understood fascism above 
all to be a state system promoting virulent Croatian nationalism. The 
revival of Croat national sentiment in any form was ipso facto 
interpreted by them as the return of fascism. The port of Split, just 
forty miles from Knin, was a new centre of militant Croat nationalism 
and it was in such regions, far from Zagreb's cosy Central European 
consciousness, that the more radical Croats started political 
experiments which simply confirmed the Serbs' erroneous conviction 
that fascism was awakening from its slumber and therefore they must 
answer the call to arms.126 
1.  Franjo Tudjman: the Way to Opportunistic Nationalism 
From the beginning his administration was autocratic as the constitution of 
1990 gave him virtual control over the government and the parliament, and his 
strategy was compromising. Tudjman was convinced that a 'grand Croato-Serb 
agreement' was possible. Milosevic would let Croatia go its own merry way if only 
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Tudjman did not obstruct him elsewhere, notably in Kosovo, Vojvodina and 
Montenegro and if a deal could be struck to divide Bosnia between Serbia and 
Croatia. It was not difficult to see how Milosevic, who outmatched Tudjman both 
in cunning and in cannon and beat him hands down in autocracy and inconsistency, 
easily took Croatia for a ride. Milosevic never would have done so much damage 
had the Croatian leadership pursued a different strategy. But instead of seeking 
Allies to protect his country Tudjman committed three glaring mistakes: 
1) Frustrating the Anti-Milosevic coalition 
The hopes of Kosovor Albanians, Montenegrins and various minorities - such 
as the Bosnian Muslim minority in the Sandzak region of Serbia - were quickly 
disappointed. Their unsolved problems still add to the tensions which lead to war. 
2) Lack of preparations for war 
Despite resolute rhetoric Tudjman did little to prepare Croatia for the 
onslaught of the Yugoslav People's Army; ... imagination is a creative faculty that 
Tudjman sorely lacks. 
3) The plot to divide Bosnia 
Tudjman's several attempts to plot covertly with Serbia to divide Bosnia- 
Herzegovina finally was his biggest mistake, as there is no way to appease Milosevic 
as long as one acts against the Greater Serbian agenda.127 
2.  Croat Serb Complicity 
These mistakes resulted in disaster when the Great Serbian Agenda met the 
Great Croatian Agenda. Croatia's role in Yugoslavia's collapse is far from being an 
"innocent victim" of pure Serb aggression. When confronted by Milosevic, Tudjman 
attempted to succeed by embarking on various dangerous adventures which probably 
cost him his chance from the very beginning. It still seems impossible to appease 
Milosevic. 
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To be sure, the Serbian leader had backed down at various times. His 
original goal in 1987 was to assume the leadership of all Yugoslavia 
and recentralize the country by overthrowing Tito's federal 
constitution....Later in 1991, he abandoned the idea of holding on to 
Slovenia... Still later, in 1992, he reconciled himself to the possibility 
of a feeble Croatian (without the Serb-occupied territories) and a 
softened Macedonia... Most recently, he has given up the idea of 
keeping all of Bosnia.128 
Tudjman was wrong in interpreting any move of Milosevic as a 
conciliatory gesture. In fact, Milosevic's retreats only reinforced his 
claim to an expanded Serbian state. Each of Milosevic's retreats was 
forced upon him by the stiff resistance of the Slovens, Croats, 
Macedonians and Bosnian Muslims. Thus it was completely unrealistic 
to assume, as Tudjman evidently does, that Milosevic would agree to 
a withdrawal from Croatia in exchange for Croatia acceptance of 
Milosevic's land grabs in Bosnia. Milosevic's aims are promoted every 
time his goal of creating an ethnically pure Serbian state is mistaken 
as neutral horse trading.129 
Tudjman's declared agenda on the divisibility of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or 
through the Croat looking-glasses of "Herceg-Bosna", would become reality and was 
so proclaimed on August 24, 1990: 
Tudjman played into Milosevic's hand in another way ....The various 
schemes of the international community, a la Vance-Owen and Owen- 
Stoltenberg, created an appearance of fairness to the different parties 
in slicing Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in actuality strengthened 
Milosevic's attempts to hold onto its conquest. None of these schemes 
would have worked had Croatia stood by the Bosnian government. 
Instead Tudjman promoted the division of Bosnia since at least 1990, 
and in 1992 set up his own para-state of Herceg-Bosna, which made 
Milosevic's job all easier. The irony of the situation is that more than 
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two thirds of Bosnia's Croats live outside the so-called Herceg- 
Bosna.130 
Tudjman was willing to sacrifice all Croats outside Croatia and Herceg- 
Bosna. He expected them to withdraw from their ancient homesteads in central 
Bosnia for the sole purpose of sohdifying his deal with Milosevic and to receive 
international legitimacy through the Owen-Stoltenberg scheme. 
Again nothing like this could have been established without Tudjman 
if he hadn't manufactured accusations against the Muslims, or 
promoted brutalities against them. This damaged longstanding Croat- 
Muslim cooperation. And when the Muslims picked up arms against 
the Croats, committing their own brutalities, the circle of war was 
completed. The hierarchy of the Catholic church soon started tilting 
against Tudjman's Bosnian policies. The archbishop of Sarajevo is on 
record as opposing the ethnic cleansing of Croats from central Bosnia 
and as favoring the coexistence with all nationalities of Bosnia. The 
victims of Milosevic's aggression ended up adopting his patterns of 
behavior. The international community thus found another excuse for 
inactivity.131 
So far, the ideas and agendas of the Serb and Croat leader have been 
outlined. It has been shown that they were both determined to stay in power. They 
influenced the course of events that navigated their political entities through the 
troubled waters flowing from the end of Communism in Post-Tito Yugoslavia. The 
Slovene leader became the first to "row his boat ashore", once the war finally broke 
out. 
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D.  SLOVENIA SAVED BY THE BRIONI ACCORD 
The fate of Slovenia may be remembered as the sole example, whereby Serb 
aggression, tanks and the YPA involved, was successfully stopped by diplomacy and 
negotiations: 
What the Great Serbian bloc in Belgrade completely underestimated, 
was the readiness of Yugoslavia's constituent nations to defend 
themselves. In dismissing this factor of the people's war, the Serbian 
dominated army made its biggest mistakes. Neither in Slovenia nor in 
Croatia nor in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the aggression to be the 
anticipated walkover, despite the defenders lack of arms.132 
The Slovene leader Kuzan challenged Milosevic at the 1988 all-Yugoslav 
conference on his ideas on how best to deal with the economic problems. Kuzan 
linked reforms with more intra-party democratization. Instead of reform the party 
adopted repression. 
Milosevic's first planned provocation of the still Yugoslav Federal 
Republic of Slovenia - a threat to hold a big rally of Serb nationalists 
in Ljubljana, Slovenia's capital city, in March 1989 ~ was met by a 
stiffening of Slovene resistance. In February 1989, a large meeting 
took place in Ljubljana in solidarity with the strike of Albanian 
miners at the Stari Trg mine in Kosovo. At the meeting, Kucan 
declared that the miners were defending Yugoslavia as created in the 
revolutionary war of 1941-1945. When Serb militants tried to enter 
Slovenia, the Slovene authorities banned the rally and sent a message 
that they would be stopped by force at the Slovene border. Serbia 
responded by imposing a boycott of Slovene goods. It was at this 
juncture, it seems, that Milosevic opted for war with Slovenia.133 
Slovenia was allowed to go away from the Former Yugoslavia, by mutual 
consent, after a brief military incursion - a ten day war - started in June 1991. 
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Serbia  was already at war in Croatia,  when the Yugoslav People's Army 
(Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija, JNA) started military action in Slovenia. 
When the war broke out in Slovenia many Europeans became 
acquainted with this small pocket of the Alpine lowlands for the first 
time. But a different war in Croatia was well under way (in Osijek, 
the eastern Slavonian capital which lies thirteen miles west of the 
Danube, Croatia's border with Serbia) before the Yugoslav People's 
Army and the Yugoslav state effectively capitulated to Slovenia by 
signing the Brioni Accord (July 1991). This agreement , which 
acknowledged Slovenia's liberation from the control of Belgrade, was 
preceded by a burst of chaotic diplomatic activity organized by the 
European Community Troika of the foreign ministers of Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and Italy. The delegation leader Gianni de Michelis 
on his return two days after their initial negotiations with Slobodam 
Milosevic and his General Veljko Kadijevic in Belgrade and Tudjman 
and Kucan in Zagreb now realized that all his theoretical 
understanding was of little value in a country where deceit is the most 
common political currency. For Balkan politicians, it is axiomatic that 
the only truth is the he. Throughout the Yugoslav crisis, both 
President Tudjman and Milosevic, not to mention scores of lesser 
figures, committed themselves solemnly to accords and agreements 
whose provisions they would openly flaunt the following day.134 
The signing of the Brioni Accord stipulated the withdrawal of all 
Yugoslav army units from Slovenia, thus implying that international 
recognition of southern Slavdom's small Alpine protrusion would soon 
be granted. But although Croats were party to the negotiations which 
led to Brioni, the agreements therein left the issue of Croatia entirely 
open. Thus while this initial intervention of the European Community 
was not without value as it ended the war in Slovenia, it none the less 
failed to address the central issue of the Yugoslav crisis — Croatia. 
The essential problem of a Yugoslav state lies in the numerical and 
political dominance of Serbs over Croats; the essential problem of a 




Glenny, Misha, The Fall of Yugoslavia, The Third Balkan War 
(New York, Penguin Books, revised edition, 1993), p. 99. 
Glenny, Misha, Ibid, p. 100. 
99 
Slovenia successfully sought international recognition. One of the reasons that 
recognition was successfully obtained was that the Serb or Croat ethnicity factor was 
not an issue. A second reason was that Kuzan did not mobilize Slovenians with 
exaggerated nationalism and continued promoting political reforms and economic 
change, as he had in preparing Slovenia's December 1990 referendum. 
As the war progressed in Croatia, the situation in Bosnia became more 
and more tense. The issue that set the mix on fire was diplomatic 
recognition in spring 1992. The European Community had not 
immediately recognized either Slovenia or Croatia when they declared 
their independence in 1991. ... In December 1991 the European 
Community agreed to recognize those former Yugoslav states that met 
certain requirements, including the protection of human rights. The 
Badinter-Commission examined the documentation and found that 
only Slovenia and Macedonia met the requirements for 
recognition.136 
It might be too early to conclude, but it seems that on issues at the periphery 
of the Greater Serbia's agenda agreements could be achieved. Certainly no Serb 
minority was threatened in Slovenia. The way Milosevic dealt with Macedonia, 
however, was different and more difficult for the Macedonians. 
E.  FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND GLIGOROV 
Not a "sacred shrine of Serbdom" ~ but in Serbian eyes still regarded as part 
of "Old Serbia" ~ Macedonia became an area where Great Serbia wants to exercise 
its influence, even though only a two percent137 Serb minority lives there. 
Once the Greek president Mitsotakis informed the world that Milosevic was 
going to divide Macedonia at his convenience, diplomacy, backed up with force, i.e. 
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the willingness actually to put some peacekeeping troops on the ground to enforce 
the decision, was able to deter Milosevic's government from seeking further action. 
According to the Macedonian authorities, there are some 43.000 Serbs in Macedonia 
although the Montenegrin newspaper Pobjeda claims there are really about 
300,000....As the rump Yugoslavia (new constitution of April 27, 1992) headed by 
Milosevic increasingly takes the look of the villain of the Balkans, Greece has 
maintained its close historical ties with Serbia. Milosevic and Mitsotakis do not see 
eye to eye on all matters, however, as witnessed by disclosure in Athens that the 
Serbian President proposed six months ago [i.e. December 1991] that Macedonia be 
carved up between Serbia and Greece. Mitsotakis declined and reported the 
proposition to the European Community.138 
On August 21, 1992, the Macedonian Foreign Minister Malewski met with 
U.S. Under Secretary (for International Security Affairs) Wisner: 
Wisner emphasized the U.S. desire to follow through rapidly on 
President Bush's proposal that a continuous international monitoring 
mission work in Macedonia, under the auspices of the "Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe" (CSCE), to help prevent the 
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina from spreading.139 
...regarding recognition Wisner emphasized that the U.S. strongly 
supports the stability and territorial integrity of Macedonia. The U.S. 
view is that prompt resolution of the Macedonian recognition issue will 
help to bring stability to the Balkans.140 
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The Republic of Macedonia's legislature had to amend Macedonia's new 
constitution in order to clarify it and satisfy their Greek neighbors, who claimed 
Macedonia as part of 4000 years of Greek history. Article 49 
stated that the Republic cares (sic) for the status and right of those 
persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighboring countries 
as well as Macedonian expatriates, assists their cultural development 
and promotes link with them.141 
The advantage of recognition for the Former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) is that it can receive assistance from the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, or the EC in spite of Greek sanctions. The current situation 
reduces tensions and provides stability. FYROM does not show any aggressive 
imperial attitudes towards its neighbors' territories but should renounce its 1992 
irredentist claims and provocative symbols like the "sixteen-pointed sun of Vergina" 
in its national flag. Once normal relations are established with Greece and its 
economic problems are solved, FYROM's sovereignty will probably be more secure. 
F.  CONCLUSIONS ON INHERENT TENSIONS BETWEEN THE PARTS AND 
WITHIN YUGOSLAVIA 
It seems obvious that there is no hidden agenda but an open one at work so 
far. Serbia feels that with the breakdown of communism it can overcome the 
restriction of Tito's 1974 constitution. Led by their champion, Milosevic, the Serb 
may now gain whatever leading role they deserve. This was achieved by taking away 
the privileges of the autonomous regions, and, with those privileges, their only 
defense against violent Serb aggression. This happened for economic reasons with 
the Vojvodina and for purely nationalistic reasons with Kosovo, still violently ruled 
by a communist party. Once the Yugoslav Central Government was taken over by 
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Serbians, purges of the communist party apparatus followed, in Serbia as well as the 
former autonomous provinces. 
The Yugoslav People's Army was turned into an instrument for Serb 
repression. Non-Serbian officers defected, and former communists unwilling to 
change their loyalities towards Serb Nationalism were dismissed. 
Meanwhile in Slovenia and Croatia the Serb build-up to achieve an inner 
Yugoslav hegemony led both leaders to embark on a course of nationalism: the 
Slovens felt that secession was their only option, that they would benefit from 
economic reforms and be able to join the integration process under way in western 
Europe. 
In Croatia, Tudjman opportunistically promoted Croatism and did not 
prepare for an encounter with Serbia, or even come close to preparing the other 
constituent parts of Yugoslavia to resist Serbia. Tudjman tried to cut his deal with 
Milosevic and failed, perhaps because Tudjman's Greater Croatia idea might have 
threatened Milosevic, or because of Milosevic's will to take the lead in pursuing his 
great Serbian goals. In any case, war broke out in Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina shortly afterwards. 
G.  BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND AIJJA IZETBEGOVIC 
Serbian and Croatian nationalists both have claimed that Bosnia 
should be theirs, but in 1992 it was the Serb who provoked the 
Bosnian war. Influenced by Serbian nationalistic enthusiasms of the 
late 1980's, Bosnian Serbs, under the unbalanced leadership of 
Radovan Karadzic and with the encouragement of Slobodam 
Milosevic, began a propaganda campaign against Alija Izetbegovic, 
whom they falsely accused of being a Muslim fundamentalist. By 
raising the issue in this way they brought back primitive memories of 
the Ottoman period, which Serbian tradition characterizes as one of 
bloody oppression of Serbs. Serbian activists in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
started establishing local units of government, creating militia to 
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"Protect" themselves, and proclaiming their desire to become part of 
Milosevic's Serbia.142 
President Alija Izetbegovic's aim was always to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina 
together and upon the war's conclusion to restore a united Bosnia-Herzigovina with 
a decisive central government in Sarajevo. This is the fundamental condition, the 
"conditio sine qua non", to survive as a constitutional arrangement. All attempts by 
Croatia (with the exception of the period of the Croat-Muslim agreements) and by 
Serbia deny this opportunity for Bosnia-Herzigovina to be a sovereign state. 
Compared to Serbia's encounter in Croatia, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina followed 
a different scheme. The Serbs were going to occupy and "protect" territory which 
would become part of permanent greater Serbia: 
In Croatia the war gradually built up from a local Serb 'uprising' in 
the summer 1990 to a full scale war in the summer of 1991. Serbia's 
aggression against Bosnia Herzegownina took the form of a 
Blitzkrieg. In Croatia "ethnic cleansing" was to produce some 300.000 
refugees in the course of one and a half years. In the case of Bosnia- 
Herzigovina the victims of the policy of "ethnic cleansing" on a larger 
scale numbered almost 2 millions within six month. A U.S. Senate 
report estimated that during this period as many as thirty five 
thousand people were killed as a result of 'ethnic cleansing' alone. In 
Croatia, Serbia fought the war ostensibly to defend a minority 
threatened by a 'fascist regime'.143 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs were not a minority but one of three 
formally recognized constituent nations. The Bosnian elections of 
November 1990 produced an assembly in which the Serbs were 
represented in numbers reflecting their weight in the population as a 
whole. A government was formed with appropriate Serb 
representation. Despite this, the war against Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
from the start waged with one aim only: complete destruction of the 
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republic. It was here that the 'Great Serbian' project was finally to 
reveal fully its true criminal nature.144 
1. Initial Serb War Strategy: Ethnic Warfare 
From the very beginning of the Bosnian war, the atrocities were primarily 
against the Muslim minority but were also against the Croats that were settled in 
Serb-claimed areas. This was part of the Serb strategy to achieve an ethnically 
"clean" territory at the end of the war. 
The Bosnian war began with the shooting in Sarajevo on April 5,1992. 
Serb gunmen standing on top of the Holiday Inn fired upon anti-war 
demonstrators in the center of the city. One might also mark the 
outbreak of hostilities with the April 2nd raid by paramilitary units 
from Serbia on Bijeljina, a town near the Serbian border. Those who 
entered the city claimed that the Muslims in Bijelijna were planning 
a massacre of Serbs. The Serb forces supposedly acted to prevent such 
an event. They took over the town and in the course of their operation 
they murdered at least several dozen Muslims. From that day until 
now, the war has unfolded according to a precise plan: non-Serb 
territories are encircled and Serbian majority areas are linked with 
one another. 'Ethnic cleansing' has been an integral part of the entire 
plan. As Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights and former Prime Minister of Poland, 
put it: 'Ethnic cleansing' was the objective, and not a consequence, of 
the war.145 
Instrumentalized to become weapons in "ethnic warfare" became rape and 
castration : "Castration has occurred with some regularity in the Balkan war and 
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it appears, together with rape, to be part of a pattern of psychological pressure that 
has played an especially insidious role in ethnic cleansing.146 
The European Community recently put the number of rape-victims at twenty 
thousand. The Sarajevo State Commission for Investigation of War Crimes estimates 
that fifty thousand women were raped up to October 1992. Even if numbers are 
highly controversial, it may be that the truth will not be known until after the war, 
if at all. 
Rape is an instrument of war, a very efficient weapon for 
demoralization and humiliation....What seems to be unprecedented 
about the rapes of Muslim women in Bosnia (and to a lesser extend of 
Croat women too) is that there is a clear political purpose behind the 
practice. The rapes in Bosnia are not only a standard tactic of war, 
they are an organized and systematic attempt to cleanse (to move, 
resettle, exile) the Muslim population from certain territories. Serbs 
want to conquer in order to establish a Greater Serbia. Thus not only 
is their cultural and religious integrity destroyed but the reproductive 
potential of the whole nation is threatened. It may seem very abstract 
to speak of rape as a method of "ethnic cleansing", but is becomes 
quite clear when one talks to the victims and witnesses.147 
2. Initial Serb War Aims: Establishment of Serb Autonomous Regions 
The preparations for the assault on Bosnia-Hercegovina followed a 
pattern already set in Croatia. Once again a Serb Democratic Party 
(SDS) was set up which prior to the elections of November 1990, 
immediately proceeded to declare itself sole representative of Bosnian 
Serbs, who were to been viewed as part of a seamless Serb nation. A 
Serb National Assembly and a Serb National Council were set up in 
Banja Luka in October 1990, as sovereign legislative and executive 
bodies, wholly independent from Sarajevo. From   October 1990 to 
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December 1991, the SDS was busy consolidating its structure including 
its police and its armed forces. The Serbs started demarcating new 
internal borders in Bosnia-Herzegovina and at the end six so-called 
Serb Autonomous Regions (SAOs) had been established by the end of 
this process: Bosanska Krajina, Northern Bosnia, Northeastern Bosnia, 
Romanija, Hercegovina and Old Hercegovina. These were then 
proclaimed parts of a "Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina "later 
(spring 1991) renamed the "Serb Republic" (Srpska Republic). Many 
non-Serb areas found themselves included in this self-proclaimed 
mono-ethic state. The first aim of Serbian military operations in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was subsequently to be the establishment of 
corridors between the different SOAs, cleared of all non-Serb 
population.148 
3.  Serb Attack on Bosnia's Democratic Institutions: 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina's National Assembly, three big parties 
controlled 86 % of the 240 seats. The elections produced a coalition 
government and state precidency made up of representatives of the 
three main parties: Serb Democratic Party (SDS) 86 seats, Croatian 
Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica B-H, HDZ) 44 
seats and the Muslim-based Party of Democratic Action {Stranka 
Demokratske Akcije) SDA with 86 seats. The SDS used its influence 
to prevent all moves the Bosnian government might make to save the 
republic. Besides this obstruction the SDS splits the National Assembly 
into two unevensized blocs: The minority, made up by the SDS and its 
satellite parties, wanted the republic either to join Serbia en bloc with 
some 'federal' facade or be broken up. No compromise was possible 
with the majority bloc composed of deputies belonging to the SDA, the 
HDZ and most of the smaller parties which wished to become Bosnia- 
Herzigovina a sovereign state within Yugoslavia, or failing this an 
independent state. For obvious reasons the SDS in February 1991 
turned down a proposal by the SDA (supported by the HDZ) to adopt 
a declaration giving the Bosnian legislature precedence over the 
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In October 1991 the National Assembly adopted a draft memorandum 
confirming constitutional amendments, which as in other republics the departing 
Communist administrations introduced designed to enhance the republic's integrity 
and sovereignty. Bramka Magas noted that, though "falling short of a declaration 
of independance, the Memorandum affirmed the inviolability of the republic's 
borders, while expressing support for Yugoslavia made up by sovereign states". The 
SDS deputies with their leader Radovan Karadzic walked out before the vote was 
taken. The adoption of the Memorandum provided an occasion to declare Bosnia's 
neutrality in the ongoing war already raging in Croatia. 
4. Death of Bosnian Identity 
The creation of the "Serb Republic" (Srpska Republic) and the "Croatian 
Union of Herceg-Bosna" was effectively intended to destroy all attempts to establish 
a "Bosnian identity", which was necessary for Bosnia-Herzigovina to survive the 
challenges of Serb and Croatian nationalism. The inviolability of borders would 
become meaningless, if the Serbs and Croats sought linkages to their home 
territories.   The National Assembly's affirmation of sovereignty was immediately 
followed by the SDS's proclamation of a separate Serb state: the "Serb Republic". 
The proclamation of the Serb Republic was followed by local Croat HDZ 
leaders calling for the establishment of two so-called Croat Communities, one in the 
north on the Sava River and one in the south called "Herceg-Bosna". The Bosnian 
HDZ leadership (supported by almost all Croatian parties and most of the Bosnian 
Croats) denounced the moves as a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, Serbs 
and Croats made it clear that their recognition of the Sarajevo Government could 
only be achieved, if Sarajevo retained its independence from the former and any 
future Yugoslavia. Croatia did not attack Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also did not want 
to disregard its considerable Croat population there. Franjo Tudjman made it clear 
at an early point that he believed neither in the likely survival of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina,   nor  in  its  historical  legitimacy  in  the event  of Yugoslavia's 
disintegration into national states.  In Croatia, the idea of dividing Bosnia- 
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Herzigovina was deeply unpopular. And on the principle of the inviolability of 
Yugoslavia's internal borders, Croatia hoped for the return of its Serb-occupied 
territories. 
To accomplish the impossible Croat officials followed the SDS in proposing 
the "Cantonizing" of Bosnia-Herzegovina on an ethnic basis. 
5.  "Divide and Rule" Became Cantonization 
Croat officials followed the SDS in proposing 'cantonization' of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina on an ethnic basis. The SDS had justified the creation of the six SAOs 
on the grounds that, in a centrally-run republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs would 
become an oppressed minority. Under Zagreb's influence, parts of the Bosnian HDZ 
now accepted the same logic. 
The European Community too — to its eternal discredit -, encouraged this 
'ethnically based' program, in whose name it has subsequently sought to qualify the 
Bosnian government's legitimacy. 
The ethnic dispersion within Bosnia-Herzegovina, of course makes the idea 
of cantonization (like Switzerland) on an ethnic basis dangerous nonsense. A look 
at the census makes it clear, that for the benefit of creating cantons with absolute 
national majorities an enormous proportion of Bosnia-Herzegovina's inhabitants 
would have to be uprooted and resettled. Cantonization involved not only just civil 
war, but destruction of the very identity of the Bosnian state created by the 
coexistence of the three nationalities. This is why the idea of cantonization was 
rejected by all Bosnian Muslims, by a majority of Bosnian Croats, probably by most 
Serbs in Bosnia's major cities, and by an unknown number of Serbs in areas under 
SDS control. 
Croat officials followed the SDS in proposing''cantonization' of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina on an ethnic basis. The SDS had justified the creation 
of the six SAOs on the grounds that, in a centrally-run republic in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs would become an oppressed minority. 
Under Zagreb's influence, parts of the Bosnian HDZ now accepted the 
same logic. The European Community too — to its eternal discredit, 
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encouraged this 'ethnically based' program — in whose name it has 
subsequently sought to qualify the Bosnian government's 
legitimacy....The ethnic dispersion within Bosnia-Herzegovina, of 
course makes the idea of cantonization (like Switzerland) on an ethnic 
basis dangerous nonsense. A look at the census makes it clear, that for 
the benefit of creating cantons with absolute national majorities an 
enormous proportion of Bosnia-Herzegovina's inhabitants would have 
to be uprooted and resettled. Cantonization involved not only just civil 
war, but destruction of the very identity of the Bosnian state created 
by the coexistence of the three nationalities. This is why the idea of 
cantonization was rejected by all Bosnian Muslims, by a majority of 
Bosnian Croats, probably by most Serbs in Bosnia's major cities, and 
by an unknown number of Serbs in areas under SDS control.1" ISO 
6. Bosnian Self-Defense Rests in Bosnia's Independence and Recognition 
In December 1991 the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was in the air - 
despite the results of the Badinter commission - and therefore at the end of the 
Maastrict Treaty conference on December 20th Bosnia-Herzegovina applied to 
become a independent state. 
The European Community arbitration commission invited Bosnia- 
Herzegovina to hold a referendum on the issue of independence as a condition of 
recognition, which in the National Assembly was approved Jan. 25,1992 by the SDA 
and HDZ deputies, supported by most of the smaller opposition parties. The 
referendum would be held under international supervision. 
The SDS leaders proclaimed the decision towards independence to be null and 
void and announced that in case of the event that independence would be granted, 
the "Serb Republic" would become part of the "Federal State of Yugoslavia".151 
As outlined above, it became impossible to achieve a constitutional consensus 
for Bosnia-Herzegovina's future. 
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The decision to apply for independence is discussed even though, given the 
dedication of the SDS to create a "Greater Serbia" and to join "Mother Serbia" with 
their "Serb republic", there was no real choice anyway. Bosnia-Herzegovina had 
fulfilled the conditions set by the EC for international recognition, but the West 
bowed to Serbian pressure by conditioning the recognition of the Sarajevo 
government upon its acceptance of "cantonization". This principle was first put on 
ice when the link between "cantonization" and "ethnic cleansing" became quite 
obvious in Summer 1992, when a war was in progress, for which Bosnia- 
Herzegovina was not prepared at least. 
The same arms embargo which has given the Belgrade Serb forces such an 
advantage against the Croats has been maintained until now and has directly 
contributed to the human and material devastation. 
In summary, Bosnia-Herzegovina, because of its geopolitical location, 
unluckily situated and exposed to the opposing powers Croatia and Serbia, had no 
real chance to be a political sovereign entity. The governments in Serbia and Croatia 
wanted to divide Bosnia and annex the spoils. Since Serbia and Croatia did not 
achieve their goals, they closely controlled the movements of the party leaders of 
their respective nationalities. The leader of the Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, 
proclaimed his own independent state, as did the leader of the Croats, Mate Boban, 
who replaced Stjepan Kljuic as leader of the Croat party HDZ. Boban replaced 
Kljuic because of the latter's opposition to dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, 
placing the condition of "cantonization" on recognition of the Sarajevo government 
led to violent war. 
Those who were born and bred on Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory started 
fighting for what they considered their home. However, the Serbs immediately 
spread the terror of "ethnic cleansing" in order to achieve a homogeneous Serb 
territory - as far as their forces are able to hold it — one that would later unite with 
Serbia. The Croats joined in the fighting in order to protect their territorial 
heritage. Every nationality was fighting against the other, including the Croats 
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against the Moslems; and the Muslim-Croat atrocities by the Spring of 1993 started 
to run out of control. 
H.  CONCLUSIONS ON THE INTERNAL ASPECTS OF MILOSEVICS 
YUGOSLAVIA 
Tito left Yugoslavia too decentralized to allow a single ethnic group to 
dominate it. Milosevic from the very beginning set out to enable the Serbs to play 
the role that they believed their large population and historical "mission" entitled 
them to. He therefore deprived the autonomous regions of their autonomy and 
incorporated Kosovo and the Vojvodina with Serbia and Montenegro, forming the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Milosevic began his career as a communist apparatchik of extremely 
authoritarian mien, even for Serbia. He rose to the leadership of the 
Serbian party by betraying the man who gave him his chance in 
politics, Ivan Stambolic, whose purge Milosevic organized. Milosevic 
is an opportunist, not an ideologue, a man driven by power rather 
than nationalism. He has made a Faustian pact with nationalism as a 
way to gain and hold power.152 
But with nationalism unleashed, the Slovenian nationalists broke all political 
and economic ties with the Yugoslav government and in their drive to independence 
they simply ignored the 22 million Yugoslavs who were not Slovenes. Before 
Milosevic was able to annex Macedonia to 'Great Serbia,' a continuous international 
monitoring mission under the auspices of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) protected Macedonia's integrity. With the U.S. 
strongly supporting the stability and territorial integrity of Macedonia, a prompt 
resolution of the Macedonian recognition issue followed. 
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As Yugoslavia could no longer include "all Serbs in one country", Milosevic's 
Serbian project would encompass them. This meant annexation or war for Bosnia- 
Herzigovina. Warren Zimmermann still believes "that Milosevic and Bosnian Serb 
leader Radovan Karadzic had already decided to annex the majority of Bosnia by 
military force", Milosevic had spoken to him of 70 percent. Zimmermann also 
reports that "neither Milosevic nor Tudjman made any effort to conceal their 
designs on Bosnia" from him. Bosnia, known as the "place where Serbs, Croats, and 
Muslims had coexisted peacefully for centuries," became "an affront and a challenge 
to these two ethnic supremacists."153 
In March 1995 all the warring parties in the Yugoslav conflict are preparing 
to fight again. The cease-fire secured by former President Carter after Christmas 
is still lasting but no political breakthrough is in sight. 
Croatia's 74-year-old President Franjo Tudjman decided that he cannot wait 
much longer to recover the thirty percent of Croatian territory seized by the Serbs 
in 1991 and hosting the Serb Krajina Republic. Tudjman regards the 12,000 U.N. 
troops as accomplices to the Serb occupation. In January 1995 he threatened the 
United Nations cease-fire monitoring mission in Croatia by no longer allowing them 
to stay. The UNPROFOR's recent mandate would expire on March 31, 1995 and 
their withdrawal had to be completed on June 30. Tudjman's bargaining successfully 
earned him the United States attention. For not ousting the peacekeepers the 
American Vice President assured Tudjman of "full U.S. support for restoring 
Croatian sovereignty to all parts of Croatia."154 
Milosevic's goal in 1995 is to get the trade sanctions lifted. He has formally 
cut Belgrade's support for the Bosnian Serbs, not to give up the Serbian cause but 
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to destroy his personal enemy Karadzic. To recognize Croatia and Bosnia, however, 
seems to be an insurmountable problem for Milosevic, as he could not survive 
politically: it would mean to give up and bury the idea of a Greater Serbia. 
Meanwhile the Bosnian Government is determined to take back territory by 
military means and to avenge the atrocities suffered by the Muslim civilians. Roger 
Cohen reports: 
As for Bosnia, General Rasim Delic, the commander of the 
Government Army, appears to have drawn his conclusions about the 
future. 'We have used this period to train our army,' he said this 
week.'We are now better prepared than ever to fight.'155 
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V      THE EXTERNAL DYNAMICS OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS: 
GLOBAL    AND    REGIONAL    ORGANIZATIONS    FOR   DEFENSE    AND 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY, THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
THE UNITED STATES 
This chapter deals with the involvement of global and regional organizations 
for defense and collective security in the Yugoslav crisis. The struggle over how to 
end the conflict in Yugoslavia — which nation or organization should lead to the way 
out — is not yet decided. However, the years since 199C have influenced the 
development of a European common security and defence policy. The Economist 
notes that 
The trouble with talking about a 'European defence policy' is that so 
many important questions still have no answers. Will NATO find a 
new role for itself in the post-cold-war era? How will the bitter 
experience of peacekeeping in ex-Yugoslavia, especially the row it has 
caused between Europe and America, influence the debate? What will 
come out of next year's [1996] constitutional conference of the 
European Union, the EU, which is due to examine...the Maastricht 
treaty's vague commitment to 'the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy which may in time lead to a common defence'?156 
How the security organizations adapted to the crisis is investigated here. It 
is concluded that the regional security organizations, after realizing the inadequacy 
of their institutional approaches, tacitly or openly re-established the United Nations 
as the sole practicable international authority to mobilize military forces for 
hazardous interventions. The United Nations greatly influenced the peace plans, and 
U.N. peacekeeping operations supported the delivery of humanitarian aid. The 
United States as the sole remaining superpower participated in the UN work but also 
followed its own agenda. The U.S. influenced the peace plans and sponsored the 
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Croat-Muslim agreement. In March 1995 the United States Vice President Al Gore 
assured the Croat President Tudjman "of full support for restoring Croatian 
sovereignty to all parts of Croatia."157 
A. INTRODUCING THE ACTORS IN THE BALKAN REGION: THE UNITED 
NATIONS AND THE 'ALPHABET SOUP' OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE. 
In 1989 Francis Fukuyama discussed the "End of History."158 Fukuyama 
certainly would have joined in the joy of the heads of state and government in Rome 
on November 7,1991. There Western European, Canadian and United States leaders 
confirmed that 
...[t]he world has changed dramatically. The Alliance has made an 
essential contribution. The peoples of North America and the whole of 
Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on 
freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.159 
A Europe of cooperation and prosperity should counter the new challenges 
with a new security architecture: 
The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be 
comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a 
framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of 
Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a 
new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the 
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European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe 
complement each other. Regional frameworks of cooperation will also 
be important. This interaction will be of the greatest significance in 
preventing instability and divisions that could result from various 
causes, such as economic disparities and violent nationalism.160 
Less euphoric in his assessment, Henry Kissinger believes the security 
architecture today has changed dramatically in the past five years. In Kissinger's 
opinion the convenient and relatively simple zero-sum game of the Cold War era has 
been replaced by a complex security architecture for a cold peace. He writes that 
The complex interplay of 'interlocking regional institutions' and the 
UN is best characterized by the efforts to restore peace and security 
in the former Yugoslavia. Here, what Kissinger called an 'alphabet 
soup' of security and defense organizations were and are working to 
bring the situation under control.161 
For brevity's sake the United Nations and Europe's regional security 
organizations are addressed, notably those directly involved in the Yugoslav 
crisis.162 
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The United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros- Ghali, has urged an 
expanded role for regional organizations, and he has clearly stated that the regional 
organizations in Europe have a special responsibility to relieve the already over- 
burdened UN machinery. However, the initial division of labor among the regional 
organizations and the United Nations has been hard to maintain. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a collective defense 
organisation, is regarded by some as a self-defense alliance similar to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Both collective defense organisations 
aspire to maintain the territorial integrity of their members.163 Individual NATO 
and CIS member states currently contribute to the UN peacekeeping contingent 
present on the ground in the former Yugoslavia. 
General defense alliances include the Western European Union (WEU) and 
possibly the European Union (EU). Both organizations have military aims that 
encompass more than collective self-defense, but they are primarily directed against 
any common foe. 
NATO, CIS, WEU and EU are distinct from universalist, Wilsonian-style 
collective security organizations. The purpose of such collective security 
organizations is to maintain the status quo. Members exist peacefully together and 
take action, if necessary, to prevent a conflict. In the event that one state violates 
the status quo, penalties can be imposed ranging from diplomatic disapproval and 
economic sanctions to military action. The only European collective security 
organisation is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
referred to as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
since December 1994. 
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Since the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis in 1991, several attempts have failed 
to establish a truce or cease-fire and to move towards a permanent cessation of 
hostilities. The security organizations involved in promoting a peace acceptable to 
all parties are introduced and discussed in this chapter in accordance with the 
broader sequence of the events. The organizations involved in efforts to end the 
Yugoslav crisis have not failed totally, even though in March 1995 no peace 
settlement has yet been achieved. Lessons have been learned as the conflict regarding 
Yugoslav secession developed into a crisis on Yugoslav succession and then into a 
full-scale war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Numerous diverging interests are involved, 
allowing Serbs, Croats and Bosnians to carry on fighting and to play one European 
power against the other. The conflict, however, has been contained within the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, as a result of the involvement and actions of the 
several security organizations. The failures and modest achievements during the 
Yugolslav crisis will influence the options of the security organizations in the future. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
From January 1990 — when the Yugoslav League of Communists adjourned 
their party congress to never meet again — until the end of March 1995 four distinct 
phases of the Yugoslav conflict may be identified. During the first phase the 
international community supported Yugoslavia's political integrity. The break-up 
would, it was feared, set a bad example for other multi-ethnic countries, especially 
the Soviet Union. The break-up of Yugoslavia had to be avoided in order to keep the 
federation together, it was argued. The European Community offered economic 
assistance and trade concessions and refused to recognize any breakaway republics. 
In the summer of 1990 the Serb "uprising" in Croatia signaled the start of the war 
of Yugoslav secession, which became a full-scale war in the Summer of 1991. 
In June 1991, when the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) attacked Slovenia, the 
second phase began. It was characterized by Austria's initiation of the emergency 
mechanism of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The 
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CSCE's Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna required Yugoslavia to clarify its 
military intentions. The CSCE's and the European Community's diplomatic 
intervention achieved the end of the fighting in Slovenia. 
Phase three began with the movement of the YPA into Croatia and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. International efforts became necessary to resolve the conflict. The 
European Community initially attempted to persuade Serbia to agree to a political 
settlement and simultaneously to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina together, thus limiting the 
rise of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia. The number of cease-fire monitors was 
increased to 300. Political negotiations sponsored by the E.C. peace conference 
began, forming three working groups (on constitutional arrangements, minority 
rights and economic relations). The working group considering the republics' 
constitutions became known as the Badinter commission. 
Phase four has been characterized by the conflict in Bosnia, which began 
when the Bosnian Serbs started to consolidate their control over Serb-dominated 
areas in Bosnia-Herzigovina. Milosevic explained this to Warren Zimmermann in 
October 1991 that "...the Serbs were a rural people living on 70 percent of the land, 
to which they therefore had a right".164 The Serb reaction on April 7, 1992, to the 
Bosnian referendum in favor of independence undermined the security situation. The 
Bosnian Serbs, aided by the Yugoslav Army, escalated the violence and focused on 
the forcible removal, intimidation, and killing of Bosnian Muslims and Croats to 
create "ethnically pure" Serb enclaves. This phase continues. 
A fifth phase is likely to begin in Spring 1995. In a worst-case scenario the 
the UNPROFOR mandate will then be terminated and, with the completion of the 
UNPROFOR withdrawal, war will almost certainly engulf Croatia. 
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1. The European Communfty1*5: The E.C. Before Maastricht 
In retrospect it is evident that the twelve European nations then forming the 
European Community (E.C.) tried to adniinister rather than control the crisis.166 
At the beginning of the crisis, however, it might have been possible to stop Serbian 
aggression and further escalation without overwhelming military force. But the 
Western Europeans did not agree on sending a WEU interposition force to Eastern 
Croatia as proposed by Germany and France. Nicole Gnesotto writes that, 
The Franco-German axis held firm during the first months of the 
conflict: in mid-August 1991, a Franco-German proposal was made 
for the deployment of a force between Serbs and Croats in Croatia 
itself, within a WEU framework. This was immediately opposed by 
the British who...[have] drawn from Northern Ireland and Cyprus the 
lesson that great caution has to be exercised in interposition 
operations....The affair came to an abrupt halt When, on 19 
September 1991, the European Council simply asked WEU to draw up 
plans for a possible peacekeeping operation and turned to the United 
Nations for the management of the conflict. From October 1991 and 
the UN's appearance on the scene, the Franco-British axis was, 
however, to become dominant, and Germany was to go it alone and 
later be absent altogether.167 
In December 1991 neither the E.C.'s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) nor the particular role of the WEU forces had yet been developed. For this 
reason Great Britain opposed the employment of armed forces. 
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In the autumn of 1991 the Presidential Committee of the Assembly of 
the WEU asked the Council of Ministers to invite the UN Security 
Council to set up a peace-keeping force capable of enforcing the cease- 
fire in the area. It hoped the WEU could play that role if such a force 
were constituted, but the Council restricted itself to declaring an 
embargo on the delivery of arms and military equipment to 
Yugoslavia.168 
Instead of an armed force for interposition operations the E.C. sent its 
European Community Monitor Mission into Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, on the 
diplomatic front, the European Community in September 1991 created a commission 
to establish criteria for recognizing breakaway Yugoslav republics. This commission 
was led by the French Minister of Justice, Robert Badinter. The efforts of the E.C, 
the CSCE and the Security Council of the United Nations to resolve the crisis were 
supported by NATO ~ support that was emphatically expressed at the Rome summit 
of the NATO members in November 1991. NATO welcomed the measures agreed 
upon by the European Community's member states at the meeting of foreign 
ministers on 8 November. The foreign ministers also agreed to Lord Peter 
Carrington's efforts. His plans provided a framework for the peoples of Yugoslavia 
to solve their problems. Gerard Berkhof wrote that, 
[a]t the diplomatic level the EC initially took the lead, beginning with 
the 'Troika' of past, present and future chairmen, and then with 
special representative Lord Carrington, followed by Lord Owen. The 
objective was to bring about a cease-fire, first between the different 
republics of the former Yugoslavia - Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia - 
and later between the warring factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at 
diplomatic conferences in The Hague, Brussels and London. Later, 
when the UN became involved, the venue was moved to Geneva. The 
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endeavors of EC diplomacy were supported from the outset by an EC 
Monitor Mission in the field.169 
The European Community developed a basic strategy which from the very 
beginning of its involvement in the crisis in 1990 included three actions: permanent 
negotiations with the conflicting parties, economic sanctions and an arms embargo, 
and some hindrance of the military operations of the conflicting parties through 
peacekeeping forces. 
2.  The United Nations: UN Resolution 713 
The Secretary General of the United Nations, Xavier Perez de Cuellar, was 
reluctant to involve the UN. After the outbreak of fighting, he initially rejected UN 
intervention in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, as Slovenia was not a member of 
the United Nations. 
But with the continued failure of EC-led efforts, attention increasingly 
focused on the UN as an alternative forum. France (a permanent 
member in the Security Council, and the Council's chair in September 
[1991]) and Austria (serving a term membership on the Council) 
continued to lead the effort. France's interest in UN action was 
stimulated by the continued political disagreements within the EC on 
how to proceed and by a general unwillingness to use the WEU, while 
Austria was a neighbor concerned about possible widening of the 
conflict and responding to its close historical and cultural ties to 
Croatia and Slovenia.170 
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On 25 September 1991, the Security Council supported the cease-fire 
agreements of 17 and 22 September 1991 by encouraging diplomatic action and 
adopting its first resolution on Yugoslavia to implement an arms embargo. The 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 713 states that member nations 
are, i 
...[djeeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia which is causing a 
heavy loss of human life and material losses,... [concerned that a 
continuation of this situation constitutes a threat to international 
peace,...[cjommending the efforts undertaken by the European 
Community and its member States, with the support of the States 
participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia, through, inter 
alia, the implementation of a cease-fire including the sending of 
observers, the convening of a Conference on Yugoslavia, including the 
mechanisms set forth within it, and the suspension of the delivery of 
all weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia... [djecides, under 
Chapter VH of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, 
for the purpose of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, 
immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all 
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.171 
On 8 October 1991, Perez de Cuellar appointed former U.S. Secretary of 
State Cyrus R. Vance as his personal envoy to Yugoslavia. In November 1991 a 
second United Nations Security Council resolution 721 (later called Resolution, 
UNSCR), considered the "request by the Government of Yugoslavia for the 
establishment of a peace-keeping operation."172 But Resolution 724 of December 
1991 - the third on Yugoslavia in 1991 - stated that the 
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conditions for establishing a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia 
still do not exist... [Nevertheless the Security Council] [e]ncourages the 
Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Yugoslavia in 
liaison with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF and other 
humanitarian organizations, to take urgent practical steps to tackle the 
critical needs of the people of Yugoslavia, including displaced persons 
and the most vulnerable groups affected by the conflict, to assist in the 
voluntary return of displaced persons to their homes.173 
The actions outlined in the three Resolutions of 1991 were all undertaken with 
respect to threats to the peace as provided by Chapter VII of the Charter.174 Each 
supported the negotiated and unconditional cease-fire and the implementation of the 
arms embargo. Once the cease-fire was agreed upon in Geneva on 23 November 
1991, the employment of peace-keeping forces would follow in accordance with the 
Charter's Chapter VIII.175 This phase lasted until the end of 1991 and was 
characterized by the absence of a military threat by an international force. This 
phase resulted in numerous attempts to arrange cease-fires and provide 
humanitarian relief to civilians and refugees. 
3.  The European Community at Maastricht: The E.C. Summit in 
December 1991 
At the Maastricht Summit it became evident that the conflict in Yugoslavia 
did not threaten the Western European states and therefore no immediate calls for 
action or assistance would be pursued. Planning the economic future for Europe 
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eclipsed the development of a consolidated peace effort, despite the Western 
Europeans' diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.176 
The Treaty on European Union, which was negotiated . .became the 
focal point of the post-cold war campaign of EC completion. The 
Maastricht Treaty has been widely heralded as the most important 
[but]...is first and foremost an economic document, designed to 
consolidate and expand upon the progress which had been made 
during the cold war toward the creation of a fully integrated West 
European economic system.177 
"During the spring and summer of 1991, as West European governments were 
preparing for Maastricht," Douglas Stuart observed, "Yugoslavia was treated as an 
annoyance and an inconvenience rather than an immediate regional security 
crisis."178 
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In early December [1991], the leaders of the E.C. at last sat down in 
Maastricht. Neither together nor singly had they done anything worth 
mentioning about Serbian aggression. Carrington had brokered a 
succession of cease-fires, not one of which lasted much longer than the 
time it took to announce it. In two full days of meetings to conclude 
their treaty, the E.C. leaders dealt quickly with the recognizing of 
Croatia and Slovenia. But neither the consequences of recognition nor 
the real problems posed by Yugoslavia ever came up in their 
discussions.179 
The act of recognition by the E.C. in January 1992 followed another, more 
durable, cease-fire in Croatia.180 Cyrus R. Vance, the personal envoy of the 
Secretary General of the United Nations, had negotiated this cease-fire. The lengthy 
duration allowed the United Nations peace plan to take effect.181 "The cease-fire 
was seen by many relieved Europeans and most Germans as proof that recognition 
had done no harm, and possibly even some good."182 Since Croatia and Slovenia 
had become independent, Bosnians were confronted with a choice they would have 
preferred to avoid. If they would not attempt recognition, Bosnia would become part 
of the Serbian-dominated "Rump-Yugoslavia," with "ethnic cleansing" and the 
expulsion of Muslims. Applying for recognition, however, was likely to bring on civil 
war. In February 1992, Bosnia held a referendum for independence and the E.C. 
and the United States recognized Bosnia in April 1992. 
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In February 1992 the United Nations, supported by the E.C. and the CSCE 
states, decided to establish a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).183 
After recognition fighting broke out in Bosnia, which in April 1992 already 
influenced the timely deployment of advanced elements of the UNPROFOR.184 The 
Security Council authorized full deployment of the UNPROFOR on April 7, 1992, 
under the command of the Indian General Satish Nambiar. Units of the Yugoslav 
People's Army and elements of the Croatian Army were still operating in Bosnia- 
Herzigovina when the UNPROFOR called for a mandate for Eastern Slavonia, a 
region rich in resources such as oil on Croatia's Serbian border, where the heavy 
artillery of the Yugoslav army shelled the urban Croat population. 
Since May 1992 the safety of personnel operating under the aegis of the 
United Nations or the European Community Monitor Mission has not been 
guaranteed in Yugoslavia.185 The European Community was still pursuing efforts 
to establish a framework on constitutional arrangements for Bosnia-Herzigovina at 
the Conference on Yugoslavia, when the safe and secure access to Sarajevo was 
already threatened. The United Nations plan, once implemented, would create 
United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) where the UNPROFOR should disarm all 
irregular forces, irrespective of their origin. "On May 19th, [1992,] Margaret 
Tutwiler, the U.S. State Department spokesperson, had said that she was 'not aware 
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or any American security interest at stake in Yugoslavia.1"86 At the following 
NATO meeting held in Lisbon on May 24th an American-led delivery of 
humanitarian aid was approved unanimously, but it has been dependent on the free 
use of the Sarajevo airport and therefore threatened.187 It was known before 
the Maastricht Summit, but afterwards became more evident, with the outbreak of 
hostilities: "the Balkan crisis has confirmed that the EU cannot provide security 
guarantees."188 
The E.C. was confident that the established embargo would succeed. More 
economic sanctions were agreed on by the United Nations before the summer of 
1992. But the sanctions did not force the warring parties to agree to a conference; 
instead violence increased. The French announced that they were prepared to 
support humanitarian aid with ground forces and President Mitterrand on "Kosovo- 
day", 28 July 1992, made a one-day trip to the beleaguered city of Sarajevo. In 
addition to the need for humanitarian aid, it became known that prisons, camps, 
and detention centers were established in Yugoslavia to promote "ethnic 
cleansing."189    Mass killings and the continuance of the practice of "ethnic 
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cleansing" led to demands that international humanitarian organizations, in 
particular the International Committee of the Red Cross, have access to the 
detention camps.190 As "ethnic cleansing" became recognized as a phenomenon 
throughout Bosnia-Herzigovina, "the promoting of safe areas for humanitarian 
purposes," became a major effort. 
4.  The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: The CSCE 
Helsinki Summit in the Summer of 1992 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe became involved 
because of its newly established emergency mechanism which would provide for 
holding a special meeting of the CSCE at the request of one member, if that request 
was supported by twelve other CSCE members as well. On 28 June 1991 Austria 
requested a meeting to have Yugoslavia clarify its military intentions. As a result, 
three E.C. foreign ministers negotiated the Brioni Accords of 8 July 1991 which 
ended the fighting in Slovenia, and established a cease-fire and a moratorium on the 
declaration of independence. The E.C.'s Monitor Mission, consisting of 30 to 50 
observers, had the task of monitoring compliance with all the previous agreements. 
Almost exactly a year later, on 10 July 1992, the members of the CSCE 
returned to its birthplace, Helsinki, Finland. The 1992 Helsinki document states 
(regarding security and management of changes and conflicts) that, 
[In paragraph 18:] The CSCE has been instrumental in promoting 
changes; now it must adapt to the task of managing them.... 
[In paragraph 19:] We have provided for CSCE peacekeeping 
according to agreed modalities. CSCE peacekeeping activities may be 
undertaken in cases of conflict within or among participating States 
to help maintain peace and stability in support of an ongoing effort at 
a political solution. In this respect, we are also prepared to seek on 
a case-by-case basis, the support of international institutions and 
organizations such as the EC, NATO and WEU, as Well as other 
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institutions and mechanisms, including the peacekeeping mechanism 
of the CIS.... 
[In paragraph 23:] We remain convinced that security is indivisible. 
No state in our CSCE community will strengthen its security at the 
expense of other States. This is our resolute message to States which 
resort to the threat or use of force to achieve their objectives in 
flagrant violation of CSCE commitments.191 
Paragraph 23, as mentioned above, concerned Serbia's and Croatia's position 
vis-ä-vis the other recognized states of the former Yugoslavia; rump-Yugoslavia 
consists of Montenegro and Serbia with its former autonomous provinces of Kosovo 
and the Vojvodina. In accordance with paragraph 19 the E.C. Monitor Mission in 
August 1992 was endorsed by the CSCE countries. 
This prepared the ground for non-EU states - Canada, 
Czechoslavakia, Poland and Sweden- to join the mission. Beginning in 
October 1992, seven Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) were 
deployed in the countries bordering 'Rump Yugoslavia': Albania, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia [FYROM], Romania and Ukraine, under the aegis of, and 
financed by, the CSCE. Customs officers on the SAM teams, 
consisting of more than 150 members, advise the authorities of the 
host countries on the implementation of sanctions and thus support 
those authorities in enforcing the blockade imposed by the UN 
Security Council.192 
The period from the Summer of 1992 to the Summer of 1993 was 
characterized by numerous efforts to implement and tighten the economic sanctions. 
At Helsinki the CSCE Ministers decided to send human rights observers to Serbia 
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(Kosovo, Sandzak, and Vojvodina), in order to implement monitoring operations in 
the Adriatic Sea. NATO and WEU naval forces were soon deployed to the region. 
Gerard Berkhof writes that, 
[i]n February 1993, the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE 
appointed a joint CSCE-EU Sanctions Coordinator to oversee the 
sanctions imposed on 'Rump Yugoslavia'. Later, in April, 1993, the 
CSCE 'welcomed' the Western European Union's patrolling operation 
to implement the sanctions on the Danube. This 'allowed' all riparian 
states to accept the WEU operation. In the Yugoslav conflict the WEU 
has consistently acted in close collaboration with the UN.193 
5. The Western European Union: WEU Monitoring 1992 -1993 
The idea of a Western European Union (WEU) was born in 1948. Established 
in London by the Brussels Treaty, the WEU was modified by the Paris agreement 
of October 1954.194 After maintaining a low profile the WEU was reactivated 
in Rome after 30 years on October 27, 1984. The negotiations concerning the 
withdrawal of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union made it necessary to develop European consultations on defence. The 
European role inside NATO and the dialogue with the Warsaw Pact countries on 
arms control was discussed in the WEU Ministerial Council's "Platform on 
European Security Interests" at The Hague on October 27, 1987: 
'We recall our commitments to build a European Union in accordance 
with the Single European Act, which we all signed as members of the 
European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an 
integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include 
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security and defence' (paragraph 2 of the preamble). Member States 
resolved 'to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance.'195 
By 1988 the WEU had deployed minesweepers to the Arabian Gulf. In 1990 
the WEU naval forces participated in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert 
Storm. In 1992, with its parliamentary assembly and research institue located in 
Paris, the WEU had a planning cell of approximately forty participants working on 
contingency planning, peacekeeping, crisis-management and humanitarian relief. 
Regarding the Yugoslav crisis, the WEU contributed to the sanctions imposed on 
Serbia-Montenegro through two complementary actions: 
[First: The Embargo in the Adriatic Sea] From 16 July to 22 
November, [1992,] WEU vessels, acting in close coordination with 
NATO, carried out monitoring operations in the Adriatic, followed by 
embargo enforcement operations since 22 November [1992]. 
[Second: The embargo on the Danube River] At an extraordinary 
meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on 5 April 
1993, Ministers proposed that WEU member States also provide 
assistance to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in their efforts to 
enforce the embargo on the Danube [River]. This was a police and 
customs operation of a civilian nature aimed at strengthening the 
embargo to which WEU countries would contribute appropriate 
resources. This joint initiative by WEU and the three riparian States 
has been coordinated with the efforts of other organizations, in 
particular the EC and CSCE.196 
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In June 1993, a single leader became the authority over the combined 
NATO/WEU embargo enforcement operations. The effect of the WEU effort called 
"Operation Sharp Fence" is discussed in the next section together with NATO's 
involvement. By the late Summer of 1992, the WEU's naval forces were trained to 
operate together with NATO's naval forces. This deployment emphasized monitoring 
operations at sea ~ similar to its counterpart the EC Monitor Mission ashore - 
called "Operation Maritime Monitor." With regard to the Yugoslav crisis the 
WEU efforts alone might not provide an adequate solution, some critics believe. The 
Economist wrote that 
... it is unlikely that they [the WEU members] organize a purely 
European force, for any purpose, even a twentieth of the size of the 
alliance that won the Gulf war. The bigger the crisis, the more likely 
that the Europeans would have to turn to America for help.197 
6.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO Displayed 
Determination, Denied Flight and Enforced the Maritime Embargo 
In the Summer of 1992, the UN again requested strengthening the arms 
embargo and the economic sanctions. NATO198 deployed one of its Standing Naval 
Forces, the former Mediterranean naval on-call force (NAVOCFORMED), into the 
Adriatic. In 1991, this force was established as NATO's Standing Naval Force 
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Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED). It consisted of six naval units of destroyer and 
frigate size, a Mediterranean sister to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic.199 
In September 1992, within the context of the Yugoslav crisis, NATO used the 
annual presence of its Standing Naval Force Atlantic in the Mediterranean to 
exercise its ships in joint operations with naval units of the United States Sixth Fleet, 
particularly the Saratoga Battle-Group. This large-scale naval operation took place 
in the Adriatic, Ionian and Aegean Seas and was named "Exercise Display 
Determination." 
It is not possible to prove that the show of force at sea displayed NATO's 
determination and added to its credibility about taking the lead in the Yugoslav 
crisis. At least the International Conference on Yugoslavia at Geneva made some 
progress, and the Joint Declaration was signed on September 30,1992, and October 
20, 1992, between Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro. The Joint Statement made by 
Tudjman and Milosevic on October 19,1992, and the Joint Communique issued on 
November 1, 1992, at Zagreb by Tudjman and Izetbegovic allowed some hope of a 
peaceful resolution. The Mixed Military Working Group was established in the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and an outline constitution was drafted. 
Nevertheless the deteriorating situation caused by Serb military forces in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the continuing support for the Serbs by military flights 
obliged President Izetbegovic to address the Security Council on October 4, 1992. 
Resolution 781 banned all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina.200 
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On 16 November 1992, the Security Council agreed to enforce the embargo 
on the Danube River and in the Adriatic Sea.201 When naval forces in the Adriatic 
were ordered to enforce Resolution 787, NATO's Standing Naval Force 
Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) and the Naval Forces of the Western European 
Union (NAVFORWEU) immediately took charge. STANAVFORMED employed its 
ships and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) in "OperationMaritime Guard", whereas 
NAVFORMED continued "Operation Sharp Fence." In Summer 1993 
... [following the adoption of Resolution 820, WEU and NATO have 
studied means of enhancing the effectiveness of these embargo 
enforcement operations. At a joint session on 8 June 1993, the North 
Atlantic Council and the Council of Western European Union 
approved the concept of combined NATO/WEU operations under the 
authority of the Councils of both organizations, and a single 
commander was appointed to head the combined NATO/WEU task 
force.202 
The combined NATO/WEU Task Force 440 combined the operations "Sharp 
Fence" and "Maritime Guard" to "Operation Sharp Guard." In July 1993, the 
Standing Naval Force Atlantic joined the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and 
the NAVFORWEU in NATO's Southern Region under the single command of 
Commander Naval Forces Southern Region (COMNAVSOUTH). 
The American Admiral Jeremy Boorda, NATO's former Commander in Chief Allied 
Forces Southern Europe and superior to COMNAVSOUTH, wrote 
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[f]or the first time in history NATO is in action. In a rapid transition 
from its original deterrence and defence mission the Alliance has 
deployed its mighty means in support of the United Nations. The aim 
is to save lives, restore order and hopefully, bring about peace, in 
compliance with the will of the international community to develop a 
more peaceful and better world. The Southern Region has been 
NATO's agent in a remarkable performance of the Alliance's new 
role.203 
The naval blockade component included a total of twenty ships with several 
units permanently blocking access to the ports of Bar and Kotor in Montenegro. 
Other naval units tracked shipping leaving the Adriatic. Nearly every ship entering 
the Adriatic has been inspected for contraband and weapons. Permanent air 
coverage for surveillance of the entire operations area was provided by military 
patrol aircraft performing from Italian air bases. NATO's Operation "Deny Flight" 
was installed as the air component to enforce the UN sanctions, in order to ban 
military flights in the air space over Bosnia-Hercegovina and to provide air cover 
of UNPROFOR whUe carrying out its mandate. Approximately 4,000 personnel from 
ten NATO nations operated from air bases, mostly in Italy, to deny the warring 
parties the use of air power over Bosnia.204 French, British and American aircraft 
carrier groups patrolled the Adriatic to protect the UNPROFOR detachments 
ashore. In May 1994 the American Vice Admiral J.W. Prueher described both the 
operations as a big success. Prueher concluded that "multi-national forces can work, 
that effectiveness transcends efficiency, that presence connotes deterrence."205 
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Robert H. Thomas recently published a study entitled Use of Naval Forces in 
Imposing and Enforcing Sanctions, Embargoes and Blockades. He wrote that, 
[t]he blockade against the Balkan states has been ineffective for many 
reasons. Apart from the problems posed by access through the Danube 
River, the attractiveness of this market in a world experiencing a 
major recession and concurrent reduction of armed forces has been 
too great to pass up. Slovenia and Croatia have been able to acquire 
military equipment from at least ten countries, often channelled 
through illicit arms markets in Austria. It has been claimed that the 
relative peace in Lebanon has been achieved only through the 
wholesale transfer of arms into the Balkans. 
Despite the expanding efforts of the United Nations, NATO and the 
WEU,...supplies continue to enter overland and up the Danube. 
Bulgaria is supplying...oil and additional material is provided through 
Albania and Greece....Given the right equipment, they [the blockade 
enforcers] have the capability to be effective in their role. The overall 
success of the mission, however will depend more on the political and 
diplomatic activities required to develop a comprehensive enforcement 
policy and on the will to persevere over time to achieve the desired 
result, than it will depend on the intrinsic capability of the naval 
forces themselves.206 
The naval blockade and the no-fly zone over Bosnia successfully contained the 
Yugoslav crisis from spreading. Both were still in place, when on completion of the 
Geneva foreign ministers meeting on 5 July 1994 the North Atlantic Council at its 
meeting on 11 July 1994 decided to support the Geneva peace plan. 
7. NATO's Failed Test of Power At Bfliac in November 1994 
On 21 November 1994, the American Admiral Leighton W. Smith, the 
Commander of the NATO forces in Southern Europe, ordered thirty nine aircraft 
from the United States, Britain, France and The Netherlands to attack the Udbina 
airfield in Croatia and to destroy all runways, taxiways, anti-aircraft guns and 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. 
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surface-to-air missiles that posed a threat to NATO pilots. This airport was used by 
Croatian Serbs to support Bosnian Serbs in their attack against Muslims in the 
United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) of Bihac. Croatian Serb aircraft flying out 
of Udbina attacked civilians in the Bosnian town of Bihac, using cluster bombs and 
napalm. At the request of the UN military commander in Yugoslavia, Lieutenant 
General Bertrand de Lapresle of France, the raid did not attack Serbian aircraft at 
the base. Ambassador Yasushi Akashi, the top UN official in the former Yugoslavia, 
received authority from the UN Security Council to use NATO air power to strike 
the Serbs on Croatian territory. Previously such authority was confined to Bosnia. 
Because the air raid did not take place in Bosnia, it did not involve Lieutenant 
General Sir Michael Rose, the Commander of UN forces in Bosnia. From January 
1994 to January 1995 Rose was a persistent opponent of the use of NATO air power 
against the Serbs. 
The strike on Udbina air base was NATO's newest type of combat 
involvement since July 1992, when NATO warships began operations in the Adriatic. 
In April 1993 NATO began combat patrol operations to enforce compliance with the 
flight ban, and in June 1993 NATO offered close air support to protect UN 
personnel in Bosnia. In August 1993 Bosnian Serbs threatening Sarajevo came under 
attack. In February 1994, the Sarajevo ultimatum forced the Serbs to withdraw 
their heavy weapons around Sarajevo within ten days. Four light Serbian attack 
aircraft were shot down the same month. In April 1994, the first allied attack on 
ground targets - against Serb forces around Gorazde - was conducted. NATO 
announced its preparations to protect all six UN "safe areas" with air strikes. The 
Serbs therefore withdrew from Gorazde. In August 1994, heavy weapons deployed 
in violation of the exclusive zone around Sarajevo were attacked, and in September 
1994 a Serbian tank that had been used to attack UN peacekeepers was hit near 
Sarajevo. 
Despite this record of successful strikes, including the November 1994 series 
of strikes on Serbian missile sites in northwestern Bosnia, the united States and its 
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European allies remained divided on the fundamental question of how to respond 
to the threat to European security from the fighting in the Balkans. Craig R. 
Whitney wrote that 
The United States has often inclined towards punishing the Serbs, but 
has never wanted to send in American soldiers on the ground to do it. 
Since the beginning of the Clinton administration, it has been pressing 
the allies to agree to a combination of stepped-up NATO air strikes on 
the Serbs and lifting the arms embargo for the Bosnian Government 
forces. The Europeans have inclined instead toward forcing the 
combatants to compromise. They have provided the bulk of an 18,000- 
strong UN force that does what it can to protect civilians from the 
worst ravages of war.207 
With the war raging around Bihac, General Sir Michael Rose in January 
1995 praised NATO's role as 'indispensable'. He is quoted as saying that, 
... lifting the arms embargo would be catastrophic and predicted that 
the United Nations forces would stay on in Croatia despite the 
Croatian Government suggestion that it might ask them to leave.208 
8.  The UN Agenda 1995: UNPROFOR Support UNHCR 
On 28 January 1995 the change of command of the UNPROFOR in Bosnia 
occurred. When General Sir Michael Rose relinquished command to Lieutenant 
General Rupert Smith, he repeated that his forces had to retain strict neutrality to 
fulfill their mission, which is primarily an operation to bring relief aid to 2,700,000 
people. John Darton writes that 
Britain opposes exempting the Bosnian Government from an arms 
embargo in the Balkans on the ground that it might deepen the 
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conflict. Britain also opposes widening the use of air strikes against 
the Bosnian Serbs lest that lead them to retaliate against United 
Nations forces. Britain has 3,500 troops in Bosnia and the neighboring 
Croatia.209 
The UNPROFOR blue helmets and the humanitarian missions run by the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are sharing three main jobs. The 
Economist labeled those "Aid provision, Protecting minorities and Peacekeeping:" 
Aid provision'. Some 2.7m people in Bosnia, and around 3.8m 
throughout all former Yugoslavia, get some kind of aid...The UNHCR 
delivers it, along with various agencies from small private ones to the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent. UNPROFOR's main job is to assist the 
UNHCR. In some areas this means giving aid trucks an armed escort 
which can shoot back if fired upon...The most dependent on the UN 
operation are Sarajevans, whether Muslim, Croat or Serb. The bulk 
of their aid is flown into the city's airport which is run by 
UNPROFOR. Protecting minorities: UNHCR protection officers also 
monitor the fate of minorities caught behind the lines, Serbs in 
Muslim areas, Muslim in Serb areas and...can also signal when 
emergency evacuations are necessary. Peacekeeping: In central Bosnia 
the UN polices a cease-fire between Croats and Muslims which has 
brought peace and opened up roads for commercial traffic; thanks to 
this hundreds of thousands there no longer depend on humanitarian 
aid. The UN, however, still has a part to play, through its military 
observers...In Serb-held areas of Croatia, UNPROFOR troops have 
helped ensure that... war has not spilled out from the borders of 
Bosnia.210 
With the peacekeepers serving as a liaison on both sides of the front line the 
UN acts as the communications link betweeen the warring parties and may enable 
them to achieve a permanent peace. At the top of UNHCR and UNPROFOR 
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Ambassador Yasushi Akasbi, the UN Secretary General's special envoy, acts as the 
crucial link between the warring forces and the outside world. 
This review of events has shown how the security organizations adapted to the 
crisis. It concludes that the other security organizations, after realizing the 
inadequacy of alternative institutional settings, tacitly re-established the United 
Nations as the sole practicable international authority to mobilize military forces. 
9.  The Absence of Effective Institutional Settings for the Post-Cold War 
Era 
The limited interest of the superpowers - and especially the limited interest 
of the United States - forced European leaders to confront the Yugoslav problem. 
For several different reasons both the trans-Atlantic and the European regional 
organizations failed. The institutional settings were too weak to deal with the 
problem, partly because the adaptation to the post-Cold War era had just begun. 
The European Community was active at the beginning of the crisis. On the 
diplomatic front the E.C. achieved a cease-fire by concluding the Brioni Accords. 
The E.C. set up the Badinter Commission to establish criteria for recognition and 
the E.C. kept the community together. This was very successful diplomacy, 
compared with the events following the Balkan crisis in 1914. 
In 1991 the E.C.'s and the CSCE's adaptation to the ppst-Cold War era was 
not developed. Therefore the E.C.'s 'common foreign and security policy' (CFSP) 
and the CSCE's 'standing on-call military component for common action' was still 
missing. The Yugoslav conflict thus contributed to the discussion of a CFSP and 
made it obvious that the E.C. needed a common policy to act successfully. The 
sequence of events, however, limited the Maastricht provisions on a CFSP. 
In 1991, the CSCE established a mechanism to allow a single member to call 
an emergency meeting as a crisis response reaction. Austria called for such a 
meeting when the YPA attacked Slovenia, and consequently Yugoslavia became the 
first member of the CSCE whose membership was suspended. The principle of 
consensus minus one was established, and the 1992 Helsinki Conference proved that 
142 
the CSCE constitution could be adapted to the Yugoslav crisis. The position of a 
High Commissioner for National Minorities was established, and the CSCE agreed 
on mechanisms and procedures for conflict prevention and crisis management. 
CSCE peacekeeping would include actions of the EC, as well as military forces and 
civilians from NATO, WEU and CIS. 
The Yugoslav crisis pushed WEU leaders to adjust their organization. At the 
Petersberg meeting near Bonn in 1992, the WEU developed a permanent planning 
staff with 100 members. The Petersberg Declaration defined WEU peacekeeping 
missions for the UN and the CSCE, as well as humanitarian and rescue missions. 
As a result, naval forces were tasked to enforce the UN Adriatic embargo and to 
patrol the Danube river. 
NATO did not react immediately to the Yugoslav crisis because no signatories 
of the treaty nor any member's territory was attacked. NATO became involved as 
the action arm of the CSCE and the UN Security Council. NATO's Adriatic sea 
embargo, the surveillance of the no-fly zone over Bosnia, and all of its forces 
participating in the UNPROFOR acted under the aegis of the United Nations. 
All these organizations indicate that institutional problems were solved as the 
crisis developed. As all these organizations rely on individual member states, 
fundamental disagreements between the members were imported into the 
organizations. As James B. Steinberg wrote: 
Ironically, what many considered the regional organizations' 
comparative advantage — proximity to and interest in resolving the 
conflict — also proved a serious limitation. Because many states in the 
region had historical alliances with the parties to the Yugoslav 
conflict, their impartiality was questioned.211 
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The sympathies of France and to a lesser extent Britain have been with the 
Serbs. Germany and Austria have closer political, historical and religious ties to 
Croatia and Slovenia. Steinberg explains that these concerns about partiality were 
blamed for the limited success of the E.C.-sponsored peace conference. Russia, the 
dominating member of the CIS and member of the UN Security Council, has 
traditionally been sympathetic to the Serbian cause. 
Besides the problems of impartiality, there exists ah imbalance between 
France, Britain and Spain and the other European countries in terms of resources 
and risks. Germany, no longer hampered by its constitutional constraints, has to 
decide how it will join those three in sharing the burden of military intervention. 
Such an imbalance implies political consequences which will influence the 
development of the security organizations in the post-Cold War era. 
C.  THE UNITED NATIONS INFLUENCE 
1. The United Nations' Sole Authority to Resort to Military Force 
The Yugoslav crisis re-established the United Nations as the sole practicable 
international authority to mobilize military forces for hazardous interventions 
abroad. Nicole Gnesotto wrote that, 
the decision to resort to military force - for reasons other than 
individual or collective self-defence — can elude the strictly European 
frameworks and be transferred to the UN. ...Indeed, all the 
democratic governments have wanted to act in Yugoslavia in response 
of a UN mandate: firstly, because the UN continues to represent the 
hope, or the illusion, of new, post-communist international 
cooperation; secondly, because the UN makes it possible to short- 
circuit or hide any domestic political reticence in each of our 
[democratic] countries; and, finally, because this allegiance to the 
authority of the UN is supposedly stamped with the virtues of 
example, in particular with Russia in mind, which nobody wishes to 
see unilaterally using its armed forces to defend the 25 million or so 
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Russians outside Russia. For the first time in its history, the UN has 
thus managed a grave crisis in continental Europe.212 
The UN reference for the legitimation of the use of military force is 
convenient and helpful but not necessarily the ultimate wisdom. Even it is not always 
relevant today, in view of Moscow's explicit veto of any anti-Serb action by the UN. 
This should not necessarily mean that blocking UN action, would prohibit the United 
States, NATO or the WEU from carrying out retributive action. For Germany it 
would be unacceptable to mount military action without the blessing of the UN. 
Recalling the clarification on this point made by the British government during the 
Gulf war, Nicole Gnesotto wrote, "for other Europeans with different military 
cultures, the UN's primacy does not imply the UN's exclusiveness in legitimating the 
use of military force."213 
2. United Nations Peacekeepers and Peace Plans 
Since late 1991, various bilateral, national, multinational and supranational 
authorities have increasingly tried to influence the conflict's outcome. Most of the 
external influence is reportedly impartial and designed to bring about a quick and 
lasting peace. The multitude of those external attempts cannot be analysed here. 
However, the efforts brought forward by the international community through the 
United Nations as well as the European Community have been designed to overcome 
the internal tensions. The agreed upon solutions to exercise influence by these 
organizations have been through the use of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and 
peace plans. Both are used to assess progress and are discussed in this section. The 
peace plans' common denominator is the "cantonization" of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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Several initiatives in diplomacy have been undertaken, but they have not solved the 
conflict. Cyrus R. Vance negotiated the Serb-Croat cease-fire in Spring 1992. Gale 
Stokes writes that, 
[t]he European Community reacted with shock at the outbreak of civil 
war almost in its midst but found it very difficult to find an effective 
response. The Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe 
proved to be useless in the face of this level of conflict, as did the 
Western European Union. The European Community attempted to 
bring the warring sides together in a series of meetings in The Hague, 
but when truce after truce was immediately broken, it had to admit 
defeat, although desultory negotiations continued. Finally a United 
Nations negotiating team, headed by the former United States 
secretary of state Cyrus Vance, was able to achieve a break in the 
fighting, and in the spring of 1992 blue-helmeted United Nations 
troops, operating under a mandate of the Security Council, took up 
positions in Croatia. By the time of arrival of the United Nations 
force, Serbs had been able to seize about one third of Croatia's 
territory, which, under the truce arrangement they continued to 
occupy.214 
In contrast with "normal" peacekeeping operations (PKO), the warring 
parties in the Yugoslav war do not agree on disarmament nor do they want to stop 
their warlike activities. From the beginning of PKO there has been no peace to keep. 
The Serbian goal has been quite obvious in their pursuit of a Greater Serbia: to 
occupy and hold Serb territory and to "ethnically cleanse" areas in order to link 
them to Serb territory, despite on-going talks, conferences or any agreement on a 
cease-fire or truce. 
[t]he proposal of the mediator Lord Carrington was to make Bosnia 
a state "with three constituent units based on national principles" 
though the split would also have taken geography and wealth into 
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account. Under it, the Muslims would have got about 44 % of Bosnia, 
the same as the Serbs.215 
3.  The Vance-Owen-Peace-Han in Winter 1992 
The participants at the Geneva Conference table presented a promissing 
amount of Yugoslav leadership. Misha Glenny writes that, 
[fjrom its inception, The Geneva Conference on Yugoslavia took its 
work extremely seriously. With a core team of highly skilled 
international civil servants who overshadowed the bundle of dead 
wood also floating around the conference floor, the co-chairman, 
Cyrus Vance, appointed by the United Nations, and Lord Owen, the 
European Community representative, set about their work with gusto. 
Within three months, they had produced a draft constitution and the 
outline of the Vance-Owen peace plan (VOPP) for Bosnia- 
Hercegovina. It was an incredibly complex diplomatic task which 
involved negotiating with three delegations headed by Izetbegovic, 
Karadzic and Boban; presidents Milosevic (Serbia), Tudjman 
(Croatia), Cosic (Yugoslavia) and Bulatovic (Montenegro); the 
Yugoslav Prime Minister, Milan Panic; the three Bosnian army 
commanders Sefir Halilovic, Ratko Mladic and Milivoje Petkovic; and 
the chiefs of the Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije) and the Croatian 
Army (Hrvatska Vojska), generals Zivota Panic and Janko 
Bobetko....The whole operation had to be coordinated on the ground 
with the United Nations Protection Forces UNPROFOR commander 
General Satish Nambiar and the head of the UN Civil Affairs for 
Yugoslavia, Cedric Thornberry. In addition, the work required 
extremely close co-operation with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was led by Sadako 
Ogata.216 
Once all of the high-profile delegations mentioned above were brought to sit 
down at the negotiation table — the peace plan on the table was intended to carve 
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Bosnia into ten provinces with a weak central government. Stjepko Golubic noted 
that, 
[r]egardless of any differences or refinements, critic« of the peace 
plan, and all other such proposals for Bosnia-Herzegovina - designed 
on the principle of carving-up territory on the basis of ethnicity - are 
inherently unworkable attempts to divide the indivisible.2 217 
Misha Glenny further stated that, 
[t]he peace plan was an exceptionally good document... and was never 
intended as a definitive solution to the Bosnian crisis. Its function was 
to provide an interim political solution which would facilitate the 
scaling down of military operations in the republic. It certainly 
provided a very clear framework and direction for any future 
constitutional order but it was not considered immutable by the 
authors.218 
However, this document was abused by the politicians in press and media 
throughout the world and particularly inside Yugoslavia, where it was wilfully mis- 
interpreted to legitimize Serb military action to achieve the 'proper ethnic mapping' 
or to intimidate and terrorize the opposed nationality. Glenny writes that, 
[t]he VOPP involved both the Bosnian government and the Bosnian 
Serbs making substantial concessions. The Bosnian Croats and by 
extension the government in Zagreb, were perfectly satisfied with the 
plan. President Izetbegovic's first response to the VOPP was to reject 
it as it involved the collapse of his aim of restoring a unitary Bosnia- 
Herzigovina with a decisive central government in Sarajevo. ... 
However, although it gave the Serbs wide-ranging powers in the areas 
designated to them, it contained punitive measures against them as 
well. Firstly, it insisted that they hand back 60% in total (25% of 
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Bosnian territory as a whole) of the territory which they had 
conquered militarily in what they perceived to be a civil war. This 
included such crucial towns as Zvornik, Bratunac, Visegrad, Foca, 
Bosanski Novi and Rogatica. They would be denied a northern 
corridor, while the southern route to eastern Herzegovina was also 
broken. In addition, the VOPP specifically denied them their central 
war aim - the formation of an independent state outside Bosnia- 
Herzegovina with the right to forge constitutional links with third 
parties [i.e. Serbia and the Krajina]. So the VOPP was hard for both 
Moslems and Serbs to swallow, although the problem for the Bosnian 
government was ameliorated somewhat inasmuch as their options were 
strictly limited because of their military weakness.219. , 
The Bosnian Muslim lobby at the Geneva conferrence, particularly Bosnia's 
Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic, advocated the dropping of the VOPP an 
d instead requested a lift of the arms embargo against Yugoslavia. European 
countries with troops on the ground acting as UNPORFOR Blue-Helmets, including 
Russian troops, were opposed to the idea of supplying weapons to the Muslim 
government and provoking the Serbs with air strikes to attack peacekeepers. 
The Croats were alarmed by the proposed idea that a strengthened Bosnian 
Muslim might turn against Croat-held territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United 
States proposal for a 'lift-and-strike' policy instead of the VOPP was not accepted 
by the Europeans. President Clinton's Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, after 
several months of procrastination, unveiled the Clinton-Plan, which was identical to 
the VOPP with one negligible exception of territory in favor of the Bosnian 
government. When the Clinton-Christopher-Initiative was abandoned in late April 
1993 (no lift and no strike), the Bosnians pressed for the immediate implementation 
of the VOPP for two reasons: the Bosnian Serbs had occupied 70 percent of Bosnian 
territory and the Croat diplomatic failures to implement the VOPP on their 
Croatian Army (Hrvatska Voijska) HVO-controlled territory was crushing the 
Bosnian government's influence. The VOPP had allotted eight districts with a 
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Moslem majority to the Croats. There Mate Boban's government of "the Croatian 
Union of Herceg-Bosna" in March and April 1993 tried tq 'solve the minority 
problems' in a militarily way. This culminated in the massacre of Muslim civilians 
in the village of Ahmici, a site of considerable religious significance for Bosnia's 
Moslems. Because the Serbs were not rewarded for their conquest of territory, they 
did not sign the VOPP. 
4.  The Owen-Stoltenberg-Peace-PIan of June 1993 
In Geneva negotiators and mediators met to establish peace, for the E.C. 
Lord Owen and for the UN Thorvald Stoltenberg. Present at the negotiations were 
Slobodan Milosevic (Serbia), Franjo Tudjman (Croatia) and as head of Bosnia's 
delegation Alija Izetbegovic (a total 10 member Bosnian Collective presidency of all 
three ethnic groups, including Mohammed Filipovic and Fikret Abdic). 
An agreement to split Bosnia-Herzegovina in three, even with the 
signature of the three warring Bosnian leaders on it, is no guarantee 
of peace, as the international mediators ... well know. But given the 
reluctance of the outside world to do more to protect them, it may be 
Bosnia's best chance to avoid even worse punishment at the hands of 
the Serb and Croat forces.220 
The situation after 15 months of war was that Serb forces still held Gorazde 
under siege. In June 1993 Charles Lane reported that, 
[l]ast week in Geneva, European Community mediator Lord Owen 
and U.N. envoy Thorvald Stoltenberg gave up all but the pretense of 
holding a sovereign Bosnia together and convened talks on a new 
'peace' plan to turn it into three ethnic ministates. The latest scheme 
would ratify the carve-up of an internationally recognized republic 
along the bloody lines of ethnic cleansing - exactly what the 
international community had pledged to resist.221 
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The plan would assign Bosnian Serbs half of the territory, Bosnian Croats 30 
percent. Both ethnic groups would apparently be free to link up with Serbia and 
Croatia respectively. The proposed state for Muslims would consist of two separate 
landlocked pockets on some 20 percent of the remaining land. The Bosnian 
government did not accept this proposal as it was evident that the Muslim pockets 
would not be economically viable, with no access to the Mediterranean through the 
Adriatic Sea (Ploce would be a Croat port). The reaction was spectacular and 
desperate. Bosnian President Izetbegovic, who would have had to sign off on the 
plan, labeled the proposal "genocide" and stormed out of the Geneva talks. 
Vice President Ejup Ganic said there would be terrorist attacks by Bosnians 
in Europe if the West abandoned Bosnia. As result of the non-signing, the Serb and 
Croat conquest of Bosnian territory to the disadvantage of the Muslims continued. 
Some groups felt legitimized by the Owen-Stoltenberg mapping to "ethnically 
cleanse" their assigned territory. 
5.  The "Land-for-Peace" Contact-Group Proposal in Spring 1994 
Led by the chief American official Charles Thomas, the five-nation group 
called the "Contact Group" started a new diplomatic effort to bring peace by 
supporting a modified partition plan in the Balkans. France, Germany, Russia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States strongly believed that there was no better 
and more honest partition possible. The plan was offered to the parties and (despite 
Serb rejection) not modified. The plan was presented as a take-it-or-leave-it 
alternative. In December 1994, the plan had still not been accepted by the Serbs 
because it does not acknowledge the 70 percent territorial gains of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina by the Serbs. The position of the Bosnian Serbs, lead by Radovan 
Karadzic, is best expressed by the Serb Commander-in-Chief, who still controls and 
coordinates all Serb military actions west of the Drina River; General Ratko Mladic 
said that, 
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'the dominant shape of armed conflict for me is attack....I have an 
offensive character and that's acceptable to the High Command of the 
army of the Republic of the Serbians.'...Asked to cede to the Muslims 
land his 80.000 troops conquered? 'I wouldn't do it if I had one 
million lives and had to lose them all. Only an army that is defeated 
retreats.'222 
D. UNITED STATES INFLUENCE: CROAT-MUSLIM AGREEMENTS 
The tragic tale of U.S. involvement in Yugoslavia began in late 1989 and early 
1990 when the CIA warned the Bush administration of the impending violent 
breakup of Yugoslavia. It has been shown in this thesis that the violence and turmoil 
in the region was not a spontaneous and unforeseen event. It can be stated that the 
initial U.S. policy was not caused by a lack of intelligence.223 The initial Bush 
administration policy with regard to the disintegration of Yugoslavia was one of non- 
involvement. The U.S. president's knowledge about the military superiority of the 
Serb forces indicated passive support for the Serbian cause. Secretary of State James 
Baker arrived in Belgrade on June 21, 1991. The last U.S. ambassador to 
Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, noted Baker's arrival and wrote: 
During his one-day visit Baker had nine consecutive meetings: with the 
Albanian leaders from Kosovo, with all six republican leaders, and 
twice with Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic and Foreign 
Minister Budimir Loncar. Listening to Baker deal with these complex 
and irascible personalities, I felt that I had rarely, if ever, heard a 
secretary of state make a more skillful or reasonable presentation. 
Baker's failure was not due to his message but to the fact that the 
different parts of Yugoslavia were on a collision course....Baker did, 
however, leave a strong political message. He said to Prime Minister 
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Markovic, a conduit to the army, 'If you force the United States to 
choose between unity and democracy, we will always choose 
democracy.' Baker's message was the right one, but it came too 
late.224 
Former Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in retrospect 
described the inaction during this time as a mistake, believing "that a tough-minded 
initiative, led by the United States and centering on NATO, might have averted what 
is now, in his mind, an unfixable tragedy."225 After almost a complete year of 
abstinence of U.S. diplomacy regarding Yugoslavia, from June 1991 to June 1992, 
In Washington the Bush administration tried to obscure its own 
passivity and uncertainty by talking a tougher game than it was 
prepared to play. According to The Times, Baker told Republican 
senators at the end of July [1992] - shortly before he left State to 
head the President's reelection campaig — that European foot dragging 
had held back American policy.226 
The first implementation of President Bush's 'defuse-and-contain' policy was 
the United States recognition of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzigovina on 7 April 
1992. It appears that the recognition by the United States — four months after the 
E.C. had recognized Slovenia and Croatia — was intended to dissuade the Serbs 
from actively continuing an aggressive action against another internationally 
recognized state. The Bush administration's policy shift stressed six distinct 
objectives: 
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1) First and foremost there was to be an end to the ethnic cleansing 
activities of the Serb forces. 2) The US government having recognized 
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, would establish full 
diplomatic relationships with those governments. 3) The Serbians 
would continue to be the primary target for sanctions, aimed at 
forcing them to ease aggressive activities. 4) The spread of the Balkan 
conflict into Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandzhak and Macedonia was to be 
prevented by all diplomatic means. 5) The spread of conflict to 
neighboring states was to be actively prevented. 6) NATO was to 
become an active player in the implementation of the above 
objectives.227 
In the Summer of 1992 the United States attempted to overcome the 
diplomatic and military stalemate of the three belligerent parties in order to achieve 
an agreement. During the stalemates, the strongest party usually lost less in 
negotiations. Serbia always used time to its advantage and did so by creating terror 
and    continuing    to     ethnically    cleanse    the    territories    it    controlled. 
1.  The Way to the 1992 Croat-Muslim Agreement 
The United States, having agreed that Serbia has to be the primary target for 
sanctions aimed at forcing Belgrade to cease aggressive activities, supported the 
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in resisting the Serb aggression. A coalition 
of Croats and Muslims could fight Milosevic's Croatian and Bosnian Serbs. 
In 1992 Croatia needed to leave the corner of the aggressive Milosevic- 
type state on the Balkans. This could only be achieved by turning 
away from the Bosnia-Partition policy. It needed a responsible Croatia 
repudiating all territorial ambitions in Bosnia-Herzegowina. Croatia 
should be strongly encouraging the democratic rights for all national 
groups and trying to find a common language with the Bosnian 
Muslims. At the same time it could try to find a common cause with 
the non-irredentist Serbs inside Croatia and attract them to a 
nationally pluralistic vision of Croatia's future. A coalition could fight 
Milosevic's Bosnian surrogates. In the long run this would weaken 
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Milosevic, and he would be less able to challenge the world community 
any longer.228 
To close observers of the diplomatic scene and to Patrick Moore 
[i]t appeared that a kind of international division of labor had 
emerged or been hammered together, with the United States taking 
the lead in bringing the Muslims and Croats around to an agreement 
and with Russia moderating Bosnian Serb behavior.229 
When Patrick Moore analyzed the Croatian-Muslim Agreements, he wrote 
in 1994 that, 
[t]here had been a formal alliance between Bosnia and Croatia dating 
back to 12 July 1992, but it had broken down by spring of the 
following year; in any event, the ten or more documents on restoring 
the alliance signed by the two sides since 1992 proved to be as 
ephemeral as most of the other agreements that have emerged in the 
course of the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession. The Croats at first 
seemed to have the upper hand in the ensuing conflict but by early 
1994 the Muslims had not only gone on the offensive but stood a good 
chance of driving out the ancient Croatian communities of central 
Bosnia. The Serbs, however, continued to hold 70% of the republic's 
territory, and ultimately they remained the chief problem for Muslims 
and Croats alike.230 
2.  The 1994 Croat Muslim Agreement 
More than in 1992, the State Department in 1994 was informed by its allies 
in the Islamic world, in particular Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that pressure 
was building up within the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) to help the 
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Muslims in Bosnia. No European or Western power wants to establish a 'strong 
Muslim fundamentalist state in Central Europe' but the seventeen Muslim states in 
the United Nations cannot be ignored. 
On 1 March 1994 Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, Croatian 
Prime Minister Mate Granic and Kresimir Zubak of the Presidency 
of the self-proclaimed Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna signed a 
series of agreements....One document was a preliminary accord 
between the Croats and the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina to set 
up a federation of ethnically-based cantons. A second group of 
documents provided the broad outlines of a confederation consisting 
of the new Bosnian state and the Republic of Croatia, as well as of the 
rules governing transportation and trade between the two countries, 
including guaranteeing the Muslim access to the Adriatic.231 
Croatia's objective seemed to be very clear: unable to fight the Serbs alone 
in the Croatian territory of the Krajina and in increasingly worse shape in its bid 
to hold Croat-occupied territory in Bosnia, a Croat-Muslim confederation would at 
least save Croat territorial gains and allow Croatia to play a bigger influence with 
the help of a Muslim partner. If in the long run a post-Cold War 'New Yalta' might 
be established, Croatia and Bosnia might hope to find themselves in the area under 
the influence of the United States rather than in a Serbian 'Russian Sector.' 
3.  The "Bihac" Offensive of November 1994 
What will probably become known as just another step of international 
failure to influence the events in Bosnia towards a peaceful outcome is called the 
November 1994 Bihac offensive. The Bosnian army, confident of its support from 
Croat forces and knowing about Milosevic's unwillingness to support Karadzic, 
hoped the time was right to successfully reconquer lost territory. In December 1994, 
the Muslim-Croat military alliance looked like it would fail instead of forcing the 
Bosnian Serbs back to the negotiation table. 
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Since June 1994, when Vojislav Seselj, the Chairman of the Serbian Radical 
Party (the ultra-nationalist wing in the Serb government coalition), made public 
Milosevic's attempts to defeat Radovan Karadzic, the world was made to believe and 
thought that Milosevic's support for the Bosnian Serbs was coming to an end and 
that this would allow peace to be achieved soon. In a report 
Seselj i claims that Milosevic had constructed a plan supported by the 
West for a four month truce in Bosnia, so that he could organize 
elections during that time and, with the help of the State Security 
Service, secure Karadzic's defeat at them.232 
Furthermore, The Economist wrote that, 
[i]n the wake of battlefield reverses, military tribunals have been set 
up to try Bosnian Serbs accused of failing to defend their posts. 
Radovan Karadzic ... says menacingly that anyone who spreads the 
belief that land recently lost had been given up in some secret deal 
would be shot. But sullen conspiracy theorists within his own camp 
say that Mr. Karadzic is creeping towards acceptance of the western 
plan to give the Serbs half of Bosnia rather than the 70% they hold. 
They speculate that it is politic for him to start deliberately losing 
surplus territory in battle — albeit at the cost of several hundred dead 
Serbs — rather than give it away in negotiations....In any case, Mr. 
Karadzic has ordered full mobilization and demanded martial law in 
some parts of his self-proclaimed republic, against the wishes of his 
own politicians....In Belgrade, Serbian officials are sanguine ... about 
the recent reverses suffered by their brother Serbs in Bosnia. It 
became fashionable to talk breezily about a "transitional solution" — 
meaning the period between the hoped-for fall of Mr Karadzic and the 
installation of new leaders obedient to Mr Milosevic. "Karadzic is 
history," rasps a senior man in Serbia's ruling Socialist Party.... 
'There can be only one boss of the house.' If they cannot get rid of Mr 
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Karadzic now, the people around Mr Milosevic hope he will soon be 
forced to sign the peace plan — before he is finally ousted. I 233 
In October 1994 the Bosnian Serbs still refused to sign the peace plan 
proposal and Karadzic was still in office, when the Bosnian Government army in the 
Bihac enclave at the north western tip of Bosnia decided to start an offensive and 
to shift the military balance in favor to the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. After a 
short period of advances for Bosnia's Muslim-led army, the Bosnian Serbs fought 
back. Roger Cohen wrote that the Bosnian Serb offensive, . 
supported by rebel Serbs from the Krajina region of Croatia and some 
renegade Muslim forces, came in response to an abrupt advance last 
month [October 1994] by the Muslim-led Bosnian Army to the east of 
Bihac. More than 10.000 Serbian civilians lost their homes to the V 
Corps of the Bosnian Army and fled west and south into Serbian-held 
parts of Croatia.... At least 8.000 Muslim refugees of a total 
population of 180.000 Muslim people in the Bihac pocket have fled the 
Serbian advance.234 
The Bosnian Serb offensive showed first the involvement of the Croatian 
Serbs, as the attack on Bihac has fully coordinated between Croatian and Bosnian 
Serbs. Roger Cohen reported that on a recent visit to Knin. the capital of the 
Krajina region, Croatian Serb officers could be seen calling Banja Luka in Bosnian 
Serb territory to receive their instructions. Only through a coordinated campaign 
has Bihac been entirely surrounded, and the Bosnian Army attacked on several 
fronts at once. The Commander of the Bosnian Serb Forces, General Ratko Mladic, 
warned that he could no longer guarantee the safety of UN personnel on Bosnian 
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territory. During the events that followed, NATO (as the striking arm of the United 
Nations) could no longer protect the 23,000 peacekeepers on the ground. 
Approximately 500 were held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs, and negotiations about 
a cease-fire failed as Karadzic refused even to talk to the Secretary General of the 
United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 2 December 1994. The United Nations 
aims have been simple: to stabilize UN safe areas, to prevent Croatia from entering 
the war, and to stop further Serbian advances. The Serb advance is going beyond 
reclaiming lost territory: Bosnian and Croatian Serbs surrounded Bihac and took 
up positions on the outskirts of the town, leaving the Muslims in Bihac with 1,250 
Bangladeshi peacekeepers, in an untenable position. 
During the Winter of 1995 the ring Serbian rebels built around Bihac was 
kept tight. A continuing regular supply for the peacekeepers and the delivery of 
humanitarian aid never could be established. Alan Cowell reported in March 1995 
that, 
[a]part from attacks on convoys in other Muslim enclaves in Bosnia, 
officials from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and 
World Food Program have been worried by harassment of convoys 
passing through Serb-held areas of Croatia to reach the Bihac pocket 
in northwestern Bosnia. Those convoys also pass through Bosnian 
territory controlled by a renegade Muslim group, which frequently 
refuses to allow them to pass. This group, loyal to a local leader 
named Fikret Abdic, insists on what U.N. officials call 
'disproportionate' supplies of relief food for areas under its control. 
Mr. Abdic's rebels,...are allied with the Krajina Serbs in one of the 
Balkans' more baffling alliances.235 
The Serb rebels in the Krajina, which (like the Bosnian Serbs) act under the 
military command of the Serb General Ratko Mladic and are allied to Abdic's 
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Muslim renegades, were told on March 9th, 1995, that all food aid convoys to them 
would be suspended until there are guarantees of access to routes into Bihac. 
4. Croat-Muslim Agreement Endangered by Foreign Islamic Militants 
Besides the external threat through the Serbian forces in Croatia and Bosnia, 
the Croat-Muslim agreement is challenged from within. Some Islamic 
fundamentalists have formed a special battalion within the Bosnian Army. Roger 
Cohen reported that, 
[t]he Islamic militants are believed by British United Nations troops 
in the area [of the Croat suburb Podbrezje of the town Zenica] to 
number about 500 and to come mainly from Iran, Egypt, Sudan and 
the Persian Gulf. The problems arising from their presence are 
increasingly severe, threatening an already flimsy Muslim-Croat 
federation and causing strains within the Muslim-led Bosnian 
Government.236 
The Bosnian Army, as a 'secular and multinational' army, intends to 
effectively defend the Bosnian cause. The Islamic militants are forming a part of the 
Bosnian army, and their unit is called the Mujahedeen Brigade. Roger Cohen 
reported the statement of Mr. Spahija Kozlic, the spokesperson of the Zenica-based 
HI Corps of the Bosnian Army: "These people came here to help us. They are doing 
their job in a normal way. They are an integrated part of our corps." 
President Alija Izetbegovic has turned increasingly to the Islamic 
world for financial and military support as he has seen that a Western 
military intervention to save Bosnia was not forthcoming. Government 
ministers, including Prime Minister Haris Siljadic, have been regular 
visitors to Iran during the last year [1994] .2~" 237 
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There is no information available that the aid the Bosnian Government has 
received from Islamic governments has to specially support the foreign volunteer 
military forces, but it is plausible that, in return for the money coming from the 
fundamentalist countries, the Bosnian army has to tolerate the Mujahedeen. 
These mujahedeen are self-styled holy warriors from the Islamic world, who have 
come to defend Islam and to defend the Bosnian Muslims. United Nations troops 
from Turkey constantly patrol the suburb of Zenica, trying to ensure that no 
violence errupts. The Turkish peacekeepers' "main problem with the 
fundamentalists is, that they [the mujahedeens] do not like us as Turkey is a secular 
state", said the spokesman for the Turkish Batallion.238 
Much will depend on President Alija Izetbegovic's balancing act between his 
own commitment to a multiethnic and religiously tolerant Bosnia and the demands 
placed on him by countries such as Iran in exchange for financial and military 
support. 
5.  The U.S. Mission Helping to Reduce the UNPROPÖR in Spring 1995 
During the Winter of 1994/1995 the UNPROFOR in Croatia had some 12,000 
soldiers policing the 1,000-mile cease-fire line in Croatia between Croatian 
Government forces and Serbian rebels. Croatia's President Tudjman had insisted 
since January 12,1995, that the United Nations forces leave and the United Nations 
troops begin their withdrawal on March 31. This deadline was perilously close to the 
April 30 expiration of the cease-fire negotiated by former U.S. President Jimmy 
Carter. Allan Cowell reported from Zagreb that, 
[i]n the latest of a series of inconclusive Western moves to avert a 
renewed Balkan flareup, the American envoy, Assistant Secretary of 
State Richard C. Holbrooke, met with President Franjo Tudjman at 
the Presidential Palace in the hills above Zagreb....President Tudjman 
is believed to want Western troops to secure his international borders 
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after United Nations forces leave, enabling him to satisfy both his own 
ambitions and strong domestic political pressure for the re-assertion 
of formal control over all of Croatian territory. NATO officials in 
Brussels have spurned the idea.239 
The deepest worry among U.N. officials was that the localized conflict 
between Croatian Army units and the Croatian Serb militia in the Krajina region 
could easily draw in other forces from what Alan Cowell called "the patchwork of 
antagonisms known as the Balkans." 
On March 6, 1995, Croatia forged a new alliance with Bosnia. Croatia and 
Bosnia established, reported Alan Cowell, what "on paper is a common front 
between former adversaries to counter Serbian rebels in both their countries." 
Cowell further wrote that 
The new agreement was 'in fact a preparation and an agreement on 
how to act if the situation starts developing' toward broader and 
fiercer hostilities after the March 31 dead-line said Kresimir Zubak, 
the Croat who leads the Muslim-Croat federation set up in Bosnia 
with the backing of the United States one year ago. 240 
The Croatia-Bosnia military pact was intended to counter a similar pact 
between the Croatian and Bosnian rebel Serbs agreed on in late February 1995. 
Whereas the latter Serb pact always was in place, its existence was denied by the 
Serbian leaders Martic, Karadic and Milosevic. The Muslim-Croat pact has yet to 
be proved more than a symbolic gesture. 
On 8 March 1995 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) unveiled in its 
report, 
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[i]n what is believed to be the most comprehensive United States 
assessment of atrocities in Bosnia...that 90 percent of the acts of 
'ethnic cleansing' were carried out by Serbs and that leading Serbian 
politicians almost certainly played a role in the crimes.241 
The report makes nonsense of the view, which Roger Cohen noted, 
consistently put forward by western European governments and intermittently by 
the Clinton administration, that the Bosnian conflict is a civil war in which guilt 
should be divided between Serbs, Croats and Muslims rather than a case of Serbian 
aggression. 
Tudjman's insistence on making the UNPROFOR leave Croatia, the 
announcement of the existence of the Serbian rebel military pact for common 
defense of the Serb-occupied territories in Croatia and in Bosnia, the Croat-Bosnian 
alliance and the CIA report revealing the Serb responsibilities for the atrocities, all 
together prepared the ground for the United States to confront Milosevic with an 
unexpected fait accompli in Croatia. Recently, the British, French and Russians 
seemed prepared to ease sanctions on the Serbian leader to encourage his 
cooperation in recognizing the borders of Bosnia and Croatia. In March 1995 the 
United States seized the diplomatic initiative from the Europeans, who have 
dominated policy on the region for many months. Barbara Crosette wrote that 
The agreement forestalls a NATO and United States mission in helping 
more than 35,000 peacekeepers withdraw from the former Yugoslavia, 
a move the United Nations saw as inevitable if its operation in Croatia 
was cancelled by Mr. Tudjman.242 
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President Tudjman acknowledged that his demand that the UNPROFOR 
begin leaving Croatia by 1 April 1995 was a ploy. The accord reached between U.S. 
Vice President Al Gore and the Croatian president requires two new Security 
Council resolutions, creating thereby two separate United Nations Forces for Croatia 
and Bosnia. The Croatian U.N. force will be smaller, consisting of 5,000 troops 
deployed along the international border with Bosnia and no longer protecting the 
1,000-mile cease-fire line running through Croatian territory. This would stop 
Croatian Serbs from crossing the border into Bosnia and supporting the Bosnian 
Serbs in fighting the Muslim-led Bosnian government. The American Vice President 
assured Tudjman of "full U.S. support for restoring Croatian sovereignty to all parts 
of Croatia."243 
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VI   SUMMARY, ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION 
A.  THE LEGACY OF VIOLENCE 
The core of today's crisis in the Balkans is Serbia, even though the center of 
actual fighting has shifted and is limited to skirmishes over Bosnia-Herzegovina's 
Muslim areas of Bihac and Sarajevo. Serbia's history is embedded in that of the 
Balkans and has taken a specific form since the arrival of nationalism during the 
Napoleonic wars. 
From 1804 until 1806 the Serb leader, Kara Georg Petrovic, called 
Karadordes (Black George), led an uprising in Belgrade against the Ottoman 
janissaries. This led to a short period of Serbian autonomy. The autonomy attested 
to the Serbs in the peace of Bucharest in 1812, however, only lasted until 1815. At 
the Congress at Vienna Serbia was again given to the Ottoman empire. A new 
uprising in 1815 led by Milos Obrenovic achieved autonomy and the Serbs were 
granted the title of a "Principaute of succession" under Ottoman sovereignty. 
Sovereign Serbia installed a parliament and proclaimed a constitution. Kara Georg 
Petrovic returned from his exile in Austria in 1817 but was murdered by his 
Obrenovic opponents. Milos Obrenovic in 1819 was recognized by the Turks as 
hereditary prince of Serbia. The murder of Kara Georg marked the beginning of the 
blood feud between the Obrenovic and the Karageorgevic families which lasted until 
1903 when Serbia's King Alexander I Obrenovic and his wife were assassinated by 
high-ranking Serbian officers. 
In 1844 I. Garasanin developed the "Greater Serbian Program." This 
program promoted the idea of a single unified nation for all Southern Slavs, which 
in 1844, included part of Habsburg Austria. This nationalist program traces Serb 
history back to the time when the faithful Serbs defended Christianity at Kosovo in 
1389 and were completely defeated by the Turks. The event is still annually 
celebrated on June 28, as Saint-Veits-Day. The Serbs have long felt entitled to 
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pursue a nationalist program, and their recourse to force in doing so has created a 
legacy of violence. 
Today the Serbs in Croatia, the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbs 
in Serbia-Montenegro have an army. They have used this army effectively and they 
will continue to do so. If their army is defeated, the spirit of defiance will remain 
unbroken. The consequences are well-known throughout recorded history: 
assassinations, sabotage, and other terrorist activities. 
B.   YUGOSLAVIA'S UNRESOLVED NATIONAL QUESTION: 1941 AND 1991 
After the First World War the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
for the first time in history united all of the Serb population of the Balkans in a 
single state. In Yugoslavia President Woodrow Wilson's vision of bringing 
democracy and self-determination to Europe materialized. Slovenes and Croats 
welcomed this arrangement in which the Serbs were the dominant group as it 
liberated them from Austria, Germany, Italy and Hungary. It was assumed that 
Yugoslavia would develop to become a modern European state. During the inter-war 
period the conflict potential grew between Croatia and Serbia. The violent 
nationalist Ustasha movement struggled for Croatia's independence, and some 
autonomy from Serb centralism was gained for Croatia in 1939. Historical analysis 
shows that the Yugoslav state failed before 1941, in part because it did not resolve 
the national question. 
In 1941 Germany occupied Yugoslavia and allowed the extremists of Croatian 
nationalism to create an independent Croatia. In this process the Ustasha massacred 
hundred of thousands of Serbs. The Serb nationalist group of royalist Chetniks, who 
retaliated, carried out the massacres on the Croat side, poisoning the national 
question for generations. Survivors and their descendants on each side remember 
this period of violence, during which Tito and his partisan movement took sides 
whenever convenient in order to install their power. The Communist partisans 
finally participated in the Red  Army's  triumph,   liberated  Yugoslavia  from 
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occupation, and established communist rule. But Tito's Yugoslavia for the second 
time failed to solve the national question. The national question became a taboo 
instead for the sake of Tito's program declaring the 'Brotherhood and Unity' of all 
Yugoslavs. Tito's heritage, the constitution of 1974, established a federation which 
Nikola Koljevic in 1990 described as one in which "each individual people in 
Yugoslavia, irrespective of how much it has gained or lost, feels that it has been 
cheated by others."244 
Both times, before 1941 and after 1945, the state of Yugoslavia was created 
on the basis of a political idea, with little cultural or historical content, and as John 
Zametica wrote, "imposed from above [and] conceived bureaucratically rather than 
democratically."245 Both times Yugoslavia disintegrated over the national question. 
But no single person or single cause is responsible for the outcome in Yugoslavia. 
The great complexity of the Yugoslav case needs careful explanation. This thesis has 
suggested that the three factors of ethnic nationalism, economic dislocation, and 
changes in the international security environment are responsible for the Yugoslav 
crisis. Ethnic nationalism has been manifest in the competition for territory and 
political dominance among the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims and others. 
This ethnic nationalism has centuries-old roots, but came to the fore in the 1980s, 
owing to the death of Tito in 1980 and the economic setbacks of the 1980s, which led 
to a search for scapegoats and intensified inter-ethnic mistrust and rivalry. 
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C.  SERB-CROAT ANTAGONISM THROUGHOUT HISTORY 
Different aspects of the problems have been analyzed in the chapters on 
Yugoslav history, Tito's heritage, and the internal and external aspects of the 
Yugoslav crisis. Ethnic mistrust and rivalry have had a long history since migrating 
Slav tribes arrived in the Balkan region in the 4th century A.Ö. and settled on the 
fault line between the Western and Eastern Roman Empires. The Serb-Croat 
antagonism has persisted ever since. 
The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina has resulted in large part from Serbia's 
struggle to dominate what is left of the former Yugoslavia. Slovenia's secession from 
Yugoslavia was possible because Slovenia was the only Serb-free Yugoslav republic. 
The Serbs in Bosnia did not want Bosnia to become a sovereign state, because this 
would divide them from Serbia proper; nor did the Serbs living on Croatian 
territory in the Krajina intend to live separated from Serbia. Therefore in Croatia 
Milan Martic proclaimed the 'Serb Republic of the Krajina' and Radovan Karadzic 
claimed the 'Serb Republic' in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In reaction to the Serb 
proceedings, Mate Boban announced 'the Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna' for the 
Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both Serbs and Croats intended to live apart 
from the Bosnian Muslim population. Bosnia's President Izetbegovic has consistently 
advocated the preservation of a multinational Bosnia as a means to ensure Bosnia's 
survival. Recognition by the international community has not been able to save 
Bosnia, and its prospects appear bleak. The problem of Yugoslav succession has to 
be solved in a regional context. 
The core of the Yugoslav crisis is Serbia's drive to dominate the Balkan 
region. Croatia and Serbia must both be considered in any attempt to change the 
status quo. For a peaceful future both countries have first to determine how they will 
politically, economically and militarily deal with each other. The international 
community has to monitor how they implement democratic values, protect minorities 
inside their territory, and establish relations with their neighbors. 
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Serbian nationalism and the Croatian reaction have to be kept in mind, 
beginning with a portrait of the Serb leader Milosevic and Serb nationalism: 
Milosevic's Serbia was at the heart of the complex of issues that 
destroyed Yugoslavia. Serbs are a naturally talented and ebullient 
people with an instinctive liking for Americans that is based partly on 
a shared garrulity and partly on a military alliance spanning both 
world wars. Their tragic defect is an obsession with their own history; 
their hearts are in the past, not the future. In the Balkans, 
intellectuals tend to be the standard-bearers of nationalism; in Serbia, 
this is carried to fetishistic lengths. 
A lugubrious, paranoid, and Serbo-centric view of the past enables the 
Serbs to blame everyone but themselves for whatever goes wrong. 
They had a real grievance against Tito, in some measure justified, for 
creating a postwar Yugoslavia that denied them a role that they 
believed their large population...and historical mission entitled them. 
When Tito died, leaving a Yugoslavia too decentralized for any ethnic 
group to dominate, it became inevitable that a Serbian nationalist 
would rise up to redress the perceived wrongs dealt his people. It was 
a tragedy for Serbia, its neighbors, and Europe as a whole that the 
nationalist turned out to be Slobodan Milosevic.246 
Croat nationalism is best understood as a reaction based to the Serb efforts 
to dominate Croatia, and best expressed by the actions of the Croat leader Tudjman. 
Unlike Milosevic, who is driven by power, Tudjman is obsessed by 
nationalism. His devotion to Croatia is of the most narrow-minded 
sort, and he has never shown much understanding of or interest in 
democratic values. He presided over serious violations of the rights of 
Serbs, who made up 12 percent of the population of Croatia. They 
were dismissed from work, required to take loyalty oaths, and 
subjected to attacks on their homes and property....Tudjman's saving 
grace, which distinguishes him from Milosevic, is that he really wants 
to be a Western statesman....For better or worse, Croatian 
nationalism is defined by Tudjman ~ intolerant, anti-Serb, and 
authoritarian. These attributes - together with an aura of wartime 
fascism, which Tudjman has done nothing to dispel ~ help explain 
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why many Serbs in Croatia reject Croatian rule and why the core 
hostility in the former Yugoslavia is still between Serbs and 
Croats.247 
In Spring 1995 30 percent of Croatia is still occupied by the Krajina Serbs 
and 70 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory is controlled by Bosnian Serbs. 
New realities have been created, but Milosevic's Serbs are still barred from uniting 
in a Greater Serbia. Despite economic sanctions Belgrade has not agreed to 
recognize the sovereignty of Croatia nor a sovereign Bosnia-Herzigovina. Neither 
Milosevic and Serb nationalism nor Tudjman and Croat nationalism have achieved 
their goals. Croatia will not agree to a permanent loss of the Krajina and of 
Croatian territory in Eastern Slavonia. The Serb leader Martic and his ally, the 
leader of the renegade Muslims, Fikret Abdic, are controlling enclaves in Croatia. 
In their resistance to Croatian sovereignty they ignore both Serbia and the 
international community. Unless the majority of the Croatian Serbs choose to leave, 
Croatia will prepare to regain by force, what it can not retrieve by negotiations. 
Since summer 1994 Serbia has officially no longer supported the Bosnian 
Serbs. It seemed that Milosevic disagreed with the political concepts of Karadzic. 
Whether ignoring both Serbia and the international community was Karadzic's 
policy or only a maneuver remains to be seen. In December 1994 the Serb leader 
Karadzic, residing in Pale, refused to meet with the United Nations Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in Sarajevo. 
Milosevic still has to deal with problems for Serbia in Kosovo, where only a 
few Muslims are willing to live within Serbia forever. He cannot surrender the Serb 
national symbol to Albanian nationalists, nor can he yield to the Muslims in the 
Sandzak, another area of tension and potential violence. Finally, the ethnic minority 
of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina may cause problems as well. John Zametica 
writes 
247 Zimmermann, Warren, Ibid, pp. 7-8. 
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...if Serbia acceded to all the demands from its minorities, it would 
soon find itself roughly within the borders confirmed by the 1878 
Congress of Berlin: over a century of wars and sacrifices would have 
brought it back to square one. Such an outcome will naturally be 
resisted by the Serbs.248 
The problem can only be solved in a regional context. 
As a first step of analysis it shoulb be recognized that both Yugoslavias — that 
of 1919 - 1941 and that of 1945 - 1991 - faUed to resolve the national question. 
Woodrow Wilson's construction of a self-determined "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes" never became a modern European state. Tito's post-war communist 
invention of a Yugoslav state of 'Brotherhood and Unity' was to fall apart in the 
1980s. 
The obsession of the Serbians with their own history, which means to blame 
everyone but themselves for whatever goes wrong, allowed the communist 
bureaucracy to embark on a Serb national course and to seek domination of the 
former Yugoslavia by force. The pursuit of a Greater Serbia revived the Serb-Croat 
antagonism, and both nations proclaimed enclaves for members of their nationality. 
None of these enclave states wanted to settle for minority status in a foreign nation, 
and at first they were strongly loyal to their mother nation. Croatia and Serbia both 
established enclaves in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The vital problem for Izetbegovic's 
state, once it was carved up despite international recognition, became that 
the Muslims have nothing to offer either the Croats or the Serbs. 
D.  THE PHANTOM STATE OF THE BALKANS: BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
Bosnia-Herzigovina, internationally recognized and a member of both the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations, is 
nevertheless a phantom state. 
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In the past Bosnia-Herzegovina was the outpost of the Ottoman empire. It 
then marked the only area to which Austria's hegemony (blocked elsewhere in 
Europe) could expand. During the past two centuries Bosnia has always had 
protection from outside its borders to prevent it from being crushed by Serb and 
Croat attempts to establish their nation-states by force. A Serb nationalist in 
Sarajevo assassinated the heir to the Austrian throne in 1914. Both Serbs and Croats 
consider all or part of Bosnia as essential to their national identity. This sentiment 
is strongest among those Serbs and Croats actually living in Bosnia's 'Serb Republic' 
or in the 'Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna.' 
Bosnia's future viability as a multinational entity depends critically on an 
agreement of the three national components. The Serbs occupying seventy percent 
of the territory intend to link this area with Serbia. The Croats originally had the 
parallel intentions for their occupied territory, but due to tbe one-year-old (and 
recently renewed) Croat-Muslim agreement their territorial claims are not being 
pursued at present. The difficult problem for the Bosnian Muslims is to settle for 
an internal constitutional arrangement based on a territorial division of power. This 
is for Bosnia's President Izetbegovic and the Muslims a most unattractive (if not 
impossible) proposition, as it would leave them with very little territory and very 
little influence. A Greater Croatia would include the Serb Krajina and large areas 
of Bosnia. This could overcome problems that are presented by Croatia's awkward 
topography and would block Serbian territorial aspirations. As long as Serbian 
aggression is halted, the present Croat-Muslim agreement serves Muslims and 
Croats better than any feasible alternative. 
E.  THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S PROBLEM WITH 
IMPARTIALITY 
The limited interest of the superpowers — and especially, the limited interest 
of the United States ~ in the fate of the former Yugoslavia forced European leaders 
to confront the Yugoslav problem. For several different reasons both the trans- 
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Atlantic and the European regional organizations failed to resolve the crisis and 
bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. The institutional settings were too weak to 
deal with the problem, and reflected the lack of political will of the member 
governments. The adaptation to the post-Cold War era had just begun. The 
European Community in 1991 acted immediately: it established the Badinter 
Commission, and at its Maastricht summit decided to recognize Slovenia and 
Croatia. In April 1992 the E.C. decided to recognize Bosnia in order to allow 
international law to become applicable and to intervene in favor of the victim of 
aggression. In the first six months of the crisis, in 1991, American, British and 
French diplomacy was fairly pro-Serb, whereas Germany was more susceptible to 
Slovene and Croat claims. When the United Nations appeared on scene in 1992, 
mediation and dialogue with all parties became the official rule. In the tradition of 
United Nations interventions, peacekeepers have to act in a strictly impartial 
fashion, a rule that is difficult to apply in conflicts of 'ethnic warfare.' Impartiality 
created problems, as Nicole Gnesotto observed. 
Some will therefore suspect that this neutrality is merely a facade that 
conceals a widely shared pro-Serb sentiment....the decision by the 
United Nations to create UNPROFOR, shows for example the 
ambiguity in the positions adopted by Cyrus Vance in adopting the 
proposals of Milosevic rather than those of Tudjman and Izetbegovic 
on the zones in which blue helmets could or could not be deployed. 
Others...will defend the choice of neutrality as being the only possible 
and desirable option for the West, whose intentions have always been 
honorable and good, even if Western countries recognize that, 
paradoxically, the consequence of their impartiality was often to favor 
the strong rather than the weak. Indeed, there is no doubt that the 
deployment of UNPROFOR I troops in Croatia froze Serbian 
territorial conquests and prevented the return of Croatian refugees...It 
is also true that the embargo on arms to the former Yugoslavia had 
the effect of increasing the Serbian forces' military and industrial 
superiority.249 
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To these obvious limitations of impartiality must be added those which are 
based on historical experience. Historically induced political restraints restricted 
Germany in getting involved with any risk of armed conflict.250 The nations acting 
together in global or regional security organizations — the U.N., CSCE/OSCE, 
E.C./EU, WEU and NATO — therefore could only partially counterbalance with 
burden-sharing the challenges raised by the Yugoslav crisis. 
All these organizations indicate that some institutional problems were solved 
as the crisis developed. Because all these organizations rely on individual member 
states, fundamental disagreements between the members were imported into the 
organizations. As James B. Steinberg wrote: 
Ironically, what many considered the regional organizations' 
comparative advantage — proximity to and interest in resolving the 
conflict ~ also proved a serious limitation. Because many states in the 
region had historical alliances with the parties to the Yugoslav 
conflict, their impartiality was questioned.251 
The sympathies of France and to a lesser extent Britain are with the Serbs. 
Germany and Austria have closer political, historical, and religious ties to Croatia 
and Slovenia. Steinberg explained that these concerns about partiality were blamed 
for the limited success of the E.C.-sponsored peace conference. Russia, the dominant 
member of the CIS and a member of the UN Security Council, has traditionally 
been sympathetic to the Serbian cause. 
Besides the problems of impartiality, there exists an imbalance between 
France, Britain, Spain and the other European countries in terms of resources and 
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risks. Germany, no longer hampered by its constitutional constraints has to decide 
how it will join France, Britain, Spain in sharing the burden of military 
intervention. Such an imbalance implies political consequences which will influence 
the development of security organizations in the post-Cold War era. 
F. UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY SHIFT FROM THE SERB CAUSE TO 
THE CROAT-MUSLIM CAUSE 
The U.S. involvement began with the CIA's warning the Bush administration 
in late 1989 that a violent breakup of Yugoslavia was probable. In the beginning of 
the crisis the U.S. supported the idea of Yugoslavia's unity in order not to set an 
example for a possible disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Bush administration 
followed a policy of non-involvement until June 1991 when Secretary of State James 
Baker informed all six republican leaders in Belgrade that the U.S., if forced to 
choose between unity and democracy, will always choose democracy. The Yugoslav 
republics, already on a collision course, decided for secession. Serbia and Croatia 
proceeded along with their ideas about how to partition "rump-Yugoslavia." Due to 
domestic pressure and the Europeans inability to end the conflict, the Bush 
administration in August 1992 shifted its policy towards 'defuse and contain'. The 
administration also sponsored the Croat-Muslim Agreement in Summer 1992, an 
accord which broke down when fighting began again in spring 1993. 
In March 1994 the agreement was renewed with U.S. backing. The coalition 
with the Muslims offered support to Croatia, whose forces were unable to fight the 
Serbs in the Krajina. The agreement also would save Croat territorial gains. Hoping 
for Croat support, however, the Bosnian army in fall 1994 began the "Bihac" 
offensive. The fighting was intende to force the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation 
table, but after some initial success in November 1994, the joint efforts of Bosnian 
and Croatian Serbs directed by General Mladic turned the offensive into a failure. 
Since then the Serbian rebels have kept a tight siege around this Muslim enclave in 
northwestern Bosnia, and no continuing regular supply for civilians and the 
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peacekeepers has been established. In December 1994 former U.S. President Jimmy 
Carter negotiated a cease-fire, and retired U.S. army generals were sent to Croatia 
to act as advisers for the Croatian and Bosnian armed forces. 
Concerned that the deployment of United Nations peacekeepers along the 
1,000- mile-long cease-fire line running through Croatian territory might create a 
permanent political reality — like the UN-monitored demarcation line in Cyprus — 
Croatia's President Tudjman in early January 1995 announced that he would 
terminate the mandate of the UNPROFOR in Croatia. Preparing for the end of the 
cease-fire at the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR, the Croatian and Bosnian Serb 
rebels in late February 1995 announced a military pact which made public their 
intensions to defend the Serb-occupied territory wherever an attack by the Muslim- 
led Bosnian army might occur. On 6 March 1995 Croatia forged a new alliance with 
Bosnia to counter Serbian rebels in both their countries. 
In March the CIA report was "leaked" in some details, and the most 
comprehensive United States assessment of atrocities in Bosnia held the Serbs 
responsible for ninety percent of "ethnic cleansing."252 This prepared a decisive 
shift of the Clinton administration towards the Croat-Muslim cause. On March 13, 
1995, U.S. Vice President Al Gore assured Tudjman of "full U.S. support for 
restoring Croatian sovereignty to all parts of Croatia."253 However, it remains to 
be seen whether this shift indicated that the United States is inclined to take an 
active role as the sole remaining super-power and take steps to end the conflict. 
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G. TOWARDS RE-ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
The Yugoslav crisis re-established the United Nations as the sole practicable 
international authority to mobilize military force for hazardous interventions 
abroad. U.N. legitimation of the use of military force is convenient as well as helpful 
to overcome domestic political reticence. Experience has also shown that the absence 
of the lead by the U.S. leadership has undermined prospects for achieving the aims 
laid down in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions. 
It is not appropriate to blame the United States alone, for continuing political 
hesitation and indecision in the Yugoslav case. Once the Vance-Owen plan deadline 
for acceptance was ignored by Milosevic in May 1993, the Clinton administration 
intended to force the Serbs back to the negotiation table by implementing a policy 
labeled "lift and strike." The Clinton plan was based on coalition involvement, and 
the U.S. administration sought the support of the U.N., E.C. and the CSCE. 
Instead, the Europeans followed the French proposal of providing "safe 
havens," while the U.S. policy turned to supporting U.N. operations as such 
enforcing the no-fly zone, and delivering relief supplies. Thus in supporting the 
status quo the Serb aggression was rewarded. The most successful U.S. action was 
the deployment of a reinforced infantry company to monitor the Serbian border with 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Serb inaction since the arrival of 
the U.S. forces in Macedonia may be explained by a Serb reluctance to directly 
confront the U.S. on the ground. 
Even the U.S. participation in almost all air strikes executed by NATO has 
not deterred the Serbian forces as intentionally no major damage has been inflicted. 
The Serbs have responded by isolating UNPROFOR units, cutting off supply lines, 
and retaking some earlier handed-in heavy weaponry. The U.N. reaction has been 
to back down. This reaction has reinforced the Serb belief that the U.N. member 
states would get involved only as long as the effort was painless. 
On July 1,1994, Senator Robert Dole introduced a defense authorization bill 
demanding U.S. arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims." In reference to this 
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attempt to lift the embargo, President Clinton stated "that the arms embargo has 
unfairly and unintentionally penalized the victim in this conflict."254 The U.S. 
Congress in August 1994 demanded that the President seek a lifting the embargo by 
the U.N. On November 15, 1994, the United States unilaterally ceased supporting 
the arms embargo enforced by the joint NATO/WEU naval blockade. To gain time 
for a peaceful negotiated settlement, the Bosnian government asked for a period of 
delay, which will expire in May 1995. 
It appears that the United States in spring 1995 is back on the scene, with the 
Clinton administration returning to the proposed 1992 position of "lift-and-strike" 
in a changed environment. 
On 16 March 1995 President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher met with President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, Kresimir Zubak, the 
Bosnian Croat who is President of the Croat-Muslim federation, and Ejup Ganic, 
its Muslim vice president, to mark the first anniversary of the agreement and to 
"give new life to a languishing political federation that his Administration says is 
vital to helping Muslims and Croats stand up to their joint enemy, the Serbs."255 
So far the agreement has accomplished virtually nothing beyond getting the Croats 
and Muslims to stop fighting each other. But there is financial support available: 
The United States pledged $ 30 million in economic aid to the 
federation while the European Union promised about $120 million. 
Including pledges from Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey and 
other Muslim nations, a new group called Friends of the Federation 
254
 Doherty, Carrol J., "Senate puts Clinton on zigzag course towards ending 
Bosnia arms embargo.", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (Washington, Vol 52, 
No 32, August 13, 1994), p. 2362. 
255
 Greenhouse, Steven, "Clinton Meets With Bosnian and Croatian Chiefs" in: 
The New York Times (March 17, 1995), p. A 5. 
178 
has pledged more than $300 million so far to help the Muslim-Croat 
alliance.256 
Political structures are also supposed to develop. Steven Greenhouse wrote: 
...leaders of Bosnia's Muslims and Croats vowed to set up joint 
Muslim-Croat governments at the canton and town level. They also 
promised to unblock efforts to create an integrated police force in the 
southwestern city of Mostar and to allow displaced Muslims and 
Croats to return to their homes in that divided town, which was 
supposed to be a showcase for integration in Bosnia. 
With regard to the military survival of the federation, it is said that 
[t]he United States has also promised to provide Bosnia's Muslims and 
Croats with some military advisers to help them coordinate their 
armies, a move that American officials say is designed to deter future 
Serbian aggression. 
President Tudjman in March 1995 acknowledged that his demand that the 
UNPROFOR begin leaving Croatia by April 1995 was a ploy. The accord reached 
between U.S. Vice President Al Gore and the Croatian president will require two 
new Security Council resolutions, creating thereby two separate United Nations 
Forces for Croatia and Bosnia. The Croatian U.N. force will be deployed along the 
international border to Bosnia and will no longer protect the 1,000-mile cease-fire 
line running through Croatian territory. This would stop Croatian Serbs from 
crossing the border into Bosnia and supporting the Bosnian Serbs in fighting the 
Muslim-led Bosnian government. The American vice president assured Tudjman of 
"full U.S. support for restoring Croatian sovereignty to all parts of Croatia."257 
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This development has encouraged hope for peaceful change towards a final 
settlement. As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the Yugoslav crisis re- 
established the United Nations as the sole practicable international authority to 
mobilize military force for hazardous interventions abroad. The recognized legal and 
moral legitimacy of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII could support the 
United States, which prefers to exert its leadership through the Security Council 
(rather than through the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
where it is only one among equals). 
The United States seizing the diplomatic initiative may encourage the United 
Nations to move more decisively towards re-establishing international order and 
preventing the aggressors from being rewarded. The U.S. initiative has presented 
Milosevic with an unexpected fait accompli in Croatia. It is for the international 
community to join the initiative, to work out a solution for the minority status of 
twelve percent of the population, the "Serbian Croats" presently occupying 30 
percent of Croatia's territory. The protection of Serbs against Croat retaliation and 
the re-settling of Serb-expelled Croats in the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia could set 
a valuable example for the future and thus help to preserve Croatia's recognized 
international borders. To a larger extent this would be a challenge close to "nation- 
building", leading to disaster in Somalia but successfully accomplished by the U.N. 
in Namibia and Cambodia. The United States could test, if wished to do so, the 
"New Pentagon Strategy [which] Adds Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Missions to 
Combat Tasks."258 Bradley Graham reported: 
The 'National Military Strategy,' made public yesterday [March 8, 
1995], says the principal roles of American troops are no longer 
limited  to  fighting  wars   and  deterring  aggression   but  include 
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sustaining peace. The new version marks the first time the document 
has emphasized peacekeeping.259 
Could the mandate for the future UNPROFOR monitoring the Croatian 
border be complemented by the U.S. policy of "lift-and-strike" ? A military analysis 
wouldwill back the opponents of lift-and-strike, because the mountainous terrain in 
the Balkans severely limits the effectiveness of air power. Against well dug-in forces 
it is difficult to acquire targets, and the damage to the forces would probably be 
negligible. Using air power to perform a critical and decisive role for the outcome 
of the campaign might be impossible, but there are missions which could be 
accomplished that might turn the tide of the struggle in favor of the Bosnian forces. 
Serb movements of concentrated forces could be halted. Supply lines could be cut 
by destroying bridges and rail lines into the region from Serbia, striking choke 
points on mountainous roads, and by preventing all aerial movement. These strike 
actions could be coupled with rearming the Croat military and the Muslim-led 
Bosnian army. This might not only stop Bosnian-Serb advances but could facilitate 
the liberation of lost territory. 
The United Nations implementation of such a policy, with the United States 
taking the lead, would involve minimal risks for U.S. forces and might stop the 
Serbian attempt to dominate the region militarily. The United Nations could live up 
to its commitment to prevent and never again permit atrocities like those carried out 
during the Second World War. 
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, March 23rd, 1995, Gerald Axel Möller 
259
 Graham, Bradley, "Responsibilities of U.S. Military Expanded. New Pentagon 
Strategy Adds Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Missions to Combat Tasks" in Washington 




Ali, Rabia and LifSchultz, Rabia, Eds., 
Why Bosnia ? Writings On The Balkan War 
1993, Stoney Creek Connecticut, Pamphleteers Press, 
(353P./ISBN0-9630587-9-7/LCC93-84170/$15.40) 
Amnesty International AI, 




With Stalin Against Tito 
1988, New York, Cornell University Press, 
(295p./ISBN0-8014-2186-l/HX365.6.A6B36/-) 
Banac, Ivo, 
Croatism, Franjo Tudjman 's brutal opportunism 
1993, The New Republic, pp. 20-21 
Beloff,Nora, 
Tito's Flawed Legacy, Yugoslavia & the West since 1939 
1985, Boulder Colorado, Westview Press 
(287p./ISBN 0-8133-0322-2/LC 85-51327/-) 
Biberaj, Elez, 
Yugoslavia: A Continuing Crisis? 
1989, London, publ. by    Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and 
Terrorism, Conflict Studies No 225 
(22 p./ISSN 0069-8792) 
Brown, J.F. 
"Turkey: Back to the Balkans?" 
1993, in: Fuller, Graham E. and Lesser, Ian O., 1993, pp. 140-162 
Bush, George, 
"Containing the crisis in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia." 
US Department of State Dispatch, Transcript, Vol 3 No 32, August 10, 1992 
183 
Campbell, John C, 
Tito 's Seperate Road, America and Yugoslavia in World Politics 
1967, New York, Haiper & Row, publ. for Council of Foreign Relations 
(179p./ISBN_/LC 67-15967/$_,_J 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
CIA World Factbook 1993, 
1993, Washington DC 
Cerovic, Stojan, 
"Letter From Serbia: 'Greater Serbia' and Its Discontents" 
1993, in: Ali, Rabia and Lifschultz, Rabia, Why Bosnia ?. Writings On The Balkan 
War, pp. 259-268 
Collins, John M. 
Balkan Battlegrounds 
1992, Congressional Research Service, No 92-679 S, (24 p.) 
Cviic, Christopher, 
Remaking the Balkans 




The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Startegy 
1984, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press 
(614p./ISBN0-691-07655-3/HX550.N3C66/-) 
Craig, Gordon A. and George, Alexander L. 
Force and Statecraft. Diplomatic Problems of Our Time 
1983 Oxford University Press New York, 2.Ed 1990 
(310 p./ISBN 0-19-505730-9/$15.75) 
Craig, Gordon A. 
Europe since 1815 




"Germany vs Genocide" 
1994, The New York Times Magazine, New York, October 30, 1994, pp. 56-59 
184 
Crnobrnja, Mihailo, 
"The Roots of Yugoslavia's Dissolution" 
1993, in: Ali, Rabia and Lifschultz, Rabia, Why Bosnia ? Writings On The Balkan 
War, pp. 268-277 
Department of State (DOS), 
U.S.DoS Dispatch, 
1992, Sept. Vol. 3 NSUP6-7, pp. 32-33 
Djilas, Aleksa, 
"Serbia's Milosevic: A Profile," 
1993, in: Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 81-96     . 
Djilas, Aleksa, 
The Contested Country, Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution 1919-1953 
1991, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 
(259p./ISBN 0-674-16698-l/DR1291.D57/$    . 
Djilas, Milovan, 
The New Class, An analysis of the Communist System 
1957, New York, Praeger Publ., Edition 16, 1962 
(214p./ISBN_/LC 57-9496/$_,_J 
Draculic, Slavenka, 
"Women Hide Behind a Wall of Silence" 
1993, in: Ali, Rabia and Lifschultz, Rabia, Why Bosnia ? Writings On The Balkan 
War, pp. 116-121 
Dragnic, Alex N., 
"Containing Serbia" 
1994, Council of Foreign Relations, James F. HOGE (Ed.) 
Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 1994, Letter to the Editor, p. 198 
Foreign Broadcast Information System (FBIS), 
"Interview with Slobodam Milosevic" 
1989, Foreign Broadcast Information System, January 3, p. 70 
Foreign Broadcast Information System (FBIS), 
"Seselj: Milosevic Planed Karadzic's Defeat" 
1994, Foreign Broadcast Information System, June 14, p. 53 
185 
Fuller, Graham E. and Lesser, Ian O., 
Turkey's New Geopolitics, 
1993, Boulder CA, Westview Press, 
(197p./ISBN0-8133-8659-4/DR603.F85/$16.90) 
Glenny, Misha, 
The Fall of Yugoslavia, The Third Balkan War 
1993, Penguin Books, revised edition, 
(257 p./ISBN 0-14-02.3586-8/$8.75) 
Gnesotto, Nicole, 
Lessons of Yugoslavia 
1994, Paris, Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, 
Chaillot Paper 17, publ. March 1994 
(47p./-/-/$_, 
Gobulic, Stjepko, Campbell, Susan and Gobulic, Thomas, 
"How Not to Divide the Indivisible" 
1993, in: Ali, Rabia and LifSchultz, Rabia, Why Bosnia ? Writings On The Balkan 
War, pp. 209-232 
Hawkins, Terry L., 
Yugoslavia (Former) and the Post-Yugoslav Crisis 
1994, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Air University Library, 
publ. as  Special Bibliography No. 306 in May 1994, 24 p. 
Henkin, Louis, Ed., 
Right V.fersusJ Might. International Law and the Use of Force 
1985, New York, Council on Froeign Relations Press, 2.Ed. of 1991 
(200p./ISBN 0-87609-109-5/JX4471 .R54/$14,95) 
Hillgruber, Andreas, 
Germany and the two World Wars 
1981, Harvard University Press 
(120 p./ISBN 0-674-35322-6/$14.90) 
Human Rights Watch Helsinki, 
The Macedonians of Greece 
1994, New York, Human Rights Watch Publication No 1320, May 1994 
(88p./ISBNl-56432-132-0/747.M3.D46/$7.00) 
186 
Ikle, Fred Charles, 
Every War Must End 
1971, New York, Columbia University Press, 
(160p./ISBN 0-231-03496-2/LC 72-147311/$_ 
Jopp, Mathias (Ed.), 
The implications of the Yugoslav crisis for Western Europe's foreign relations 
1994, Paris, Institute for Security Studies WEU, Chaillot Papers 17, 
Keegan, John, 
The Mask of Command 
1988, New York, Penguin Books 
(368 p./ISBN 0-1401-1406-8/$4.40) 
Kelly, Michael, 
"Surrender and Blame," 
1994, The New Yorker, New York, December 19, 1994, pp. 44-51 
Kennan, George F., 
The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 
Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890 
1979, Princeton,  Princeton University Press, Ed. 4 of 1989 
(465 p./ISBN 0-691-00784-5/$20.95) 
Kennedy, Paul 
The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers. Economic Cahnge and Military Conflict 
From 1500 to 2000 
1988, New York, Random House; 1989 paperbach Ed. publ. in London, Harpert 
Collins Publ. 
(898p./ISBN0-00686052-4/_/Aus$24.95) 
Kissinger, Henry A., 
Diplomacy 
1994, New York, Simon and Schuster 
(912 p./ISBN 0-671-65991-X/$35.00) 
Lane, Charles, 
"A Partition Plan for Bosnia" 
1993, Newsweek, My 05, 1993, p.32 
187 
Laquer, Walter, 
Russia and Germany, A Century of Conflict 
1965,   New  Brunswick NJ.,   Transaction  Publ.   for State University  New 
Brunswick,     Ed. of 1990 
(377p./ISBN 0-88738-349-l/$_ 
Magas, Branka, 
"The Destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina" 
in: Ali, Rabia and Lifschultz, Rabia, Why Bosnia ? Writings On The Balkan War, 
pp. 246-258 
Moore, Patrick, 
The Croatian-Muslim Agreements, 
1994, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 3 No. 13, 
publ. 01 April 1994, pp.20-24 
Newhouse, John, 
"A Collective Nervous Breakdown" 
1991, The New Yorker, New York, September 2, 1991, pp. 88-99 
Newhouse, John, 
"Dodging The Problem. The Diplomatic Round" 
1992, The New Yorker, New York, August 24, 1992, pp. 60-71 
Newhouse, John, 
"No Exit, No Entrance. The Diplomatic Round" 
1993, The New Yorker, New York, June 28, 1993, pp. 44-51 
Nolan, Cathal J., 
The Longman Guide to World Affairs 
1994, White Plains N.Y., Longman Publ. 
(450p./ISBN0-8013-1298-l/D217.N63/$_._) 
Paret, Peter, Ed., 
Makers of modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age 
1971, Princeton NJ., Princeton University Press,  Ed. of 1986 
(941 p./ISBN 0-691-02764-l/$19.90) 
Pavlowitch, Stevan K. and Biberaj, Elez 
The Albanian Problem in Yugoslavia: Two Views 
1982, London, Institute for the Study of   Conflict, Conflict Studies No 137/138, 
(43 p./ISSN 0069-8792/$ 
188 
Perry, Duncan M., 
Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma, 
1992, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report Vol. 1 No.25, 
(published 19 June 1992), pp. 35-45 
Perry, Duncan M., 
Macedonia: From Independence to Recognition 
1994, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report Vol. 3 No.l, 
(published 7 January 1994) 
Ramet, Sabrina P., 
Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 
1992, Indianapolis, Indiana Univ Press, 2nd Ed. 
(347p./ISBN 0-253-34794-7/DR 1302.R36/$_._J 
Rich, Norman, 
Great power diplomacy 1814-1914 
1992, New York, McGraw Hill, 1. Ed 
(502 p./ISBN 0-07-052254-5/$37.40) 
Rich, Norman, 
Why the Crimean war ? A Cautionary Tale 
1985, University Press of New England, Brown University 
(258 p./ISBN 0-87451-328-6/$36.75) 
Rosenbaum, Ron, 
The Spy Who Created The Cold. Kim Philby And the Age Of Paranoia 
1994, The New York Times Magazine, July 10, Sect.6, pp.28-54 
Roskin, Michael G., 
The Third Balkan War, and How It Will End 
1994, Carlisle Barracks PA,  U.S. Army War Collage Parameters, Vol. 24 
No. 3, publ. Autumn 1994, pp.57-69 
Rothschild, Joseph, 
Return to Diversity, 




The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 
1978, Berkeley CA., University of California Press, publ. for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, London 
(410p./ISBN 0-520-03730-8/LC 76-20032/$_._J) 
Sodaro, Michael J. 
Moscow, Germany and the West from Khrushchev to Gorbachev 
1990, Cornell University Press (I.Ed) 
(424p./ISBN0-8014-2529-8/$17.80) 
Stokes, Gale, 
From Stalinism To Pluralism, A Documentation History of Eastern Europe Since 
1945, 
1991, New York, Oxford University Press, 
(267p./ISBN0-19-506381-3/DJK50.F76/$15.95) 
Stokes, Gale, 
The Walls Came Tumbling Down, The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, 
1993, New York, Oxford University Press, 
(319p./ISBN0-19-506645-6/DJK50.S75/$ 
Trnka, Kasim, "The Degradation of the Bosnian Peace Negotiations" 
in: Ali, Rabia and Lifschultz, Rabia, Why Bosnia ? Writings On The Balkan 
War, 1993, pp. 202-208 
Woehrel, Steven, 
Kosovo: The Next Post-Yugoslav Crisis? 
1992, Congressional Research Service, No 92-817 F, (11 p.) 
Zametica, John, 
The Yugoslav Conflict, An analysis of the causes of the Yugoslav war, the 
policies of the republics and the regional and international implications of the 
conflict 
1992, London, Brassey's, publ. for The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 270, 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
No. Copies 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145 
2 
2. Library, Code 52 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
2 
3. Chairman of NSA Department 
Professor Thomas C. Bruneau 1 
Code NS/BN 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5000 
4. Professor Donald Abenheim 
Code NS/AB 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5000 
1 
5. Professor David Yost 
Code NS/DY 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5000 
1 
6. Professor Claude A. Buss 
Code NS/BX 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5000 
1 
7. Professor Roman Laba 
Code NS/LB 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5000 
192 
1 
8.      Professor Paul N. Stockton 1 
Code NS/SC 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5000 
9.      NATO Europe Branch 1 
Chief of Naval Operations 
Room 4E483 Pentagon 
Washington D.C., 20350-2000 
10.    Inspekteur der Marine 1 
Vizeadmiral Hans Rudolf Boehmer 
German Ministry of Defense 
BMVG - Postfach 1328 
D 53003 Bonn, Germany 
11.    Befehlshaber der Flotte 1 
Vizeadmiral Dirk Horten 
Flottenkommando Postfach 1163 
D 24956 Gluecksburg, Germany 
12.    Stellvertreter Befehlshaber der Flotte 1 
FlottiUenadmiral Diether Huelsemann 
Flottenkommando Postfach 1163 
D 24956 Gluecksburg, Germany 
13. Kommandeur Zerstoererflottille 
FlottiUenadmiral Lutz Feldt 
Opdenhoff Strasze 24 
D 26384 Wilhelmshaven, Germany 
14. German Defense Attache 
Rear Admiral Rudolf Lange 
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany 
4645 Reservoir Road, N.W. 
Washington, D.C.  20007-1998 
15. Commander German Armed Forces Command in USA 
Brigadier General Gerd R. Meyer 
11150 Sunrise Valley Drive 
Reston, VA. 22091-4394 
193 
16. Commander Training Command U.S. Atlantic Fleet 
Rear Admiral Don Dyer USN 
1474 Gilbert Street 
Norfolk, Virginia, 23511-2795 
17. Assistant Chief of Staff Personal Training 
Commodore Greg Maddison CF 
Maritime Command Headquaters 
FMO Halifax Nova Scotia Canada D3K 2XO 
18. Marine Schule Muerwik 
Flottillenadmiral Frank Ropers 
Keim Strasze 
D 24944 Flensburg, Germany 
19. Marine Ortungs Schule Bremerhaven 
Kapitaen zur See Hans-Joachim Petersen 
Elbe Strasze 101 
D 27570 Bremerhaven Germany 
20. German Naval Attache 
Kapitaen zur See Lutz-Uwe Gloeckner 
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany 
4645 Reservoir Road, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20007-1998 
21. Zentraler Forschungs- und Studienbereich I 
Postfach 100153 
51465 Bergisch Gladbach Germany 
22. Bundeswehr Universitaet Muenchen 
Fachbereich Paedagogik 
Werner Heisenberg Weg 
85577 Neubiberg Germany 
23. German Assistent Naval Attache 
Fregattenkapitaen Karl-Wilhelm Bollow 
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany 
4645 Reservoir Road, N.W. 
Washington, D.C.  20007-1998 
194 
